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ABSTRACT 
 The rapid increase of space activity in the 21st century has raised questions about 
the adequacy of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST) to govern orbital activities and 
prevent future international conflicts. This thesis analyzes the OST’s ability to address 
critical emerging problems across three issue areas: orbital space debris, the 
weaponization of space, and asteroid and Moon mining. It concludes by arguing that the 
language within the OST does not adequately address these emerging problems, which 
could lead to possible conflicts in each of these issue-areas. This thesis offers several 
possible policy recommendations for consideration by U.S. decision makers to promote a 
future framework of stability and longevity in the use of space: 1) transfer responsibility 
for tracking non-military satellites and space debris in low earth orbit (LEO) from the 
military to commercial space companies; 2) review the current 25-year guideline for 
de-orbiting satellites for adequacy; 3) propose a moratorium to China and Russia on 
further anti-satellite weapons (ASAT) testing; 4) prohibit nefarious behavior in space, 
rather than trying to prohibit dual-use technologies; 5) initiate talks with Russia and 
China to reevaluate and discuss the Moon Treaty; and 6) reach out to interested State 
Parties in the OST to coordinate future space mining legislation. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST) is the “constitution of outer space”1 for 105 
countries across the world.2 With the advance of technology and the continuance of activities 
in space, the question arises as to whether the language within the OST designed to address 
international needs of the 1960s can sufficiently govern a domain that has undergone 
significant transformation due to advances in technology and expanding national interests in 
the 21st century. In this context, the OST needs to be examined and reevaluated to address its 
ability to handle emerging problems caused by several recent developments: the significant 
growth of orbital space debris, the possibility of the weaponization of space, and the potential 
for asteroid and Moon mining. Each of these issues poses potential conflicts well outside the 
existing tenets of the OST. The question this thesis evaluates is: can the Outer Space Treaty 
prevent conflicts in orbit in the 21st century?  
Three case studies were selected, which represent some of the critical current and 
emerging concerns in the 21st century. The case studies are: space debris, weaponization of 
space, and asteroid and Moon mining. The language within the OST does not directly address 
a range of emerging problems which could lead to possible conflicts in each of these issue-
areas. The first case study presents the hypothesis: if the current amount of space debris 
continues to expand, endangering space-based assets, it is likely there will be conjunctions 
that could cause international conflicts in the foreseeable future that the OST cannot prevent. 
The second case study presents the hypothesis: if countries continue to go forward 
weaponizing space without further legal agreements, the current OST will not be able to 
adequately prevent conflict. If space-faring nations begin to weaponize space or use space 
weapons against adversaries without new international legal agreements, it could create 
political instability and wars in space and on Earth, putting millions of people in danger. The 
third case study presents the hypothesis: if the current technological advances in both the 
commercial and military sectors regarding asteroid and Moon mining continue to move 
1 Jill Stuart, “The Outer Space Treaty Has Been Successful – But Is it Fit for the Modern Age?,”




forward without further legal agreements, the OST as it stands will not be able to prevent 
conflict. The analysis of the OST’s capability to aid in the challenges posed by the 21st century 
concerns determined that even though certain articles could cover these identified issues, they 
are not specific enough to address all the possible scenarios that could in theory occur in space. 
Analysis of the OST indicates that the terms are insufficient to address the emerging 
concerns of the 21st century. Policy recommendations for each case study provide short-term 
recommendations, with the hope that in the long term, the future of space activities will find 
a global solution because “any considerable effort to close the existing gaps in international 
space law must include measures to build confidence and transparency among states.”3 For 
space debris, two policy recommendations were offered: first, the United States could begin 
transferring the responsibility of tracking non-military space debris in low earth orbit (LEO) 
from the military to commercial space companies; second, the United States should support a 
review of the current 25-year guideline for de-orbiting satellites to determine if more rapid 
de-orbiting is required for certain types of satellites. For weaponization of space, the policy 
recommendations focus on the United States providing positive solutions rather than just 
criticism (i.e., to propose new concepts to strengthen existing proposals and/or to offer new 
regulations aimed at the prevention of weaponization). Space mining most likely will not be 
realized until 2030.4 With that in mind, the United States might be well served to get ahead 
of the process and instigate talks with Russia and China to re-evaluate and discuss the Moon 
Treaty. In the short term, these countries could adopt certain principles from the treaty to help 
establish initial norms for mining. Additionally, the United States should reach out to State 
Parties in the OST and begin initiating discussions, recommending that interested countries 
enact mirroring commercial space mining legislation, in order to promote the development of 
best practices. Currently, without further legal agreements to elaborate on these identified 
concerns the OST as it stands will not be able to adequately prevent conflict in the future. 
Therefore, the time for creative approaches and positive U.S. engagement is now. 
3 Nayef Al-Rodhan, “Preventing Future Conflicts in Outer Space,” The CSS Blog Network, March 14,
2018, https://isnblog.ethz.ch/security/preventing-future-conflicts-in-outer-space. 
4 Charles Kieck, as quoted in Lynsey Chutel, “NASA’s latest mission will show if asteroid mining will
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I. INTRODUCTION TO THE OUTER SPACE TREATY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
For more than 50 years, “international treaties and agreements, which have been in 
place have established the foundations for the exploration and use of outer space.”5 On 
January 27, 2017, one of the most important space treaties celebrated its 50th anniversary—
”The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of 
Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.”6 This treaty which we refer 
to by its nickname—the Outer Space Treaty (OST)—7 signed in 1967, was agreed upon 
among members of the United Nations, and today it currently “remains the constitution of 
outer space for 105 countries across the world.”8 The treaty has worked thus far, but the 
challenges that the 21st century presents could create future conflict in space. Is the OST 
adequate as it stands for conflict prevention in the 21st century? This thesis analyzes the 
OST and evaluates its future ability to prevent conflict in areas such as space debris, 
asteroid and Moon mining, and the weaponization of space. For over 50 years, the treaty 
has represented the foundation for how countries should act in space and ensured 
explorations remain peaceful, but it may not be able to handle the future issues, problems, 
or threats to space.9  
Henry Hertzfeld, a research professor of space policy and international affairs at 
George Washington University, explains that “the OST is only seventeen articles in length; 
by comparison, the Law of the Sea Treaty spans hundreds of articles.”10 Therefore, he 
                                                 
5 Jill Stuart, “The Outer Space Treaty Has Been Successful – But Is it Fit for the Modern Age?,” 
Space.com, February 19, 2017, https://www.space.com/35758-outer-space-treaty-success-modern-
assessment.html.  
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid.  
8 Ibid. 
9 Loren Grush, “How an International Treaty Signed 50 Years Ago Became The Backbone For Space 
Law,” The Verge, January 27, 2017, https://www.theverge.com/2017/1/27/14398492/outer-space-treaty-
50-anniversary-exploration-guidelines.  
10 Henry Hertzfeld, as quoted in Ibid.  
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believes it is likely that the OST cannot address every issue or concern.11 The OST was 
established when space technology was still in the development phase and the race to space 
involved only two nations, the United States and Soviet Union Russia.12 Today, as 
discussed by U.S. representative Jim Bridenstine, the majority of nations on Earth depend 
on the services their space assets provide to both their military and commercial sectors; but 
this reliance comes with risks.13 Recently, the International Astronautical Congress 2017 
addressed the increased presence in space and the need for global governance of space 
activities. It discussed:  
as more actors, including states, intergovernmental and non-governmental 
entities, as well as industry and private sector, increasingly engage in space 
activities, there will be an increasing need to protect the space environment 
and enhance the safety of space operations, the security of space assets, 
space systems and critical infrastructures, and the sustainability of outer 
space activities.14  
Although much has changed in 50 years, the treaty is still used when discussing additional 
space legislation.15 This thesis evaluates current concerns we are facing in the 21st century 
and, if necessary, propose policies to address the gaps that may not be covered by the OST 
to prevent future conflict.  
                                                 
11 Ibid. 
12 Grush, “How an International Treaty Signed 50 Years Ago Became The Backbone For Space Law.” 
13Jim Bridenstine, as cited in Krause, “The Outer Space Treaty Turns 50. Can It Survive a New Space 
Race?,” ABA Journal, (April 2017): http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/outer_space_treaty; 
article originally appeared in the April 2017 issue of ABA Journal with headline: “Rocket Law.”  
14 General Conference Overview, “The 50th Anniversary of the Outer Space Treaty: Global 
Governance for Space Activities.” International Astronautical Federation, September 27, 2017, accessed 
November 22, 2017, http://www.iafastro.org/events/iac/iac-2017/global-networking-forum/the-50th-
anniversary-of-the-outer-space-treaty-global-governance-for-space-activities/. 
15 Grush, “How an International Treaty Signed 50 Years Ago Became The Backbone For Space Law.” 
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B. SIGNIFICANCE OF OST ANALYSIS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 
While the principles within the OST are extremely important “to the peaceful use 
of outer space,”16 significant issues could potentially cause conflict in the 21st century.17 
As the world continues to technologically advance in and embrace space,18 the OST needs 
to be examined and reevaluated to address the pace and development of the weaponization 
of space, the significant growth of space debris, and the potential for asteroid and Moon 
mining. Each of these issues pose potential conflicts well outside the existing tenets of the 
OST. We do not want a war in space; therefore, these research questions on the evaluation 
of the OST are essential to prevent these issues from resulting in future struggles. 
The 50-year span since the creation of the OST is significant. The OST represented 
a momentous accomplishment for space law.19 It was responsible for laying down “the 
foundations for international regulation of space and established the framework of the 
present legal regime for outer space and the celestial bodies.”20 For 50 years, the treaty has 
helped prevent major conflict from occurring in outer space. But can the treaty continue to 
prevent conflict as new 21st century threats emerge? First, to analyze the significance of 
the OST, it is important to discuss the history and reasons behind the formation of the OST.  
C. HISTORY OF THE OUTER SPACE TREATY 
Immediately following World War II, the Cold War began in 1945, and between 
the years of 1957–58, both the United States and the Soviet Union had acquired a sizable 
stockpile of “hydrogen bombs of unbelievable destructive power.”21 At the same time, 
                                                 
16 Duncan Blake and Steven Freeland, “As the World Embraces Space, the 50-year-old Outer Space 
Treaty Needs Adaptation,” Space.com, July 17, 2017, https://www.space.com/37500-outer-space-treaty-
needs-adaptation.html. 
17 Ibid.  
18 Ibid.  
19 Vladimir Kopal, “Introductory Note: Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the 
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,” United Nations 
Audiovisual Library of International Law, December 19, 1966, accessed November 22, 2017, 
http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/tos/tos.html. 
20 Ibid.  
21 Helen Caldicott and Craig R. Eisendrath. War in Heaven: The Arms Race in Outer Space (New 
York: The New Press, 2007), xi. 
 4 
both nations were racing to develop intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), which 
“were designed to exit the earth’s atmosphere before raining death and destruction down”22 
on selected targets.23 This marked “the first instance of the use of outer space for military 
purposes and, once this threshold had been crossed, military planners realized space itself 
could be weaponized.”24 While the military had been dreaming about future wars in space, 
others were imagining the many ways by which space could benefit and provide for 
humanity in the future.25 Outer space was an exciting new frontier, and many felt it should 
be preserved and utilized to benefit the entire human species.26 But, due to Cold War 
political rivalry, a race to space had begun between the United States and the Soviet Union. 
In October 1957, the Soviet Union launched Sputnik, the first orbiting spacecraft.27 
On January 31, 1958, at the National Press Club, Chief of Staff of the Air Force Thomas 
Dresser White discussed a new space policy in response to Sputnik, arguing that the Soviet 
Union had one-upped the United States and that our homeland was in danger.28 The United 
States answered the Soviet Union with Explorer I, which put the United States back into 
the space race.29 Shortly after, White discovered that the capability to possess total control 
on the ground was equivalent to the ability to control space.30 Therefore, the need to 
formalize an international legal agreement for space was paramount.  
According to Vladimir Kopal, professor of International Law at West Bohemian 
University, “the creation of a special regime for outer space and the celestial bodies was 
                                                 
22 Ibid., xi-xii. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid., xii. 
25 Ibid., xiii. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Henry R. Hertzfeld, “Developing Issues in the Law of Outer Space,” Penn Undergraduate Law 
Journal 3, no. 1 (Fall 2015): 1–15, https://spi.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2251/f/downloads/Articles/
Hertzfeld%20Developing%20Issues%20in%20the%20Law%20of%20Outer%20Space.pdf, 2. 
28 Chief of Staff of the Air Force Thomas Dresser White, as quoted in Caldicott and Eisendrath, War 
in Heaven, 3. 
29 Caldicott and Eisendrath, War in Heaven, 4. 
30 Chief of Staff of the Air Force Thomas Dresser White, as quoted by in Ibid.  
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necessitated by the commencement of space activities and the rapid development of rocket 
technology.”31 As Hertzfeld writes, “under the auspices of the United Nations in 1959, 18 
nations formed the Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) beginning the 
process of negotiations that led to a set of space treaties.”32 COPUOS understood that its 
role would be to develop with the international community a treaty for the use of outer 
space.33 Human activity in outer space was a new arena and it was essential any 
international agreements would have to be adopted and implemented by consensus.34 
COPUOS began this discussion by utilizing the framework provided by the Antarctic 
Treaty and adapting it for regulation of space activities.35  
1. Antarctic Treaty—Precursor to the OST 
In 1959, “COPUOS was tasked to develop specific proposals concerning the 
development of international cooperation, conduct in outer space, and space exploration 
for peaceful purposes.”36 Prior to 1960, a substantial amount of discussions had occurred 
addressing the conduct in outer space.37 One of the major questions was whether a nation 
could claim sovereignty over celestial bodies in space.38 An additional concern questioned 
whether existing laws could support such claims as legal.39 The United Nations “suggested 
that some form of international administration over celestial bodies should be adopted.”40 
                                                 
31 Kopal, “Introductory Note.” 
32 Hertzfeld, “Developing Issues in the Law of Outer Space,” 2. 




37 Paul G. Dembling and Daniel M. Arons, “The Evolution of the Outer Space Treaty,” The Journal of 
Air Law and Commerce 33, no. 3 (1967): 419–456, http://libproxy.nps.edu/
login?url=https://search.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/docview/1296599846?accountid=12702. 420. 
38 Ibid.  
39 Dembling and Arons, “The Evolution of the Outer Space Treaty,” 421; Lipson and Katzenbach, 
Report to the National Aeronautics and Space administration on the Law of Outer Space, A.B.A. FOUND. 
22(a) (1960). 
40 Ibid., 420–421. 
 6 
Shortly after the UN suggestion, on September 22, 1960, President Eisenhower proposed 
guidelines regarding sovereignty in space.41 President Eisenhower said:  
Side by side with these startling changes, technology is also in revolution. 
It has brought forth terrifying weapons of destruction, which for the future 
of civilization, must be brought under control through a workable system of 
disarmament. And it has also opened up a new world of outer space--a 
celestial world filled with both bewildering problems and dazzling 
promise.42  
In his speech, President Eisenhower continued to address the issues confronting the United 
States in outer space. He made it clear that it was our choice to make whether this would 
become the focus for another arms race or international cooperation to maintain space for 
peaceful purposes.43 He stated:  
the nations of the world have recently united in declaring the continent of 
Antarctica “off limits” to military preparations. We could extend this 
principle to an even more important sphere. National vested interests have 
not yet been developed in space or in celestial bodies. We must not lose the 
chance to control the future of outer space.44  
Twelve countries that had been active in and around Antarctica during the years 
1957–58 signed the Antarctic Treaty in Washington on December 1, 1959.45 It “entered 
into force on June 23, 1961.”46 The treaty laid binding regulations and guidelines for the 
international community regarding scientific exploration in Antarctica.47 Some of the 
principles of the treaty included the following: “it demilitarized the Antarctic continent, 
provided for its cooperative exploration and future use, and served as a model for later non-
                                                 
41 Ibid. 
42 “Dwight D. Eisenhower: Address Before the 15th General Assembly of the United Nations, New 
York City – September 22, 1960,” The American Presidency Project, September 22, 1960, accessed 
November 22, 2017, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=11954. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
45 “Narrative of the “‘Antarctic Treaty,’” U.S. Department of State, Signed at Washington December 
1, 1959, Entered into force June 23, 1961, accessed November 22, 2017, https://www.state.gov/t/avc/trty/
193967.htm.  
46 “Ibid. 
47 Ibid.  
 7 
armament treaties such as the exclusion of weapons of mass destruction from outer 
space.”48 The acceleration of space activities and development, combined with the political 
tensions and pressures, created momentum to create a demilitarized zone in space. At this 
time, COPUOS was the principal organization dedicated to bringing about 
recommendations on cooperative space programs and initiatives.49 
The Antarctic Treaty and the guidelines proposed by President Eisenhower played 
a significant role in shaping the OST. Specifically, the similarities in the Antarctic and the 
OST include the concepts of peaceful purposes, freedom to pursue scientific research and 
investigations, and prohibiting nations from making additional claims of sovereignty.50 
President Eisenhower proposed four agreements that would enable future generations to 
peacefully and scientifically explore space without fear of an arms race.51 These 
agreements were:  
We agree that celestial bodies are not subject to national appropriation by 
any claims of sovereignty; we agree that the nations of the world shall not 
engage in warlike activities on these bodies; we agree, subject to appropriate 
verification, that no nation will put into orbit or station in outer space 
weapons of mass destruction. All launchings of space craft should be 
verified in advance by the United Nations; we press forward with a program 
of international cooperation for constructive peaceful uses of outer space 
under the United Nations. Better weather forecasting, improved world-wide 
communications, and more effective exploration not only of outer space but 
of our own earth - these are but a few of the benefits of such cooperation.52  
After President Eisenhower proposed his space guidelines, COPUOS finally regrouped as 
it had not met for several years due to a Soviet protest regarding membership and voting.53 
COPUOS met in November-December 1961, discussed the President’s proposals, and 
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adopted the principles regarding international law.54 COPUOS, to the UN, “proposed that 
international law be applied to outer space and celestial bodies.”55 It further suggested that 
states could explore and use space only as long as such exploration conformed to 
international law and excluded national appropriation.56 The Antarctic treaty and proposals 
made by President Eisenhower were the starting point for proposed space regulations, but 
additional treaties were used as well in the later creation of the OST.  
2. First Draft of Outer Space Treaty 
In the spring of 1962, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics submitted to the 
Legal Subcommittee “a draft Declaration of the Basic Principles Governing the Activities 
of States Pertaining to the Exploration and Use of Outer Space.”57 Initially, numerous 
member States of COPUOS did not support it, but “the idea gained ground, and in 1963, 
the Declaration (UN General Assembly Resolution 1962) was successfully negotiated”58 
and unanimously adopted at the United Nations on December 13, 1963.59 This “declaration 
included a set of general principles which characterized the legal status of outer space and 
celestial bodies and outlined the scope of legality for activities of States in the space 
environment.”60  
3. Additional Treaties/Resolutions used in Creation of the Outer Space 
Treaty 
The OST also later incorporated precedents from the Limited Nuclear Test Ban 
Treaty (August 5, 1963).61 It “prohibited the testing of nuclear weapons in outer space, 
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underwater, or in the atmosphere.”62 The Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, a product of 
the Cold War, addressed the concerns regarding the harmful environmental/health effects 
of nuclear testing and helped to deter a potential nuclear war between the United States and 
the Soviet Union.63 President John F. Kennedy was determined to put an end to the testing 
of nuclear weapons and staunchly supported the treaty.64 President Kennedy felt his 
support for this treaty would prevent nuclear weapons from being obtained by other 
countries in the future.65 President Kennedy played a significant role in gaining support 
for the treaty by convincing fearful American citizens and a weary Senate to agree to the 
terms set forth.66 In the fall, UN Resolution 1884, adopted by the General Assembly on 
October 17, 1963, “called for a ban on orbiting any weapons of mass destruction in 
space,”67 passed the United Nations.68  
In 1964 and 1965, the primary concerns included “assistance to and return of 
astronauts and space objects”69 as well as “liability for damages caused by space 
vehicles.”70 Additionally, COPUOS and its Legal Subcommittees continued to further 
their guidelines governing Moon exploration activities.71 The international community felt 
a sense of urgency as the race between the United States and the Soviet Union continued 
to the Moon.72 This urgency called “for an international agreement on the exploration of 
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the Moon and other celestial bodies”73 and was reiterated by President Lyndon B. Johnson 
on May 7, 1966.74 President Johnson emphasized the importance of space to the future of 
mankind and the need for international law to be created in support of exploration for 
peaceful purposes and scientific investigations.75 President Johnson proposed a few 
principles to be considered in an international agreement. The agreements proposed were 
as follows: 
The moon and other celestial bodies should be free for exploration and use 
by all countries. No country should be permitted to advance a claim of 
sovereignty; There should be freedom of scientific investigation, and all 
countries should cooperate in scientific activities relating to celestial bodies; 
Studies should be made to avoid harmful contamination. Astronauts of one 
country should give any necessary help to astronauts of another country; No 
country should be permitted to station weapons of mass destruction on a 
celestial body. Weapons tests and military maneuvers should be 
forbidden.76  
President Johnson wanted to ensure that the United States acted quickly regarding the use 
of space “not only for his generation, but for future generations”77 to prevent political and 
military conflicts from arising because of space activities.78 
4. Finalization of the Outer Space Treaty 
In 1966, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Arthur J. Goldberg wrote a letter 
to Dr. Kurt Waldheim of Austria, the Chairman of the COPUOS, requesting the Legal 
Subcommittee to consider meeting earlier to address the principles proposed by President 
Johnson for consideration as an international treaty.79 The committee met on the July 12, 
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1966, and began discussions on the principles that would make up the OST.80 The 
committee utilized the current situation and conflicts to help mold the “Treaty on Principles 
Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and use of Outer Space including the 
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.”81 Additionally, the treaty included rhetoric from 
proposals made by President Eisenhower, President Kennedy, and President Johnson, as 
well as previous treaties and resolutions. On December 8, 1966, “an agreement had been 
achieved among the members of twenty-eight-nation United Nations Outer Space 
Committee on a treaty that would establish principles governing the activities of states in 
the exploration and use of outer space, the Moon, and other celestial bodies.”82 Of note, 
the OST repeated the 1963 UN space resolutions with additional language added to cover 
the activities regarding the Moon. The United Nations General Assembly finally approved 
the Treaty on December 19, 1966 and opened for signatures on January 27, 1967.83  
5. Post Outer Space Treaty Era 
After the ratification of the OST, President Johnson cautioned that “in diplomacy 
of space and as technology increases, it is essential to note that interim achievements not 
be mistaken for final success.”84 Despite the treaty’s approval, the principles were generic 
and subject to interpretation.85Additionally, President Johnson advised policymakers to 
remember that this “treaty is a first step, but a long step toward assuring the peace essential 
for the longer journey.”86 50 years later, we must look at the first steps taken and apply 
them to the issues in the 21st century that are causing contention and begin to address the 
second step toward the continuing assurance of peace in space.  
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6. Additional Space Policy, Legislation, and Treaties since the Outer 
Space Treaty 
The OST was the first big step in the defining the legal status of outer space.  
The OST was followed by the 1968 Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, 
the 1972 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by 
Space Objects, the 1975 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched 
into Outer Space, and the 1979 Agreement Governing the Activities on the 
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.87  
The 1979 Moon Agreement (also known as the Moon Treaty) has not been ratified by any 
major space-faring powers and therefore, is now considered latent.88 In addition, non-
binding guidelines and resolutions for the international community were proposed and 
adopted by the General Assembly.89 These included:  
the 1982 Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth 
Satellites for International Direct Television Broadcasting, the 1986 
Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space, the 
1992 Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources In Outer 
Space, and the 1996 Declaration on International Cooperation in the 
Exploration and Use of Outer Space for the Benefit and in the Interest of 
All States, Taking into Particular Account the Needs of Developing 
Countries.90 
More recently, on November 25, 2015, H.R.2262—U.S Commercial Space Launch 
Competitiveness Act or Spurring Private Aerospace Competitiveness and Entrepreneurship 
(SPACE Act of 2015) became public law.91 It was introduced on May 12, 2015 by 
Representative Kevin McCarthy (Rep-California).92 The primary goal of H.R.2262 is to 
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promote continued growth within the commercial space environment.93 Additionally, the 
“American Space Renaissance Act,”94 was introduced to the House by Representative Jim 
Bridenstine (Rep-Oklahoma) on April 14, 2016, and on September 30, 2016, it was referred 
to the Subcommittee on Space.95 Within the provisions of this act, the President is directed 
to develop: 
a doctrine for the Armed Forces and the intelligence community governing 
the U.S. response to efforts by state and non-state actors deliberately to deny 
the United States or its allies or partners access to space or space operations 
or degrade or destroy any of their government or commercial space assets; 
and a doctrine for the Armed Forces with respect to the rules of engagement 
for space forces.96 
Additionally, this bill requires that the DoD appoint a qualified official to become the 
Principal Department of Defense Space Advisor (PDSA) to the President on any and all 
matters regarding space activities.97  But, in December of 2017, President Donald Trump 
signed the “2018 defense authorization bill,”98 which officially terminated the position of 
PDSA.99 
7. Emerging Concerns 
In regards to international space law, the OST, represents one of the most 
significant treaties developed and adopted by the United Nations.100 But space is becoming 
a big business for the private and commercial sectors which are placing new pressures on 
                                                 
93 Summary Text of H.R.2262, as quoted in Ibid.  
94 H.R.4945 – American Space Renaissance Act, Referred to Subcommittee on Space 30 September, 
2016, 114th Congress (2015-2016), https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/4945.  
95 Ibid.  
96 Summary Text of H.R.4945, as quoted in Ibid.  
97 Ibid.  
98 Valerie Insinna, “The Pentagon no longer has a leader on space programs. What does that mean?,” 
DefenseNews, January 18, 2018, https://www.defensenews.com/space/2018/01/18/the-pentagon-no-longer-
has-a-leader-on-space-programs-what-does-that-mean/.  
99 Ibid. 
100 Kopal, “Introductory Note.” 
 14 
the laws and regulations of outer space.101 Space activity is still largely driven by national 
space agencies and military agencies, but private interests in space are rapidly 
increasing.102 According to Krause, “nearly 50 years after the U.S. beat the USSR to land 
the first humans on the Moon, a new 21st century space race is underway.”103 Can the 
Outer Space Treaty stand up to the challenges presented in this new race to space? This 
thesis evaluates the significance of the OST and whether it can adequately handle the 
current 21st century conflicts. The concerns faced during the creation of the OST do not 
necessarily mirror the issues of the 21st century. The research questions proposed in this 
thesis address three current 21st century issues and evaluate whether the OST is still able 
to prevent conflict in space.  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Given the recent anniversary of the OST, an increased amount of information has 
been published regarding the adequacy of the treaty. The OST has been subject to debate 
by various scholars regarding its successes, failures, gaps/limitations, and the benefits of 
either amending the treaty or enacting new laws/agreements. Additionally, research has 
identified recommendations and policies to address the gaps in space law, specifically the 
OST. This literature review assesses those perspectives to lay out the background 
information necessary to address the research question. This literature review will 
incorporate different perspectives regarding the OST. These sources will address the 
viewpoints on whether to amend the treaty, enact new laws/agreements, or do nothing, as 
well as highlight some of the gaps/limitations in the OST.  
First, it is important to address the literature that completely supports the OST to 
further guide space activities. Supporters argue the OST, just like the U.S. Constitution, is 
rooted with basic values that are fundamental and applicable in any age.104 An example 
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provided by Joanne Gabrynowicz, professor emerita at the University of Mississippi 
School of Law and editor-in-chief emerita of the Journal of Space Law, states “the OST 
proposed that space should be used for peaceful purposes; that’s the principle. It’s no less 
ambiguous than due process or other fundamental principles.”105 Other support for leaving 
the treaty as it is has come from the results of May 23, 2017, hearing of the Senate 
Commerce Committee’s space subcommittee. During this hearing, an examination of the 
OST was conducted to see if it should be updated.106 Those in support of an update felt 
the OST did not sufficiently regulate the commercial space sector activities nor would it 
suffice against future conflicts that may emerge.107 However, others argued “that although 
the treaty is not ‘self-executing’—that is, its provisions are not binding without federal 
laws to implement them—any regulatory gaps could be addressed without changing the 
treaty itself.”108 Even the co-director of space, cyber, and telecommunications law 
program at the University of Nebraska College of Law, Matthew Schaefer, concurred with 
the previous statement, discussing the advantages the OST provides to commercial U.S. 
companies due to the “minimally burdensome”109 provisions, allowing for multiple 
interpretations.110 Additionally, Bob Richards, chief executive of Moon Express, 
expressed his opinion of the OST in response to the hearing. He stated,  
while the Outer Space Treaty may appear antiquated, in some ways it is a 
remarkably visionary document with profound principles that have served 
the world for decades and our time and energy are better spent continuing 
to interpret the Outer Space Treaty in favor of international collaboration 
without constraining the rights, benefits, and the freedoms of U.S. 
commercial enterprise.111  
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The current debate in the U.S. Congress is whether the United States should amend, 
enact new laws/agreements, or withdraw from the OST.112 Literature collected and 
reviewed shows a range of perspectives: support and explore amending, enacting new laws/
agreements, or completely withdrawing from the treaty. Additionally, some sources 
provide differing perspectives within their documents regarding their stance on the OST. 
Dr. James Vedda, senior analyst at Aerospace, wrote a policy paper addressing 
differing possibilities on the handling of the OST. Vedda provides us with an interesting 
perspective supporting the revision of the OST and then turns around and details the risks 
associated with opening a long-standing international agreement.113 In terms of revising 
the OST, Vedda discusses two topics that might be targeted for possible added 
guidelines.114 The first topic is remediation and mitigation of orbital debris and the second 
is the “issue of property rights in space”115 having the potential to hinder commercial space 
activities.116 Vedda suggests that if the United States decides to go the route of amending 
the treaty, it also comes with risks.117 One of the risks suggested involves the treaty’s 
amendment process and the challenging aspect of opening an international agreement of 
this magnitude.118 Additionally, Vedda states “it would require a considerable amount of 
time and effort, without a guarantee that the result would be better than what is already in 
place.”119 Michael J. Listner, graduate of the Regent University School of Law, also 
discusses the pros and cons of amending the OST to try and shape the treaty more in line 
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with the present-day global concerns.120 Listner highlights areas regarding national 
security, property rights, and commercialization of space.121 However, like Vedda he 
believes that each nation has its own objectives and stakes in space and therefore it would 
be very challenging to gain support among the signatories.122 Plus,Vedda says any one of 
those nations has the right to “bring up its own amendments, which could be objectionable 
to the major stakeholders.”123 
While scholars agree that the OST has been the forefront for space law, many are 
realizing the inadequacy of the treaty to stand up to current space law issues. One scholar 
previously mentioned, Joanne Gabrynowiz, argues both in support and in need for 
upgrading or creating additional legislation to the OST. Gabrynowiz states “space law is 
still rooted in 20th century international conventions, that begun with the OST.”124 
Additionally, she offers her belief that the OST is outdated and in need of an upgrade.125 
She suggests “that new legislation and regulation is the only plausible avenue for 
modernizing the legal framework in outer space right now.”126 As 21st-century challenges 
arise, she says Congress must define a legal framework that can support orbital debris 
mitigation, weaponization of space, asteroid and Moon mining, commercial space 
activities, and other future concerns.127 Not only are academic professionals illustrating 
the need for new legislation but also politicians as well. Senator Ted Cruz (R-Texas), 
chairman of the Senate’s space subcommittee, stated his concerns during the May 23, 2017, 
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hearing on the OST.128 Senator Cruz was worried that the OST did “not reflect the needs 
and interests of emerging commercial space companies.”129 Senator Cruz felt it necessary, 
regarding commercial prospects in space, to enact new policy and legislation that was not 
covered adequately in the OST.130  
Space Foundation Research Analyst G. Ryan Faith states “Americans tend to think 
of space exploration in terms of science, not strategy or war, but other nations don’t always 
make that distinction—and the laws guiding militaries in space are sorely outdated.”131 In 
Faith’s article, he explores the relevancy of the treaty and discusses the parts of the treaty 
that are relics of the Cold War that ought to be discarded.132 Faith believes the OST has 
been successful thus far in terms of preventing additional competitions within space-faring 
nations but argues that exploration of space is changing and becoming a new realm of 
possibilities.133 This new realm “includes a full spectrum of human activity, including 
everything from property rights to deterrence structures.”134 He advocates, much like 
Vedda, Gabrynowiz, and Listner, that a new space era has dawned and the challenges that 
were faced in the initial creation of the OST do not correlate with “21st century issues 
ranging from new defense applications, dual-use technologies, and growing accumulations 
of space debris.”135 
The literature discussing the OST addresses concerns that space law and the treaty 
contain gaps and limitations that are very problematic. The solutions to these problems 
directly correlate with the literature that supports the argument to enact new laws or 
agreements into space policy. Specific guidelines for commercial activities in space are 
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one of the main gaps in the OST and constitute the main problem for many of those who 
support the proposal of new laws and agreements, rather than just amending the treaty. At 
the May 23 hearing of the Senate Commerce Committee, some “commercial space 
companies and space law experts recommended against any changes to the OST, arguing 
that regulatory issues could better be addressed by enacting new national laws and 
regulations.”136 In 2015, Congress passed “the Spurring Private Aerospace 
Competitiveness and Entrepreneurship Act (SPACE Act),”137 which permitted mining of 
asteroids by U.S. commercial companies.138 The act also gave “U.S. commercial 
companies exclusive rights to the resources that they collected from the asteroids.”139 But 
the passage of this act has also brought up scrutiny regarding property rights in space.140 
This act was intended to promote the exploitation of resources by the U.S. private space 
industries.141 The OST clearly prohibits countries from making territorial claims, but “the 
SPACE Act assumes that commercial exploration and use of celestial objects such as 
asteroids or the Moon is legal, which is not universal law or opinion.”142 Article II of the 
OST states “that outer space is not subject to national appropriation by claim of 
sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.”143 Amir Siraj with 
the Harvard Political Review, suggested that the SPACE Act could be considered a 
violation of Article II because it “gives American companies property rights to any natural 
resources collected from celestial bodies.”144 Jill Stuart, Department of Government, 
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London School of Economics and Political Science, weighs in on this debate suggesting 
that,  
although the SPACE Act of 2015 seems to be undermining the space 
treaty’s ban on anyone owning celestial territory, the act itself has a clause 
stating, in simple terms, that the U.S. does not lay claim to, or own, any 
such thing.145  
Stuart discusses the importance of OST, but clearly believes it is failing in the modern era 
due to its primary focus on countries only and little consideration for commercial interests 
in space.146 These issues and challenges addressed could cause potential international 
conflict in the 21st century, which is why this thesis will address asteroid and moon mining 
as a case study. Additionally, U.S. Representative Jim Bridenstine (R-Oklahoma) believes 
that it is necessary to perform a complete space law reform.147 He provides recent 
examples to support a reform, such as the U.S. weather satellite being hacked by the 
Chinese and major advances in technology both in the military and commercial sectors.148 
Additionally, he proposed the “H.R. 4945 American Space Renaissance Act (ASRA) to 
permanently secure the United States as the preeminent spacefaring nation and bring about 
significant changes in the nation’s commercial space policies.”149  
The OST “is not anomalous or unusual area of law”150 and, according to Jason 
Krause, “it is very similar to maritime law.”151 But, in application, “the treaty is like the 
Antarctic Treaty System, which called for a non-militarized environment and put off claims 
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of sovereignty in Antarctica.”152 One of the problems that he addresses is direct attribution, 
meaning space-faring nations are responsible for their actions in outer space.153 Article VI 
provides the legal basis for regulations regarding commercial space activity.154 
Specifically, this provision “makes states responsible for the activities of all 
nongovernmental entities based in their countries, requiring ‘authorization and continuing 
supervision’ of commercial space activities by their respective national governments.”155 
Additionally, a space law advisor for the Secure World Foundation, Chris Johnson, argues 
that when the OST was being formalized, commercial interests were not included and 
therefore must be supplemented using new legal agreements or proposals.156 Direct 
attribution will be discussed in this thesis in regards to asteroid and Moon mining. This 
thesis intends on analyzing asteroid and Moon mining in the 21st century, applying relevant 
issues to the OST, and discussing in depth whether the treaty can prevent conflict in this 
area.  
An additional gap in the OST that has been highlighted in the literature, space debris 
mitigation directly correlates to one of the case studies this thesis will evaluate. Vedda 
points out that “the treaty does not directly address orbital debris mitigation and 
remediation or enable salvage in space.”157 He states that orbital debris was not a 
significant issue in 1967 and, therefore, the treaty did not adequately cover the issue.158 
Currently, the required technology for space debris removal is within reach and the need 
for regulation has become even more pressing.159 Vedda says “as space operations become 
more sophisticated and debris concern increase, reconsideration of the space salvage may 
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become a priority.”160 Additionally, Vedda offers one possible solution to debris 
mitigation.161 He suggests a new amendment to the OST that is new rhetoric yet 
incorporates already existing debris mitigation norms.162 This thesis will address space 
debris mitigation in the political, military, and commercial sectors and determine whether 
the OST could prevent conflict in those areas.  
One of the more alarming gaps in the OST regards the concept of weaponizing 
space. The existing literature shows perspectives that are for and against the weaponization 
of space. Articles III and IV of the OST are responsible for providing guidelines, often 
considered extremely restrictive, on military activity in space.163 Specifically, Article IV 
“prohibits placing nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction into 
orbit or permanently affixing them to a celestial body.”164 Jinyuan Su, faculty of Law at 
McGill University, discusses the potential uncertainties to international peace and security 
due to the current inadequacy of existing international law to prevent an arms race in outer 
space.165 He “believes that the destabilizing effect of space weapons and their potential 
devastating threat to the benign space environment make them one of the most serious 
challenges to the peaceful exploration and use of outer space.”166 Although, the OST 
prohibits certain categories of space weapons, Jinyuan Su is adamant that preventing the 
weaponization of space should be considered high priority in regards to enacting new laws/
agreements.167 Similar arguments are made by Alexander Chanock, a graduate of the 
UCLA School of Law. He discusses the main problem associated with weaponizing space 
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is the likelihood of an arms race.168 He believes that an arms race could have severe 
destabilizing effects on “the international system and make the world more vulnerable to 
war.”169 Peter Kamocsai, a graduate in space policy at George Washington University, 
suggests a differing viewpoint than that of Jinyuan Su. He advocates space faring nations 
are interpreting the OST in a way that gives them the opportunity to weaponize space.170 
He believes that United States should lead the charge in space weaponization because, if 
we do not deploy space weapons now, we risk falling behind in space.171 Additionally, 
Alexander Chanock provides two valid reasons for the United States to ignore discussions 
on the banning of weapons in space and moving toward a weaponized outer space. The two 
“reasons include the inevitability of the weaponization of space and the vulnerability of 
U.S. space assets.”172  
The inevitability theory of space weaponization stems from the notion that 
the international community will develop weapons for space just as it has 
for every other frontier.173  
Chanock identifies the OST “as the only international framework that specifically 
addresses the problem of space weaponization,”174 but notes that the treaty was signed 
over fifty years ago and “contains many ambiguous provisions that prevent it from 
effectively dealing with the proliferation of space weapons in the 21st century.”175 This 
thesis analyzes potential conflicts in-depth that could arise due to the ambiguity of the 
space weaponization in the OST.  
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One limitation surrounding the OST is the interpretation of the treaty. The way one 
country interprets the treaty could be very different from another country. Some scholars 
are concerned that interpretation of the treaty could cause significant issues regarding space 
activities. Professor Henry R. Hertzfeld notes that all UN treaties have to be translated into 
six different languages, which means the OST has been translated into six official 
versions.176 Hertzfeld provides an additional two perspectives regarding the limits of the 
OST. First, he discusses, the concern with the treaty’s focus solely on that of “human 
activities in space”177 and the gross disregard to define space itself.178 Second, he says, 
the treaty does not provide adequate definitions for terms “such as celestial body or 
peaceful purposes,”179 leaving room for various interpretations.180 Additionally, Professor 
David Koplow, a Georgetown law professor, discusses his opinion on how the international 
community should interpret the 50-year-old text.181 He proposes that scholars, lawyers, 
nations, politicians, etc., should avoid any further debates and arguments over the OST and 
move on to negotiating new treaty that addresses the current 21st century issues.182 Both 
of these distinguished professors, present a perspective on the OST that shows that the 
provisions of the treaty can be interpreted and implemented based on the reader’s interests 
or translation, which limits the treaty and causes potential space activities to fall within the 
cracks of the OST. This thesis will address whether such activities could cause conflict in 
the 21st century. 
The final perspective regarding the OST, is for the United States to withdraw from 
the treaty. Both Vedda and Listner offer their views on withdrawing from the OST as a 
possible solution, but, they agree that this is not a wise option. Listner offers what he deems 
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is “the fastest and most efficient solution, which is to withdraw from the OST,183“ which 
would eliminate the problems associated with the OST.184 But both Vedda and Listner 
believe that while withdrawing from the treaty may eliminate initial problems, the political 
fallout would be great.185 Additionally, Vedda mentions “that it is difficult to identify any 
significant or enduring benefits that could occur from the nation’s withdrawal.”186 An 
issue that could occur if the United States withdrew from the treaty is “if the United States 
tried to claim sovereignty over extraterrestrial real estate, other space-faring nations—all 
of which are treaty signatories—could refuse to recognize the claim.”187 This issue could 
then result in a domino effect, as other countries could withdraw, starting an all-out free-
for-all of nations beginning to claim sovereignty over areas in space.188 Back in 2007, John 
Hickman, associate professor in the Department of Government and International Studies 
at Berry College, wrote an article in response to the 40th anniversary of the OST regarding 
his case for withdrawal from the treaty. His argument for withdrawal stems from the idea 
that due to the treaty it “has discouraged more energetic space exploration and 
development.”189 Hickman argues that the OST is outdated and is keeping humanity from 
spreading out into the cosmos.190 Hickman is not alone in his opinions that the OST has 
prevented the Americans from embracing advancements in outer space. Dr. Everett C. 
Dolman, Professor of Comparative Military Studies at the U.S. Air Force’s Air Command 
and Staff College (ACSC), discusses in his book Astropolitik: Classical Geopolitics in the 
Space Age “the idea that nation-states can utilize space to enhance their own power.”191 
Similar to Hickman, Dolman proposes a policy that the U.S. should withdraw from the 
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OST and “announce that it is establishing a principal of free market sovereignty in space 
because he believes that the OST has had negative effects on the commercial and military 
development in space.”192 Dolman goes even further to suggest that once the U.S. has 
withdrawn from the OST, “it should endeavor to seize military control of Low Earth Orbit 
(LEO) to stop a space arms race, safeguarding the peaceful use of space for all nations.”193 
Finally, Dolman suggests coordination on future space projects between commercial, 
civilian, and military sectors lead by a newly created national space coordination 
agency.194 
This thesis, alongside the research that has already been conducted, offers a 
perspective on current challenges the space community is facing. The primary focus is to 
highlight the OST’s ability or inability to prevent military, commercial, or political conflict 
in the 21st century. Utilizing the gaps and limitations identified by various scholars within 
the space law community, this thesis plans to expand on their knowledge by providing a 
more detailed discussion on the conflicts that could potentially occur regarding space 
debris mitigation, asteroid and Moon mining, and the weaponization of space if the OST 
is not adequate as it stands to prevent conflict in those areas.  
E. EXPLANATIONS AND REASONS FOR CASE STUDY SELECTIONS 
For 50 years, the OST has helped prevent major conflicts from occurring in space, 
most importantly, to include preventing belligerent nations from putting weapons of mass 
destruction in space.195 But space has changed drastically in 50 years; new threats have 
emerged that could cause potential future conflict if not addressed adequately. This thesis 
provides three hypotheses that will be used to evaluate three emerging threats via case 
studies. The case studies are space debris mitigation, asteroid and Moon mining, and the 
weaponization of space. Each of the problem areas has the potential to create conflict in 
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the 21st century. Prior to discussing these hypotheses, it is important to explain the 
significance behind these case studies.  
Space is becoming a growing business venture, and commercial companies’ 
interests are applying additional pressures on the current laws for outer space activities.196 
Therefore, this evaluation will examine whether the conflict can be prevented and 
controlled by existing language and mechanisms in the OST. Evaluation will be conducted 
based on a comparison and analysis of the articles in the OST to the selected 21st century 
threats. If the OST does not provide guidance on the selected case studies, further analyses 
will be conducted to determine what potential conflict, if any, could occur in the military, 
political, and commercial sectors. Additionally, policy recommendations to the OST will 
be addressed in those areas where the OST may not have adequate language or mechanisms 
to prevent probable future conflicts.  
1. Space Debris Mitigation 
Space debris experts suggest that there are “more than 750,000 pieces of debris 
orbiting Earth,”197 each piece having the potential to put the future of spaceflight at risk.198 
Dr. Holger Krag, Head of the European Space Agency’s (ESA) debris office, states “in 
orbit, these objects have tremendous relative velocities, faster than a bullet, and can damage 
or destroy functioning space infrastructure.”199 Additionally, he discusses the threat to 
modern society if space debris collide with operational satellites.200 Brigitte Zypries, 
German Federal Minister for Economic Affairs and Energy, adds her perspective on the 
significance of losing satellites.201 She says, “this is a global issue that affects all space-
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faring nations from delivering critical services to their citizens.”202 Without a “global 
solution,”203 space debris will continue to present as a risk to nation’s space assets.204 If 
space debris is not addressed the ability to provide services for citizens and continued 
innovation in space technology will not be possible. That is why the evaluation of the OST 
to prevent conflict regarding space debris mitigation is essential “to sustaining the dream 
of future exploration in space” as mentioned by the ESA Director General Jan Woerner.205  
2. Weaponization of Space 
The weaponization of space is inevitable and is likely to occur in the next decade, 
“unless it is hindered by organized, effective international opposition or major-space faring 
nations, to include U.S., China, and Russia, are willing to cancel their projects dedicated 
to weaponizing space.”206 The OST specifically “bans the placing of nuclear weapons and 
other weapons of mass destruction in space, but in regards to military use of outer space, 
the treaty does not explicitly ban such activities.”207 Although space is considered a place 
for peaceful purposes and scientific exploration, current international concerns suggest 
weaponizing space is inevitable reality.208 But what does weaponization entail or mean? 
Several definitions have been offered, but there has been no accepted definition. The 
“updated 2014 Chinese-Russian Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in 
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Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT)”209 defines 
the term ‘weapon in outer space’ as: 
Any outer space object (device placed in outer space and designed for 
operating therein) or its component produced or converted to eliminate, 
damage, or disrupt normal functioning of objects in outer space, on the 
Earth’s surface or in the air, as well as to eliminate population, components 
of biosphere important to human existence, or to inflict damage to them by 
using any principles of physics.210 
The U.S. considers this definition to be flawed, “lacking any guidelines or restrictions on 
the development a stockpiling of anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons on the ground or any other 
ground-based counterspace capabilities.”211 According to Doug Lamborn (R-Colo.), “both 
China and Russia have openly admitted that they are developing counterspace capabilities, 
to include jamming of GPS and satellite communications, blinding or damaging our 
satellites with ground-based lasers, and destroying a satellite with a missile.”212 Although, 
the prior threats mentioned do not necessarily equate to weapons placed in space or 
weaponization of space, they can still directly affect and inhibit the use of space therefore 
will be treated as the weaponization of space. These threats are taken very seriously by the 
United States.213 The United States reserves the right to self-defense and if necessary will 
respond accordingly to defend ourselves and our allies.214 Currently, with no agreed-upon 
or legally binding proposals on weaponizing space and the significance of space to both 
the civilian and military populations, the probability of conflict increases. Therefore, an 
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evaluation of the OST to prevent conflict regarding the weaponization of space is essential 
to preventing a future war in space. 
3. Asteroid and Moon Mining 
As the world continues to celebrate Apollo 11’s success to the Moon, the attraction 
and desire to explore and exploit celestial bodies for possible resources has become a 
concern.215 Currently, “it is unclear who can extract and profit from the Moon’s resources, 
leading to debates within scientific, commercial, and policy circles—debates that have 
been made more lively and complicated by the changing actors and stakeholders in 
space.”216 Governmental agencies are no longer the only ones involved in space and lunar 
exploration.217 Likewise, “asteroids are also objects of interest for profit-seeking space 
enterprise.”218 At a national level, the OST adds an additional complication to the legality 
of space mining.219 For example, article VI of the OST “requires countries to perform 
‘authorization and supervision’ of activities in space by non-government entities under 
their jurisdiction.”220 Asteroid and Moon mining as well as other commercial activities, 
such as lunar landings, having no clear licensing authority, and thus fall within the gaps 
and limitations of the OST.221 Therefore, an evaluation of the OST to prevent conflict in 
asteroid and Moon mining is essential to ensure that the benefits acquired from space can 
be utilized by all mankind.  
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F. CASE STUDY HYPOTHESIS 
1. Case Study #1 Hypotheses: Space Debris Mitigation 
Space debris could potentially cause conflict in the future; therefore, an 
examination of the OST needs to be conducted. According to Joanne Wheeler, the OST’s 
provisions “are too generic to deal with the complex issues of space debris with any 
certainty”222 and this could create military, political, or commercial sector conflicts. Over 
the past decade, space debris has become a high priority and significant efforts have been 
made to formally define the concept and address the concerns debris play in the space 
environment.223 Unfortunately, despite best efforts, there is still no agreed upon definition 
among the international community and that is one reason why this thesis has selected this 
issue as a case study.224  
The hypothesis for this thesis case study on space debris is: If the current amount 
of space debris continues to expand, endangering space-based assets, it is likely there will 
be conjunctions that could cause conflict in the foreseeable future that the OST cannot 
prevent.  
2. Case Study #2 Hypotheses: Weaponization of Space 
Weaponization of space could cause conflict in the future; therefore, the OST needs 
to be examined. In the United Nations Conference on Disarmament, “there has been a 
strong and almost unanimous opposition to weaponization of space.”225 China and Russia 
have made efforts to promote and “draft a treaty to ban space weapons but the United States 
has refused to enter negotiations on such a treaty.”226 Meanwhile, China and Russia—
along with several other nations effectively killed a European proposal for an international 
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space code of conduct, which might have limited space’s weaponization.227 With no 
comprehensive treaty regarding space weapons in place, we are left to rely on the legal 
framework the OST provides regarding weaponization.228  
The hypothesis for this thesis case study on the weaponization in space is: If 
countries continue to go forward weaponizing space without further legal agreements, the 
current OST will not be able to adequately prevent conflict.  
3. Case Study #3 Hypotheses: Asteroid and Moon Mining 
Asteroid and Moon mining could cause conflict in the future; therefore, an 
examination of the OST needs to be conducted. Since the OST was created over fifty years 
ago and space mining was not a realistic capability, its provisions are unclear regarding its 
legality.229 With technological advances making this possible in the future, it has the 
potential to threaten the peaceful exploration of space, if commercial conflicts spill into the 
military or political realm. 
The hypothesis for this thesis case study on asteroid and Moon mining is: If the 
current technological advances in both the commercial and military sectors regarding 
asteroid and Moon mining continue to rapidly increase without further legal agreements, 
the OST as it stands will not be able to prevent conflict.  
G. RESEARCH DESIGN 
As Delwyn Goodrick explains, “comparative case studies involve the analysis and 
synthesis of the similarities, differences, and patterns across two or more cases that share 
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a common focus or goal.”230 This thesis will conduct a comparative case study approach 
using three case studies that share a common goal of evaluating the adequateness of the 
OST to prevent conflict in the 21st century. Specific case studies linked to the future 
challenges are testing the OST’s ability to maintain space for peaceful purposes. The case 
studies selected represent threats to the space frontier. As it is the 50-year anniversary of 
the treaty, this thesis has the opportunity to draw from various resources being published 
regarding the OST. Research and resources include but are not limited to information from 
law journals, space policy papers, dialogues from recent conferences (33rd Space 
Symposium and International Astronautical Congress September 2017), news-related 
sources (CNN, SpaceNews, SpaceDaily, etc.), and books covering topics such as the 
militarization of space, politics of space security, space strategy, and war in space. 
Additionally, this thesis will use a historical process-tracing method to conduct analysis on 
the major research questions.231 To understand the importance of the threats selected for 
the case studies, this thesis must present a historical context to the new threat. The threats 
and concerns during the creation of the OST were very different than the issues facing us 
in the 21st century.  
H. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis will be divided into five chapters. Chapter I introduced the background 
information on the OST. It was broken up into two parts to set the reader up for the intended 
thesis questions. Part one introduces the history of the OST: events leading up to the treaty, 
conflicts occurring during 1960s, reasons for making the treaty, and the details of the treaty. 
Part two transitioned into the present day by depicting the major challenges and growth of 
the use of outer space. It also addressed the change of key players in space; Russia and the 
United States are no longer alone in their race to space. Other nations with capable space 
programs include but are not limited to China, Japan, and India. Commercial actors and 
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wealthy individuals are becoming key players in the race to space. With nations, private 
citizens, commercial companies, and militaries all vying for their place in space, it could 
inherently lead to conflict. The final few paragraphs of this chapter discussed the case 
studies that will be examined to determine whether the OST is adequate as it stands to 
prevent conflict in the 21st century as new risks or threats have emerged.  
Chapters II, III, and IV will look at three case studies regarding current challenges 
in space and analyze them against the OST to determine whether changes, amendments, or 
a proposal of a new international space treaty/agreement need to be made to prevent 
conflict. Each case study will begin with a brief history of that issue and whether it was 
considered during the creation of the OST. Additionally, each case study will examine 
political, military, and commercial interests and their involvement in current space issues. 
Chapter II will introduce the first case study on the mitigation of space debris. Chapter III 
will discuss weaponization in space, potential weapons that could be used in space, and the 
effects those weapons could potentially have on the United States. Chapter IV will address 
the future of asteroid and Moon mining and the potential concerns that might come with 
these new activities. The concluding chapter, Chapter V, summarizes the findings 
(successes and failures) on whether the OST is adequate as it stands to prevent conflict in 
the 21st century, highlights the gaps (what is missing?), and provides policy 
recommendations to the treaty in support of future U.S. or international agreements. 
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II. SPACE DEBRIS CASE STUDY  
A. INTRODUCTION 
Orbital debris, also known as “space junk,”232 is an increasingly serious problem 
for satellites and their operators.233 This section will present a case study on the threat of 
space/orbital debris and address whether the Outer Space Treaty has the ability to prevent 
future conflicts that might arise in this area. The case study will be divided into four parts: 
1) an historical analysis of space debris; 2) the threat of space debris in the 21st century; 3) 
an Outer Space Treaty analysis; and 4) a discussion on the potential for conflict.  
B. HISTORY OF SPACE DEBRIS 
In the past 60 years, according to Loretta Hall, “outer space has changed drastically 
from virtually debris-free to an area cluttered with man-made objects.”234 First, an 
historical analysis on the origins of space debris will be conducted to explain where it came 
from and the current role it has in the 21st century. Additionally, this analysis will discuss 
whether space debris was a concern at the time of the creation of the OST. 
Prior to satellites being launched into space, in 1946, “scientists suggested the 
possibility of undetectable small chucks of natural debris”235 circling the Earth that could 
threaten future manned missions to space.236 At the same time, astronomer Fred Whipple 
had warned the United States “that a spaceship traveling toward the Moon”237 would have 
a 4% chance of being destroyed by small meteors streaking past Earth.238 Additionally, 
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other notable astronomers, such as William Henry Pickering, believed “small natural 
satellites”239 already existed and were orbiting the Earth.240 By 1954, the theory of natural 
satellites was thought to be very likely by Director of the Nautical Almanac office of the 
U.S. Naval Observatory Dr. G. M. Clemence.241 But there were disagreements on this 
theory among the astronomer community. Astronomer Clyde Tombaugh, who in 1930 had 
discovered then-planet Pluto, was skeptical of natural satellites.242 He “formulated a plan 
to search for natural debris near both Earth and the Moon, address the threat of collision 
with space vehicles, and discuss the possibility, if natural satellites where found near the 
Earth to use them as space stations.”243 During this research project, the Soviet Union had 
launched Sputnik 1 into orbit on October 2, 1957.244 Tombaugh was able to photograph 
Sputnik 1, which was extremely important to his study.245 Having the ability to take a 
photo of the Soviet spacecraft, correlated with his final findings regarding the existence of 
natural satellites.246 If they had existed, specifically in LEO, then Tombough believes they 
would have been detected much like Sputnik 1.247 Prior to the report’s conclusions being 
released the United States launched Vanguard 1 into orbit in March 1958.248 In 1959, 
“Tombaugh’s final report stated that no natural satellites had been discovered”249 and “we 
could send rockets out in space with very little risk of collision with natural objects.”250 
That same year, the U.S. launched two more Vanguard series satellites into orbit, which 
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are currently not operational and have been labeled as space debris.251 After the launching 
of Sputnik, the ‘Space Object Catalog’ was created by the U.S. Air Force to maintain an 
accurate picture of objects in orbit.252 In the beginning days of the U.S. and Soviet space 
programs, space debris was of little concern, their attention was set on beating the other 
and completing a successful mission.253 These early launches would be the beginning of a 
long-term problem for satellites and operators in space.  
Before June 1961, “the entire catalog of artificial objects in near-Earth orbit being 
tracked by the U.S. Air Force was just over 50 items, which included only spacecraft and 
rocket bodies.”254 Then, that year, “the first on-orbit break-up occurred, Ablestar’s rocket 
body exploded,”255 creating nearly 300 debris fragments.256 The United States “detonated 
a 1.4 megaton nuclear warhead in 1962, designated Starfish Prime, 400 km above the 
Pacific Ocean, which had devastating effects on roughly one-third of the operational 
satellites at the time.”257 This test came after the Soviet Union had broken an informal 
moratorium on atmospheric tests of nuclear weapons.258 In 1963, “the U.S. Air Force’s 
and DoD released half a billion whisker-thin cooper wires into orbit known as Project West 
Ford.”259 In the event the United States and the Soviet Union went to war, Project West 
Ford’s goal was to ensure the U.S. could provide long-range communications for military 
operations.260 Unfortunately, many of these thin cooper wires are still in orbit today, 
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adding to the increasing problem of space debris.261 In April 1964, the U.S. launched the 
Transit 5BN3 navigation satellite, which used a radioisotope thermal generator as its source 
of power.262 During the launch, its Scout launch vehicle failed causing it to scatter 
radioactive materials over the Indian Ocean, resulting in, at the time, one of the worst space 
accidents.263 In October 1965, shortly after reaching orbit, “the U.S. Titan 3C transtage 
broke up at an altitude of 739 km.”264 At the time, this was “the worst orbital debris event, 
creating nearly 475 trackable space debris in the near-Earth orbit.”265  
In 1966, NASA and individual scientists, began characterizing the hazards of 
orbital debris with a series of mathematical calculations.266 Specialists in orbital dynamics 
performed collision probability calculations to figure out whether space debris could 
become a danger for manned satellites.267 Results determined the hazard to be relatively 
small and, in addition, the risk of collision of orbital debris to spacecraft was small.268 
Additionally, on May 7, 1966, U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson reached out to the 
international community, calling for a treaty to regulate space exploration.269 President 
Johnson suggested the treaty cover topics such as “astronaut rescue and return to country 
of origin in the event of emergency landing, and liability for damage caused by space 
objects.”270 Shortly after President Johnson made his statement, a draft of the OST was 
presented to COPUOS “containing the stipulation that countries which cause damage 
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through space activities should be held accountable and liable to make compensation for 
that damage.”271 
During this time, the international community believed an agreement for a treaty 
needed to be reached as quickly as possible.272 This belief influenced the members of the 
Legal Subcommittee to decide on whether the treaty should simply provide general or 
limited principles or establish more concrete and specific rules for space activities.273 The 
earlier sessions of the Legal Subcommittee, discussed in depth principles regarding 
“assistance to and return of astronauts and space vehicles and liability for damages caused 
by space vehicles.”274 As Dembling and Arons recall: 
Various delegations expressed a desire that the Subcommittee continue its 
work on these drafts during the Fifth Session, and were not satisfied with 
the inclusion of general provisions on those subjects as items in a treaty as 
broad as those suggested by the United States and the Soviet drafts. 
However, the Subcommittee was interested in obtaining ‘maximum results 
in a minimum time’ and believed it ‘should limit itself strictly to setting 
essential and urgent issues.275 
The drafts presented by the United States and the Soviet Union were “merely starting 
points”276 according to most of the delegates.277 Although the Legal Subcommittee was 
working on drafting an additional more detailed treaty on liability, nations did not object 
to adding an article in the OST about liability and assistance.278 Two broadly phrased 
articles on liability and return of astronauts were included in the Treaty.279 A French 
delegate stated: 
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the questions of liability and assistance were extremely complicated, and if 
any reference to them was included in the treaty under discussion, it should 
be very brief and simple and should merely establish the principle 
concerned. Any additional details might deal too rapidly with problems 
which had not yet been settled.280 
The treaty “was approved by the United Nations General Assembly on December 19, 
1966,”281 and opened for signatures in Washington, London, and Moscow on January 27, 
1967.282 On October 10, 1967 the OST came into force.283  
In 1968, ASAT technology emerged and developed into a Soviet space-related 
military program.284 In October 1968, the Soviet Union used Cosmos 249, their first ASAT 
weapon, to target Cosmos 248.285 Cosmos 249 missed Cosmos 248 and exploded, “creating 
about 110 trackable pieces of debris.”286 A month later, on November 1, “Cosmos 252 
ASAT exploded when it passed its target Cosmos 248, intentionally creating about 140 
trackable debris pieces.”287 Throughout the years 1968–1971, the Soviets conducted seven 
tests, which had mixed success, but resulted in both trackable and nontrackable debris.288 
These tests created 490 pieces of trackable debris, which were primarily attributed to 
interceptors breaking up “following their release of their single fragmentation 
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warheads.”289 The non-trackable debris that were created during these tests is most likely 
greater than those that could be tracked.290  
As negotiations continued regarding liability and damage to spacecraft, NASA 
continued conducting analysis regarding the probability of collisions. In 1971, “the NASA 
Marshall Space Flight Center wrote a memorandum on Space Station Satellite Collision 
Avoidance.”291 That same year, in Geneva, COPUOS held “negotiations on the 
Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (Liability 
Convention).”292 The Liability Convention went into effect in September 1972, 
elaborating on Article VII of the OST providing a definition for space objects.293 
Additionally, it “provided that a launching State shall be absolutely liable to pay 
compensation for damage caused by its space objects on the surface of the Earth or to 
aircraft, and liable for damage due to its faults in space.”294 In the event a spacecraft has 
been damaged by an object, the Convention offers procedures on settling those claims.295  
On September 30, 1974, at the 25th International Astronautical Congress in 
Amsterdam, “a paper was presented by Brooks, Gibson, and Bess called ‘Predicting the 
Probability that Earth-Orbiting Spacecraft Will Collide with Man-Made Objects in Space,’ 
which was a shift in thinking because research that had been done prior showed a low 
probability of collision.”296 This paper highlighted the fact that space debris that were too 
                                                 
289 Moltz, The Politics of Space Security, 157; Moltz referenced Nicholas L. Johnson and Darren S. 
McKnight, Artificial Space Debris (Orbit Book Co, 1987), 15. 
290 Ibid.  
291 Portree and Loftus, “Orbital Debris: A Chronology,”12.  
292 Ibid; David S.F. Portree, Thirty Years Together: A Chronology of U.S.-Soviet Space Cooperation 
(NASA CR 185707), February 1993, 14.  
293 Portree and Loftus, “Orbital Debris: A Chronology,” 15.  
294 Resolution 2777 (XXVI) Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space 
Objects, General Assembly, 26th Session (1971), http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/
treaties/liability-convention.html. 
295 Ibid. 
296 Portree and Loftus, “Orbital Debris: A Chronology,” 19; Donald J. Kessler, “A Partial History of 
Orbital Debris: A Personal View (Part 1),” Orbital Debris Monitor, Vol. 6, No. 3, July 1, 1993; Donald H. 
Humes, David R. Brookes, Jose M. Alvarez, and T. Dale Bess, “Manmade Orbital Debris Studies at NASA 
Langley,” in Orbital Debris (NASA CP 2360), Donald J. Kessler and Shin-Yi Su, editors, 1985.  
 42 
small to be tracked had the potential to collide with man-made objects.297 In July 1976, 
Donald Kessler warns space debris will continue to increase as pieces collide with one 
another creating even more junk in orbit.298 In June 1977, “Donald Kessler and Burton 
Cour-Palais predict that the hazard posed by orbital debris would far surpass the threat from 
meteoroids.”299 
In 1978, NASA’s Donald Kessler and Burton Cour-Palais wrote an article 
discussing the potential of self-perpetuating orbital debris.300 The results of this article 
helped the DoD, along with NASA, evolve their debris mitigation practices, in specific to 
prevent Delta rocket body breakups.301 Additionally, Kessler published a paper that same 
year called ‘Collision Frequency of Artificial Satellites: The Creation of Debris Belt,’302 
which provided a prediction stating: 
By 2000, the density of space debris in Earth’s orbit would be so great that 
random collisions would be inevitable, and that the outcome of these 
random collisions would be more debris, and subsequently more collisions. 
This later became known as the ‘Kessler’ Effect or Syndrome.303  
Between 1978 and 1979, two major events occurred increasing NASA’s space debris 
awareness.304 The first was the reentry of Soviet Satellite Cosmos 954 and the second was 
the re-entry of Skylab.305 U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, shook by the disastrous re-
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entry of Cosmos 954, began to seek more information regarding harmful objects orbiting 
the Earth.306 As noted by Elizabeth Hanes, “the unexpected crash of Cosmos 954 in 
northern Canada had scattered enriched uranium across a large grassland area, which 
provoked global fear that a similar outcome could occur with Skylab’s reentry.”307 
Although the Skylab space station contained no radioactive components, the fear of damage 
to Earth was a real threat.308 In May 1981, “pieces from a Delta second stage explosion 
were recorded and later found to make up approximately 27 percent of the tracked objects 
of orbital periods under 225 minutes.”309 The creator of the Delta rocket bodies, 
McDonnell Douglas Space Systems Company, was notified and an assessment was 
conducted that later resulted in the elimination of future explosions.310 This was the first 
successful effort conducted to mitigate space debris.311 
In the late 1980s, U.N. COPUOS began addressing concerns regarding space 
debris.312 Over the next decade, Aerospace Corporation, NASA, and other organizations 
participated in studies which resulted in an increased knowledge on the potential threat to 
spacecraft and their architectures due to the rapid and continued growth of space debris.313 
These studies resulted in “new requirements and changes to spacecraft design, operations, 
and end-of-life standard practices.”314 At this time, the Soviets continued making 
improvements in their co-orbital ASAT program, leaving the U.S. concerned because of 
its deficiencies in ASAT technology.315 In terms of a space debris problem, experts from 
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NASA and other engineering companies, recognized the potential these weapons had to 
create massive amounts of debris, which would result in U.S. security issues in space.316 
These concerns were voiced to the Air Force, causing debates within the U.S. Space 
Command in Colorado Springs.317 Even the North American Aerospace Defense 
(NORAD) commander in chief agreed with these objections, but the Air Force, on 
September 13, 1985, continued with an ASAT test despite the warnings on space debris.318 
The “missile was launched from an F-15 carrying a Miniature Home Vehicle (MHV) and 
successfully intercepted an aging Solwind satellite.”319 Nicholas Johnson, later NASA’s 
chief scientist for debris mitigation, stated “the test created 285 pieces of trackable orbital 
debris, and an unknown quantity of smaller orbital debris.”320 This test sparked political 
issues within Congress regarding future ASAT tests, but, most importantly, the Air Force 
realized the threat kinetic kill activities pose to U.S. space assets and the orbital 
environment.321 In March 1986, the DoD realized the impact space debris could have on 
future military operations and committed themselves to addressing the problem.322 The 
DoD adopted new debris mitigation guidelines, which stated: “Design and operations of 
DoD space tests, experiments and systems will strive to minimize or reduce accumulation 
of space debris consistent with mission requirements.”323 Moltz mentions that although 
this new policy did not prohibit debris-causing tests, it was significant because it reiterated 
the problem and highlighted DoD’s commitment to helping mitigate debris.324 
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In 1988, for the first time in U.S. national space policy, Ronald Reagan included 
“the need to minimize the creation of space debris”325 in its rhetoric.326 Shortly after 
releasing the national space policy, an interagency report on orbital debris was published 
in 1989.327 It called for a joint NASA-DoD effort to produce accurate and extensive orbital 
debris studies, as well as mandated international cooperation on the issue.328 Over the next 
few years, studies and international support increased regarding the effects and mitigation 
techniques for orbital space debris.329 
In 1993, “the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC) was 
established as an international governmental forum for the worldwide coordination of 
activities related to the issues of man-made and natural debris in space.”330 The IADC 
facilitates “the exchange of information on space debris research activities between 
member space agencies”331 in hopes of creating guidelines for international collaboration 
in mitigation and removal techniques.332 In 1996, “President Clinton signed the new 
national space policy, which incorporated recommendations contained in the November 
1995 Interagency Report on Orbital Debris (released in February 1996).”333 It addressed 
the commitment and interest to ensure that space debris minimization was of high priority 
not only to the U.S., but to other space-faring nations and international organizations.334 
Through IADC, “beginning in the late 1990s, the United States would lead effort on debris 
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mitigation and initiating discussions on drafts for formal Space Debris Mitigation 
Guidelines to be adopted at an international level.”335 
In 1999, the COPUOS published its Technical Report on space debris.336 The 
report concluded, at this time, the threat of space debris to satellites was extremely low.337 
But the report also discussed the growth in the debris population and the potential for the 
risk of collisions and damage to increase in the future.338 In 2002, IADC released 
guidelines that were supported by the international community to assist in the efforts to 
halt the rapid growth of debris in space.339 A major event occurred a few years later, which 
sent the international community into a frenzy regarding space debris. In January 2007, an 
ASAT test was conducted by China against a non-operational weather satellite Fengyun-
1C.340 The ASAT impact “instantly created around 4,500 pieces of space debris, some 
3,000 remain in orbit today.”341 The Chinese thought they “had done nothing more than 
test a technology developed decades before by the Soviet Union and the United States,” 
but they clearly miscalculated the international reaction.342 This test rallied the space 
community into a new discussion about space security, especially in the realm of space 
debris.343 Shortly after this test in June 2007, with the support of all the major space-faring 
nations, the U.N. COPUOS approved the Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines.344 In the 
fall, this voluntary set of measures was forwarded to the United Nations for an official 
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vote.345 Due to this significant event, space debris was brought to the forefront of 
international space concerns.346 Here are some of the major topics addressed in the 2007 
Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines:  
(1) Preventing on-orbit break-ups, (2) Removing spacecraft and orbital 
stages that have reached the end of their mission operations from the useful 
densely populated orbit regions, (3) Preventing debris of orbits longer than 
25 years, (4) Preventing on-orbit collisions, and (5) Limiting the objects 
released during normal operations.347  
In February 2008, the Navy launched an SM-3 missile from the USS Lake Erie 
targeting USA 193.348 This event is not considered to have increased the number of space 
debris in orbit due to the prior planning and coordination of the shootdown.349 
Due to the relatively low altitude of the satellite at the time of engagement, 
debris will begin to re-enter the Earth’s atmosphere immediately. Nearly all 
of the debris will burn up from reentry within 24–48 hours and the 
remaining debris should re-enter within 40 days.350  
The next major incident in space debris creation was in February 2009 due primarily to 
human error and negligence.351 According to Micah Zenko, “an active U.S. Iridium 
communication satellite and a defunct Russian satellite unexpectedly collided roughly 500 
miles above Siberia.”352 This event, which could have been avoided, “caused around 2,100 
pieces of debris that were larger than 10 cm.”353 The numbers calculated are for those 
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space debris that can currently be tracked; the number that are too small to track is 
unknown, posing a significant threat to spacecraft in lower Earth orbits.354  
On January 22, 2013, a small Russian satellite, “Ball Lens In The Space 
(BLITS),”355 was struck by space debris that had been created from the Chinese ASAT test 
against Fengyun 1C Satellite in 2007.356 Russian scientists Vasiliy Yurasov and Andrey 
Nazarenko, both with the Institute for Precision Instrument Engineering (IPIE), noticed a 
change in performance, altitude, and velocity in their nanosatellite.357 The scientists said 
“it was not immediately clear whether the satellite was merely wounded or completely 
incapacitated.”358 According to Leonard David, “the International Laser Ranging Service 
later confirmed that BLITS had indeed collided with a piece of space debris”359 from the 
Chinese ASAT test.360 Additionally, the International Space Station (ISS) has also been 
hit by tiny fragments from satellites or lost equipment.361 In 2014, “NASA had to perform 
special maneuvers to raise the ISS’s altitude by half a mile to avoid a part of a European 
rocket barreling down into its orbital plane.”362  
In the beginning, space debris was being produced in insignificant amounts by 
normal spacecraft activities. Space debris included “upper stages of launch vehicles, 
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disabled spacecraft, dead batteries, solid rocket motor waste, and refuse from human 
missions.”363 According to NASA, 
the first 40 years of space exploration produced the first 10,000 pieces of 
softball-sized debris. But in the last decade alone, 13,000 pieces were 
created in space, which increased the number of total space objects by over 
sixty percent.364  
The history shows the growth of the field of orbital space debris, and it is an ugly picture 
for the future of space. Recent incidents, like the ones mentioned above, will continue to 
occur due to the increasing threat of space debris. 
C. THREAT OF SPACE DEBRIS 
On April 21, 2017, there was an agreement among the participants at the 7th 
European Conference on Space Debris, “that the continuing growth in space debris posed 
an urgent threat to vital orbital regimes.”365 Previously, in 2016, J. C. Liou, NASA Chief 
Scientist for Orbital Debris, provided a presentation at the 4th ASEAN Regional Forum 
Workshop on Space Security in Singapore displaying the significant increase in debris 
orbiting in the near-Earth space environment.366 During this presentation, they presented 
a graphic showing the progression of space debris starting before 1957 to 2016, which can 
be seen in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1.  The Near-Earth Space Environment367 
According to NASA, “space debris is any man-made object in orbit about the Earth which 
no longer serves a useful function. Such debris includes non-functional spacecraft, 
abandoned launch vehicle stages, mission-related debris, and fragmentation debris.”368 
One of the conclusions from the recent 7th European Conference on Space Debris 
“estimated there to be around 750,000 objects larger than 1 cm and an astounding 166 
million objects larger than 1 mm that reside in commercially, militarily, and scientifically 
valuable Earth orbits.”369  
The challenging aspect to space debris is those debris that are too small to be 
tracked.370 NASA believes “that there are millions of pieces of debris”371 the size of tiny 
paint flecks, which are untrackable due to their small size, but could damage a spacecraft 
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due their velocity of roughly 17,500 mph.372 Nicholas Johnson, NASA chief scientist for 
orbital debris, warns that non-trackable debris are the most significant threat to future 
missions in space.373 Additionally, space debris pose a problem at both lower and higher 
altitudes because they tend to hang around for long periods of time.374 In lower orbits, 
space debris “will eventually be pulled by the Earth’s gravity and burn-up upon re-
entering,”375 but until that time they threaten spacecraft in LEO.376 The U.S. military 
operates a majority of its essential satellites in LEO.377 The United States is not the only 
country at risk because almost “half of the world’s 1,100 active satellites operate in 
LEO.”378 Dr. Joel Primack, professor of Physics at the University of California, Santa 
Cruz, gives us a break-down on the physics of debris in his article “Debris and Future Space 
Activities.” Dr. Primack states “debris in orbits higher than about 800 kilometers (km) 
above the Earth’s surface will be up there for decades, above 1,000 km for centuries, and 
above 1,500 km effectively forever.”379 Therefore, there is a significant risk at higher 
altitudes for collisions with pieces of debris, thus creating a never-ending cycle of debris 
creation.380  
D. OUTER SPACE TREATY ANALYSIS 
According to Ram S Jakhu and Tanveer Ahmad, “the issue of space debris 
mitigation has not been explicitly addressed in the five primary UN treaties that deal with 
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outer space and related activities.”381 The analysis conducted in this section will discuss 
the OST’s ability or inability to provide guidelines to cover space debris mitigation and 
removal. This case study presents the hypothesis: If the current amount of space debris 
continues to expand, endangering space-based assets, it is likely there will be conjunctions 
that could cause conflict in the foreseeable future that the OST cannot prevent. The 
previous section showed the threat of increased space debris to space-based assets; this 
section will address whether the articles within the OST can cover the increasing issues 
regarding space debris in the 21st century.  
Several provisions of the OST could be interpreted to demonstrate the treaty’s 
ability to address and regulate debris mitigation and active debris removal.382 But, it is 
important to note that space debris is not specifically mentioned in the OST nor is there an 
internationally agreed upon definition.383 Joanne Wheeler states “the OST offers minimal 
guidance regarding space debris mitigation at the state level,”384 leaving room for different 
interpretations.385 The following discussion will highlight specific articles in the OST and 
analyze potential interpretations to see whether the treaty can adequately cover the threat 
of space debris.  
Article I of the OST “provides that the exploration and use of outer space shall be 
carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries … and shall be the province 
of all humankind.”386 Interpretations supporting the OST address the idea that this article 
implies that states subject to the treaty have an obligation to mitigate debris.387 As 
mentioned in the previous section, space debris pose a significant threat to space-based 
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assets and could potentially hinder countries from freely exploring and using outer 
space.388  
Articles VI and VII could potentially provide guidelines for the threat of space 
debris. According to Article VI, “states are responsible for their national space activities 
conducted by either the government or non-governmental entities.”389 Article VII holds 
“the launching state internationally liable to compensate for damage caused by its space 
objects or component parts to another state party to the OST or to its natural or juridical 
persons.”390 These articles are just a baseline and require an additional amount of guidance 
from the Liability Convention.391 Regarding Article VI and VII, the OST will likely not 
be able to prevent conflict in the event a conjunction occurs. The OST is a starting point, 
but it cannot be treated as the standalone policy to prevent conflict regarding liability fault. 
The Liability Convention, although not perfect, represents a more effective 
regulation in terms of liability and the space environment.392 The Liability Convention 
provides guidelines on damage and compensation caused by objects in space.393 But a few 
issues with the guidelines could make problems worse regarding space debris. In Article I 
of the Convention, the term “space object,”394 is defined which “includes component parts 
of a space object as well as its launch vehicle and parts thereof.”395 This definition raises 
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the question to what extent does the term space debris fall within the term space object.396 
The issue is that in most cases space debris cannot be attributed to a specific space 
object.397 An additional problem deals with the Liability Convention’s inability to provide 
solutions or support when damage is caused by an untraceable space debris.398 The final 
major concern is regarding the Article I’s definition for “damage.”399 The definition for 
“damage equates to loss of life, personal injury or other impairment of health; or loss of or 
damage to property of States or of persons, natural or juridical, or property of international 
intergovernmental organizations.”400 The argument is that “damage is confined to just 
physical damage to property and mental damage to personnel.”401 The definition provided 
shows no concern for the overall damage to the space environment, which is exactly what 
space debris harms.402 
Article IX of the OST could potentially provide guidelines on space debris 
mitigation. Article IX states: 
in the exploration and use of outer space, … States parties to the Treaty shall 
be guided by the principle of cooperation and mutual assistance and shall 
conduct all their activities in outer space … with due regard to the 
corresponding interests of all other State Parties to the Treaty. States Parties 
to the Treaty shall pursue studies of outer space … and conduct exploration 
of them so as to avoid their harmful contamination and also adverse changes 
in the environment of the Earth resulting from the introduction of 
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extraterrestrial matter and, where necessary, shall adopt appropriate 
measures for this purpose.403 
Article IX mentions “that state parties shall conduct all their activities in space with due 
regard to the corresponding interests of all other State Parties.”404 One interpretation of 
this, presented by Joanne Wheeler, could be that “State Parties are obliged to avoid the 
creation of, reduce, and even remove, space debris.”405 By having State Parties oblige, it 
allows for nations to continue to explore and use space without the increased fear of 
collisions with space debris.406 Another aspect of Article IX that should be highlighted is 
the phrase “so as to avoid harmful contamination”407 and the clause stating “that State 
Parties shall adopt appropriate measures for this purpose.”408 This article provides no 
guidance or information as to what exactly “harmful contamination”409 is or what 
constitutes an appropriate measure.410 Could space debris be considered as “harmful 
contamination?”411 According to Wheeler, she believes that phrase is used to prevent 
contamination produced by biological or radioactive materials and it does not refer to space 
debris.412 Another aspect of Article IX worth mentioning is where it calls on nations to 
avoid “activities that could cause harmful interference with the activities of other State 
Parties in the … use of outer space”413 and to “undertake appropriate international 
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consultations before proceeding with any such activity.”414 One interesting point made by 
Michael J. Listner suggests “that orbital debris is already interfering now with State Parties 
to the OST”415 and therefore attributable debris could be considered a violation of Article 
IX.416 Another interpretation, presented by Wheeler, discusses the issues with 
consultations regarding activities that could potentially cause space debris; she says “it is 
difficult to describe the existence or creation of space debris as a future ‘planned’ 
activity.”417 Additionally, there are no guidelines or regulations that allow State parties to 
retroactively address past activities that created space debris.418  
The analysis conducted above on the OST leads to the conclusion that although 
certain articles could be interpreted to cover the current debris issue, it is not all 
encompassing and leaves too much to interpretation to adequately prevent conflict in the 
21st century. In the following section, real events and hypothetical scenarios will be 
presented just to reemphasize the OST inability to address the current threat of space debris. 
In the concluding chapter of this thesis, potential recommendations will be provided to 
address and overcome the gaps within the OST. 
E. POTENTIAL FUTURE CONFLICTS 
According to scientists, quoted by Ian Sample, Science Editor for the Guardian 
news, “the steady rise in space junk that is floating around the planet could provoke a 
political row and even armed conflict.”419 During the Space Foundation’s 27th National 
Symposium in 2011, Commander of U.S. Air Force Command at the time, General William 
                                                 
414 Outer Space Treaty, as quoted in Michael J. Listner, “Space Debris Remediation and The 
Customary Usage of Article IX,” Space Thoughts (blog), November 10, 2015, 
https://spacethoughtsblog.wordpress.com/2015/11/10/space-debris-remediation-and-the-customary-usage-
of-article-ix/. 
415 Listner, “Space Debris Remediation and The Customary Usage of Article IX.”  
416 Ibid.  
417 Wheeler, “Space debris: The legal issues.”  
418 Ibid. 
419  Scientists, as quoted in Ian Sample, “Rise in space junk could prove armed conflict say 
scientists,” The Guardian, January 22, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/science/2016/jan/22/rise-in-
space-junk-could-provoke-armed-conflict-say-scientists.  
 57 
Shelton, said it best when he said “the traffic is increasing. We’ve now got over 50 nations 
that are participants in the space environment.”420Additionally, the space environment is 
no longer just nation states or government agencies, the commercial and private sectors 
have entered into the domain adding a new area of concern if space debris are not addressed 
on a more serious arena.421 This section will consider the potential conflicts that could 
occur regarding space debris separated by those that are most likely or most dangerous. 
Additionally, hypothetical scenarios will be discussed to emphasize the reality of future 
conflict regarding space debris. 
1. Most Likely 
Marshall Kaplan, an orbital debris expert within the Space Department at the John 
Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory, states “the buildup of debris is not a naturally 
reversible process. If we are to clean up space, it will certainly be complex and very 
expensive.”422 The major question is who is going to pay for it? As mentioned above, there 
are over 50 nations in space423; is it realistic to think that each space-faring nation will 
contribute to the clean-up in space? Or will one or two countries take on much of the cost? 
Even Kaplan suggests that “it is unlikely space-faring nations are going to do anything 
significant about cleaning up space; as any cleanup would be too expensive.”424 
Additionally, Kaplan addresses the lack of technology available to economically cleanup 
space, and with increased technology comes added costs.425 And, if the capability exists 
to remove space objects from outer space, this could then potentially become a more 
dangerous concern. What if that technology could also be used as a space weapon to pluck 
adversary satellites from the sky? That could potentially cause conflicts that would reach 
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both political and military arenas. Furthermore, space debris increase the risk of collisions 
occurring in outer space, which, in turn, raise costs of operating satellites.426 Operators 
have to consider in the design phase “greater expenditures of fuel and interruptions of 
missions from space debris avoidance maneuvers.”427 These rising costs could potentially 
“make it financially unviable to perform certain types of space missions in the future, 
leading to loss of social benefits.”428 The goal is to preserve space for all to use safely 
without worry from space debris, but these questions and concerns proposed suggest that 
cost is one of the most likely international disputes or disagreements that will be faced in 
the future. If not addressed, it could lead to more alarming conflicts. Let us imagine a 
hypothetical scenario: A proposed international agreement suggests creating an 
international agency that is solely dedicated to developing space debris mitigation 
technology. This agency is different than IADC, as it is specifically dedicated to the 
research and development of technology, only to be used for space debris mitigation and 
clean-up. In this proposed agreement, it suggests that representatives from each space-
faring nations and additional countries that have signed the OST be sent to this agency and 
that the budget for these developing technologies and inventions be split among the space-
faring nations governments. What happens if Russia or the United States decide not to 
contribute? Will one country carry the burden of all the costs? What if a space-faring nation 
do not have the means to afford it? Do they not get to participate in space? These scenarios 
could occur in the future if space debris is not addressed on an international level. 
An additional likely conflict deals with the issue of liability and attribution; what is 
the solution to damage caused by space debris that is unattributable “to a certain space 
object and thereby to a certain nation state?”429 Although Articles VI and VII of the OST 
could provide guidelines for a collision that can be attributed, realistically, they are too 
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generic to address all the various scenarios that could occur regarding space debris.430 Let 
us imagine two hypothetical scenarios. First, a U.S. satellite is struck by space debris that 
can be attributed to the 2007 Chinese ASAT test, causing severe damage; and, second, an 
essential U.S. military satellite is struck by unattributed space debris, causing severe 
damage as well as disrupting U.S. military operations. These two scenarios could very well 
happen. The first scenario has the likelihood to cause political instability, which could lead 
to a military confrontation. If it were a commercial U.S. Satellite, then the U.S. could 
demand compensation for damages through the Liability Convention. But what if the 
Chinese refuse to admit guilt or refuse to pay? That is going to cause some political tensions 
between the United States and China. Now, if the satellite hit were a strategic U.S. military 
satellite, then this could cause a little more strife within the military community. This 
scenario would not likely lead to war, but it does have the potential to create tension 
between the U.S. military and the Chinese government. The second scenario causes even 
more concern because the collision cannot be attributed and, therefore, the U.S. military 
must operate without a certain capability and must bear the costs to fix it. Military service 
operators could be in danger for a period of time, while that satellite is non-operational. 
Additionally, it does not have to be a U.S. satellite, what if the International Space Station 
were struck? Commercial companies are also promoting space tourism as well. The 
potential for innocent lives to be lost raises the level of conflict to a higher level, especially 
if that debris can be attributed to another country. The scenarios and concerns presented 
above suggest that liability and attribution are two of the more likely issues that could 
create political instabilities or even military disputes. 
2. Most Dangerous 
One of the more dangerous concerns is the idea that the world will reach “a point 
of no return in space”431 meaning there will be so much space junk that the ability to 
operate ceases to exist.432 In Marshall Kaplan’s view, “space-faring nations have already 
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passed the point of no return, with the accumulation of debris objects in LEO steadily 
building over the past 50 years.”433 As discussed earlier, NASA’s Kessler, established a 
similar concept called the Kessler Syndrome, which stated “when debris reaches a critical 
density in particular orbit, it can set off a chain reaction of collisions that create more debris, 
eventually making the orbit unusable.”434 The importance of this statement is with the 
word “eventually,” because Kessler understood that this process could take decades.435 
But, he wanted the world, especially the U.S., “to understand that if we don’t actively start 
removing five to ten objects per year for the next 100 years, we’ll have an unstable 
environment.”436 Unstable environments have the potential to lead to political and military 
crisis.  
For example, imagine a hypothetical future scenario where LEO has been banned 
for satellite usage due to the immense amount of traffic, which no longer allows satellites 
to orbit safely without being hit by debris. Also, the satellites left in LEO are colliding with 
one another, creating even more debris and, additionally, making it difficult to launch 
satellites into higher orbits. This becomes a global conflict; militaries lose capabilities, and 
civilians lose basic luxuries that commercial space offers such as Internet connectivity, 
satellite television broadcasts, and other communications. The scenario presented above 
could result in an international crisis, creating the potential for more dangerous political 
and military disputes and disagreements. If space were unusable, the world might then 
become unstable, since we now depend on a variety of data from space for society, national 
militaries, and the international economy to function.  
The loss of satellites, specifically military assets, to space debris could incite armed 
conflict between space-faring nations.437 Armed conflict or even war in space would be 
the most dangerous possibility resulting from space debris collisions. Vitaly Adushkin, 
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from the Russian Academy of Sciences, says that there can only be two likelihoods when 
a military defense satellite suddenly fails: “an unregistered collision with space debris or 
an aggressive action by an adversary.”438 Both of those possibilities deal with a sensitivity 
that has the potential to become a politically or militarily dangerous conflict.439  
F. CONCLUSION 
The amount of space debris is increasing apace; as it continues to increase, so does 
the risk of collisions to both government and commercial space assets. This case study 
discussed the progression of space debris through history showing the steady and 
continuing increase over time. Space debris was not a high priority issue during the creation 
of the OST due to the limited amount of debris orbiting the earth during that time. This 
case study also addressed the threat that space debris plays in the 21st century and discussed 
the importance of evaluating the OST’s ability to guide and direct space-faring nations on 
this issue. The analysis of the OST’s capability to aid in the challenges posed by space 
debris determined that even though certain articles could cover the issue, they are too 
generic to cover all the possible space debris scenarios that could occur in space, and they 
offer no specific remedies. Therefore, in conclusion, the OST without amendment, would 
not be able to prevent conflicts resulting from space debris collisions from occurring in the 
21st century. 
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III. WEAPONIZATION OF SPACE CASE STUDY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The weaponization of space in the 21st century represents a dangerous threat to the 
security of everyone on Earth.440 But, some argue that space weapons, rather than being a 
threat, provide deterrence and therefore could be considered a stabilizing effort.441 U.S. 
General John E. Hyten, commander of U.S. Strategic Command, suggests “deterrence 
means war will never be fought in space”442 and “the best way to prevent war is to be 
prepared for war.”443 For the purpose of this thesis, I will define a space weapon as 
anything that can be used to cause damage to any component of a satellite’s architecture 
(i.e., ground, link, or spacecraft) or deny its services from being accessed. This section will 
present a case study on the threat of weaponizing space and address whether the Outer 
Space Treaty could prevent future conflict. The case study will be divided into four parts: 
1) an historical analysis of weaponizing space; 2) the threat of space weapons in the 21st 
century; 3) an Outer Space Treaty analysis; and 4) a discussion of the potential for conflict. 
B. HISTORY OF WEAPONIZATION OF SPACE 
Space power has changed the way wars are fought, so much so, that most conflicts 
of the 21st century cannot be fought and won without the use of space assets.444 This 
reliance on space, especially for the United States, has prompted arguments regarding 
weaponizing space.445 First, an historical analysis of weaponizing space will explain its 
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origins and its current role in the 21st century. Additionally, this analysis will discuss 
whether space weapons were a concern at the time of the creation of the OST. 
Shortly after the ending of World War II in 1945, a new conflict emerged, the Cold 
War, pitting two major super powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, against one 
another.446 The Cold War created tensions between the U.S. and USSR that, by the late 
1950s, had reached into outer space.447 Space became another competitive arena in which 
“each side sought to prove their superiority in technology and military firepower.”448 
Although numerous movements supported peace, stability, and the banning of nuclear tests 
in space in the 1950s, “the weaponization (and nuclearization) of space occurred almost 
immediately after the opening of this new environment.”449  On October 4, 1957, panic 
erupted in the United States as they witnessed the launching of Soviet satellite Sputnik from 
the R-7 intercontinental ballistic missile.450 The significant power of the Soviet R-7 missile 
demonstrated the possibility to deliver nuclear weapons capable of reaching the United 
States.451 This sparked an urgency in the U.S. to respond and, in January 1958, the U.S. 
Army launched Explorer I.452 Additionally, in the summer of 1958, the U.S. tested three 
nuclear weapons in space.453 In response, the Soviet Union began testing nuclear weapons 
as well.454 Results of these tests showed the effects of radiation in space were different 
than that in Earth’s atmosphere, often times persisting much longer in space which could 
negatively affect manned spaceflights in the future as well as satellite performance.455 
During continued negotiations on a test ban, “the Soviet Union and the United States 
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suspended nuclear tests via a moratorium that lasted from November 1958 to September 
1961.”456 
U.S. political and military advisors, fearing the Soviets had continued undisclosed 
nuclear testing throughout the moratorium and significantly advancing in nuclear 
technology, pressured President Kennedy to resume testing.457 In a 1961 address to the 
United Nations, “President Kennedy challenged the Soviet Union ‘not to an arms race, but 
to a peace race.’”458 This was an unsuccessful effort, and he reluctantly announced the 
resumption of atmospheric and exo-atmopsheric testing.459 In July 1962, the U.S. Starfish 
Prime, “a large 1.4 megaton explosion,”460 space nuclear test occurred, resulting in several 
service outages of U.S. and Soviet spacecraft, putting manned spaceflights at risk.461 This 
catastrophic event threatened President Kennedy’s ambitious efforts to reach the Moon, 
causing a shift in thinking regarding exo-atmopsheric nuclear testing.462 This change in 
thinking strengthened internal U.S. negotiations on going forward with a test ban policy 
for outer space.463 
The Cold War was driven by the assumption that any weapons that the Soviet Union 
and the United States had were to be used.464 During these years the Pentagon began 
planning for “Moon-based nuclear weapons aimed at Earth, nuclear ASAT weapons, 
manned military space stations, and a variety of other offensive and defensive systems.”465 
The Soviet Union had similar military space programs that included plans for “an orbital 
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space station, space-to-space weapons, and space-to-Earth weapons.”466 The international 
community feared that these parallel ambitions would initiate an intensely competitive 
arms race in space.467 In 1962, while the superpowers steadily increased their military 
strength, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk warned that space has the potential to become 
the newest warfighting domain.468 But much to the international community’s surprise, 
the United States and the Soviet Union never deployed these weapon systems in any of 
their satellite architectures.469 The Soviet Union and the U.S. remained competitive 
regarding space activities and military research programs, but both norms and treaties 
restrained them.470 Both countries realized that their ability to engage in civilian manned 
missions, commercial satellites, and passive military technologies outweighed developing 
technologies that could threaten their use of space.471 
On June 10, 1963, Kennedy addressed American University announcing “a need 
for a new round of high-level arms negotiations with the Russians and boldly called for an 
end to the Cold War.”472 In this commencement speech, which was broadcast in the 
U.S.S.R. and reprinted in the Soviet press, Kennedy said “if we cannot end our differences, 
at least we can help make the world a safe place for diversity.”473 Shortly after, 
negotiations for a nuclear test ban resumed in Moscow.474 President Kennedy sent Averell 
Harriman, an experienced diplomat respected by the Russian politician leading the Soviet 
Union, Nikita Khrushchev, to negotiate “an agreement to limit the scope of a test ban.”475 
In early test-ban discussions, the Soviet Union was wary of in-country checks on their 
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testing sites, but after negotiations an agreement was made to exclude underground tests 
which eliminated the need for these inspections.476 After 12 days of negotiations, the three 
nations (U.S., UK, and Soviet Union) agreed to a partial test ban, eliminating testing in the 
atmosphere, underwater, and in space.477 Other provisions of the treaty:  
It allowed underground nuclear tests as long as no radioactive debris falls 
outside the boundaries of the nation conducting the test and it pledged 
signatories to work toward complete disarmament, an end to armaments 
race, and an end to the contamination of the environment by radioactive 
substances.478  
On August 5, 1963, “the Partial (or Limited) Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was signed in 
Moscow by U.S. Secretary Dean Rusk, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, and 
British Foreign Secretary Lord Home.”479 With the support of the three powers, the final 
version of the treaty sealed their commitment to ending the contamination of space with 
radioactive substances.480 Over the next few months, President Kennedy with the help 
from experts, including leading scientists, the secretaries of the defense and state 
departments, and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, convinced a wary American 
public and Senate to accept the treaty.481 Finally, “on September 24, 1963, by an 80–19 
margin, the Senate approved the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT).”482 The inclusion of 
space in the PTBT marked the first step toward settling space competition issues through 
peaceful and political negotiations rather than confrontations.483  
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In the fall of 1963, shortly after the approval of PTBT, support for limiting military 
activities in space grew.484 At the United Nations, the U.S. and Soviet Union reached an 
additional agreement “pledging not to orbit any weapons of mass destruction.”485 On 
October 17, 1963, G.A. Resolution 1884 was adopted and called on the States 
to refrain from placing in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear 
weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, installing such 
weapons on celestial bodies, or stationing such weapons in outer space in 
any other manner.486  
The growing rapprochement between Kennedy and Khrushchev stopped with President 
Kennedy’s assassination in November 1963 and Vice President Johnson became 
president.487 President Johnson, more so than the Kennedy administration, stopped 
unnecessary military competition with the Soviet Union and focused primarily on the race 
to the Moon.488 His focus was more toward civilian prospects in space, specifically in 
regard to beating the Soviets to the Moon, rather than strictly military.489  
As the intensity of the Moon race continued between the United States and the 
Soviet Union, the international community pleaded with them to agree on some sort of 
guidelines on the “exploration of the Moon and other celestial bodies.”490 Within the legal 
subcommittees of COPUOS, very little progress regarding additional space agreements and 
treaties had been made since 1963.491 Within the U.S. government, ongoing discussions 
took place about a future space treaty that could use the model of the Antarctic Treaty 
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(1959).492 Using this model in space, could “rule out the emplacement of weapons on the 
Moon and planets but not affect passive military use of non-terrestrial regions of space.”493 
Starting in mid-1966, the United States, using the 1963 U.N. Resolution, began an 
international effort to create a formal treaty.494 Both the U.S. and the Soviet Union 
submitted drafts to COPUOS, the major difference between the two was the United States 
version only applied to celestial bodies while the Soviets included “celestial bodies and 
outer space.”495 In regards to weapons in space, Article IV of the final version of the treaty 
stated “no weapons of mass destruction shall be placed in orbit or on celestial bodies, or 
stationed in outer space in any other manner; celestial bodies shall be used exclusively for 
peaceful purposes.”496 President Johnson stated that Article IV was “the most important 
arms control development since the 1963 treaty banning nuclear testing in the atmosphere, 
in space, and under water.”497 The principles in the “Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the 
United Nations Resolution 1884”498 were used to shape the language found in Article IV 
of the OST.499 It also directly took Articles VIII and IX from the draft proposed by the 
United States.500 Additionally, similar rhetoric from the Antarctic Treaty, used in the U.S. 
draft, was added to Article IV addressing “the use of military personnel, facilities, or 
equipment for peaceful purposes.”501 After a year of negotiations, in a unanimous vote in 
December 1966 at the General Assembly, the United Nations adopted G.A. Resolution 
2222 or also referred to as the Outer Space Treaty.502 On January 27, 1967, in simultaneous 
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ceremonies, the OST was opened for signatures and signed by the three major space powers 
in Washington, Moscow, and London.503  
Despite the success of the OST, it had failed to address the U.S.-Soviet conflict 
over anti-ballistic missiles (ABM) systems, which if deployed could threaten space as well 
as their satellites.504 President Johnson announced his commitment to pursuing a treaty to 
ban ABM systems, but in the event the Soviets rejected these negotiations, he added $375 
million in the budget proposal to deploy an ABM network.505 Prospects for success in 
making space more peaceful did not appear promising when, in 1968, the Soviet Union 
emerged with a program aimed at the developing ASAT technology, conducting tests 
between the years 1968–71.506 But the tests abruptly stopped because of a more 
cooperative climate between the U.S. and the Soviet Union under the new Nixon-Kissinger 
policy of detente.507 Due to the increased international cooperation, “the Soviet and U.S. 
arms control negotiators met in Helsinki to discuss more specific plans for a future treaty 
linking offensive missile limits to restrictions on ABM deployments in the so-called 
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT).”508 In early 1972, the Soviets were willing to 
negotiate restricting their largest missiles, only if the United States agreed to restrain any 
further developments of their ABM defenses.509 The ABM Treaty originally allowed site-
specific missile defenses at two locations—a national capital or an offensive missile 
squadron—with no more than 100 missiles apiece (but this was later amended in 1974 to 
allow each side only one defended site).510 Additionally, the treaty “prohibited the 
development, testing and deployment of space-based, sea-based, air-based, and mobile 
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land-based systems and components.”511 Further, the final version of the treaty specified 
conditions for a limited ban on ASATs, by specifying that, the parties agree to accept 
verification measures and not to interfere with so-called “national technical means”512 
(which both sides understood to mean satellites).513 These agreements were important 
developments in space, providing legally binding constraints and safe access to space.514 
In terms of treaties, the PTBT, the OST, the ABM Treaty, and SALT I created a culture of 
restraint and deterrence.515  
By the late 1970s, the U.S. felt the Soviet Union was no longer invested in 
cooperation due “to the stationing of mobile SS-20 nuclear tipped missiles in Europe and 
the resumption of ASAT weapons testing in 1976.”516 President Ford, prior to leaving 
office in 1977, issued a mixed directive (“National Security Decision Memorandum 
345”).517 The directive ordered the government to carry out two tasks.518 First, the State 
Department had to try to negotiate anti-ASAT arms control with the Soviet Union.519 
Second, the Pentagon was instructed to develop a deployable ASAT.520 The Carter 
administration would continue to reach out to the Soviets to negotiate space arms control 
agreements.521 As Soviet ASAT tests continued, U.S.-Soviet negotiations began with the 
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aim of producing formal and specific guidelines on banning ASATs.522 Even though a 
working agreement was reached between the two superpowers in 1979, the negotiations 
were postponed indefinitely in 1980, “following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 
December 1979.”523 In 1981, the CD began discussions and negotiations on the prevention 
of an arms race in space (PAROS) treaty due to the unresolved issues regarding space 
weaponization.524  
In March 1983, “President Ronald Reagan proposed his Strategic Defense Initiative 
(SDI).”525  
SDI was intended to defend the United States from attack from Soviet 
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) by intercepting the missiles at 
various phases of their flight. For the interception, the SDI would require 
extremely advanced technological systems, yet to be researched and 
developed. Among the potential components of the defense system were 
both space- and earth-based laser battle stations, which, by a combination 
of methods, would direct their killing beams toward Soviet targets.526 
After the announcement of SDI, the Soviets followed with “their classic dual-track 
strategy,”527 meaning on the one hand they continued advancements in their secret military 
programs while, at the same time, becoming more vocal on arms control efforts.528 The 
Soviet Union, shortly after President Reagan announced his proposed plans for SDI, 
publicized its intent to have a Soviet-specific moratorium on ASAT launches into space.529 
Additionally, the Soviets proposed to the U.N. a new draft treaty which “banned the testing 
and deployment of ‘space-strike’ weapons, the prohibition on testing and use of manned 
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ASATs or other military systems, and the destruction of existing ASAT systems.”530 
However, the U.S. declined to support the proposal, because of the difficulty in knowing 
how many ASATs the Soviets had and whether all ASATs had been destroyed.531 In 
regards to Soviet developments in co-orbital ASATs, the Reagan administration and the 
U.S. Air Force continued pursuing advancements in ASAT technologies and conducted a 
test on September 13, 1985, intercepting an aging Solwind satellite.532 That same year, 
“the CD established an ad hoc committee on PAROS.”533 
In the late 1980s, a shift in Soviet military space policy under new Soviet leader 
Mikhail Gorbachev showed a sincere commitment to future U.S.-Soviet space arms control 
discussions.534 Soviet assurances allowed Americans in the space program to feel 
encouraged with future space relations.535 However, space competition continued between 
the two nations, leaving the U.S. a bit more reserved yet still receptive toward the 
possibility of future cooperation.536 President Bush, in the spring of 1989, announced a 
decrease in the budget allotted for SDI due to the difficulty of proving the requirement for 
such a system.537 This administration focused on the concept of Brilliant Pebbles, rather 
than on Reagan’s full-scale missile defense initiatives.538 Brilliant Pebbles “was a non-
nuclear system of satellite based, watermelon-sized mini-missiles designed to use a high-
velocity kinetic warhead.”539 SDI supporters from the Reagan’s legacy staff continued to 
push for developments despite the continued cuts to the program by the Bush 
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administration.540 Also around this time, in December 1991, the Soviet Union faced its 
own political challenges which resulted in the end of the Soviet Union.541 This dissolution 
of the U.S.S.R. marked the official end to the Cold War in space.542  
During the 1990s, the United States shifted its attention to rogue states, such as 
North Korea and Iraq, because of the risk of small-scale missile attacks.543 In January 
1993, the Clinton administration initiated several changes in U.S. policy on space security: 
moving away from SDI, and returning space decision making to NASA and the Office of 
Science and Technology Policy.544 Additionally, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin made 
additional changes by switching the focus from national missile defense (NMD) to more 
ground-based theater missile defense (TMD) due “to the threats consistent with Iraqi scud 
use in the 1991 Gulf War.”545 President Clinton also explored possible options to amend 
the ABM Treaty to allow certain types of limited missile defense to appease Republicans 
in Congress.546 Throughout the Clinton administration, continued battles took place within 
Congress over space and missile defense issues.547  
In the fall of 1996, the White House issued a new space policy statement.548 This 
marked a significant event because it was the first modification of space policy since the 
end of the Cold War.549 The new space policy highlighted “the critical need to use space 
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to ‘monitor arms control and non-proliferation agreements.’”550 Additionally, it discussed 
the Clinton administration’s willingness and openness to possible additional space arm 
controls and other agreements.551 But, as Russia, Australia, and Canada continued to 
promote PAROS, the United States showed little evidence of following its own policies of 
openness to new space security concepts.552  
In December of 2001, the Bush administration saw no value or benefit in trying to 
preserve the ABM Treaty.553 President Bush gave official notice to the Russian 
government of his plan to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, which became effective in June 
2002.554 This was a significant event because it marked “the first time the United States 
had withdrawn from a major arms control agreement.”555 Additionally, as efforts 
continued in the UN to adopt a PAROS resolution, the United States grew frustrated with 
the negotiations.556 For the first time since the Clinton administration, the Pentagon made 
a significant change to its previous policy “on abstaining from the yearly PAROS 
resolution.”557 Finally, in 2005, the United States delegation “voted against this otherwise 
unanimous U.N. resolution that called the states to refrain from using space for weapons 
purposes and urged the CD to take up the issue of a new treaty at its earliest 
convenience.”558 The United States staunchly opposed PAROS, arguing “it was 
unnecessary because there are no space weapons and thus there can be no arms race in 
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outer space at this time.”559 This opposition set by the Bush administration signified a 
staunch U.S. objection to future efforts regarding space arms controls.560 
During Bush’s second term, a major change in the strategic dynamics of space 
relations occurred, with the emergence of China as a major space player and its continued 
push to support a new treaty “banning space weapons.”561 The U.S. was wary of China’s 
intentions in space and in future arms control agreements when its laser weapon research 
program became public in 2006.562 Additionally, China conducted an ASAT test in 2007 
causing even more wariness of Chinese intentions in space.563 Later in February 2008, the 
United States conducted an ASAT action using a “SM-3 launched from the USS Lake Erie 
(CG 70) to target and successfully destroy the USA-193 satellite.”564 This event was 
heavily debated. The United States offered its official explanation as “a missile was 
launched to knock out a derelict spy satellite, to head off the possibility of it splashing a 
half ton of toxic hydrazine fuel somewhere on Earth.”565 But others believed, it was a 
direct response to the Chinese ASAT test.566 
In 2008, shortly after the Chinese ASAT test, “the Russian Federation and China 
presented a draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, 
the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects (PPWT) to the UN Conference on 
Disarmament.”567 Some in the international community acknowledged the PPWT as “a 
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welcomed step toward the non-weaponization of space.”568 The “PPWT seeks to ban the 
placement of weapons in outer space and the threat or use of force against outer space 
objects.”569 Although the PPWT signifies one of the more substantive efforts thus far to 
maintain weapons-free outer space, it is still not perfect and contains a few unclear and 
flawed provisions.570 The United States opposed the draft PPWT due to the Bush 
Administration’s National Space Policy specifically stating: 
The United States will oppose the development of new legal regimes or 
other restrictions that seek to prohibit or limit U.S. access to or use of space. 
Proposed arms control agreements or restrictions must not impair the rights 
of the United States to conduct research, development, testing, and 
operations or other activities in space for U.S. national interests.571 
The United States opposed the treaty because it felt the provisions on ASATs did not 
address the problem nor did it equate to the intent of the treaty.572 The draft treaty made 
no mention on prohibiting ASAT development and testing, yet it banned their hostile use 
against objects in space.573 This meant that nations could continue to test kinetic, debris-
producing ASATs, if they were not used against foreign satellites.574 The treaty was 
proposed to prevent an arms race in space, yet nowhere in the treaty did it outright ban 
ASATs, which are considered space weapons.575 The PPWT did provide a thorough 
explanation and definition of a weapon in outer space:576 
Any device placed in outer space, based on any physical principle, which 
has been specially produced or converted to destroy, damage, or disrupt the 
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normal functioning of objects in outer space, on the Earth or in the Earth’s 
atmosphere, or to eliminate a population or components of the biosphere 
which are important to human existence or to inflict damage on them.577 
But it offered no way to verify their absence from space. Still, some viewed the PPWT as 
a unique opportunity for the international community to create “a robust, unambiguous, 
and universal space security treaty that unequivocally prohibited the weaponization of 
space,”578 yet it failed to accomplish this goal.579 Also in 2008, the European Union (EU) 
published a non-legally-binding draft Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities; the EU 
submitted a revision in 2010.580 The code asked members to create “policies and 
procedures to minimize the possibility of accidents … or any form of harmful interference 
with other States’ right to the peaceful exploration and use of outer space.”581 It also 
addressed three basic principles:  
1) Freedom of access to space for peaceful purposes, 2) Preservation of the 
security and integrity of space objects in orbit; and 3) Due consideration for 
the legitimate defense interests of states.582  
During the Obama administration, officials were torn on whether to support the code.583 
If the United States supported the code, it could lead to the establishment of essential rules 
of the road for behavior and activities in space.584 In 2010, President Obama released his 
National Space Policy which mentioned “that the United States will consider proposals and 
                                                 
577 Article 1c of PPWT, as quoted in Jaramillo, “In Defence of the PPWT Treaty.” 
578 Jaramillo, “In Defence of the PPWT Treaty.” 
579 Ibid. 
580 Micah Zenko, “Policy Innovation Memorandum: A Code of Conduct for Outer Space,” Council on 
Foreign Relations, November 30, 2011, https://www.cfr.org/report/code-conduct-outer-space.  
581 Ibid; “Draft International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities,” European Union, Version 
March 31, 2014, http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/non-proliferation-and-disarmament/pdf/
space_code_conduct_draft_vers_31-march-2014_en.pdf.  




concepts for arms control measures if they are equitable, effectively verifiable, and enhance 
the national security of the United States and its allies.”585 
In 2014, an updated PPWT was submitted to United Nations CD.586 The United 
States, under the Obama administration, opposed the new draft treaty, maintaining that it 
still failed to correct the initial 2008 draft problems.587 Frank A. Rose, deputy assistant 
Secretary of State for arms control, verification, and compliance, mentioned President 
Obama’s 2010 National Space Policy as reasoning for the continued opposition. He “told 
the CD that the United States would agree to arms control proposals or discussions if they 
were equitable, effectively verifiable, and enhance the security of all.”588 Additionally, 
Rose said that the updated PPWT failed to meet these criteria.589 
According to Alexander Chanock, “despite the relatively peaceful beginnings of 
space development, in recent years space has become increasingly more important for 
military affairs.”590 Satellites provide vital support to warfighters in conducting military 
operations.591 Realizing the significance of possible space control, the United States, 
Russia, and China are developing both offensive and defensive weapons that can be used 
in space.592 The next section will address the concerns with weaponizing space, offering 
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examples and types of weapons. Additionally, it will provide analysis on countries that are 
testing, funding, and employing these types of weapons.  
C. THREAT OF WEAPONIZING SPACE 
While weapons have not been placed in outer space, the militarizing of space began 
at the beginning of the space race.593 To our knowledge, space-based weapons have yet to 
be effectively deployed.594 But, the significant threat from ground and sea-based weapons 
(i.e., ASATs) against satellites and their infrastructures has led countries to invest time and 
resources into the development of offensive and defensive space countermeasures.595 A 
National Institute for Public Policy report stated “U.S. space systems are among the most 
fragile and vulnerable assets operated by the U.S. military and our adversaries are aware 
of our weaknesses.”596 According to Bill Gertz, a defense and national security reporter 
for the Washington times, China, North Korea, Russia, and Iran are rapidly developing 
capabilities that could “deny, degrade, or even destroy U.S. and allied space 
capabilities.”597 Additionally, the National Institute for Public Policy report addressed 
comments made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in regards to space conflict. They “warned that 
space conflict would be intense, highlighted by satellite maneuvering to hinder the 
operation of other satellites, co-orbital jamming, and the use of ground-based lasers to 
dazzle or destroy imaging sensors.”598 As mentioned in Chapter I, no definition of a space 
weapon has been accepted by the international community. For the purpose of this thesis, 
it will define a space weapon as anything that can be used to damage any component of a 
satellites’ architecture (i.e., ground, link, or spacecraft) or deny its services from being 
accessed. First, this thesis will provide a brief overview on the potential types of weapons 
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that could be used to target any component of the satellite architecture. This discussion will 
not delve into any classified information. Second, an analysis will be conducted on various 
countries developing offensive and defensive space capabilities which could include 
nuclear weapons, the use of ground/orbit based anti-satellite weapons (ASAT), electronic 
jammers/spoofing (GPS/SATCOM/downlink or uplink signal), weaponized satellites, 
directed-energy weapons, and cyber or military intrusions on satellite ground control 
stations.599  
1. Nuclear Weapons 
The most effective way that a satellite can be neutralized is to employ nuclear 
weapons.600 According to Sam Seitz, “the detonation of nuclear weapons in space would 
generate an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) that could fry satellite electronics, rendering 
them inoperable.”601 Nuclear EMP is considered a significant threat “as it can cover an 
entire continent and cripple tiny circuits inside modern electronics on a massive scale.”602 
The concern with nuclear detonations in space is the altitude at which they occur.603 For 
example, “at high elevation, gamma rays can more easily spread out, hitting many upper-
atmosphere air molecules over a large area at once.”604 In 2008, the EMP Commission 
released a report supporting this concern with high-altitude detonations, concluding “that 
the right nuclear device detonated at the right altitude could bathe the entire continental 
U.S. in EMP, disrupting telecommunications and power grid infrastructures to catastrophic 
effect.”605Although nuclear weapons cause the most destruction when employed, it is 
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highly unlikely they will be used to target nations’ spacecraft.606 States realize that by 
detonating a nuclear weapon in space, they could limit their space-based capabilities as 
well as affect friendly and allied space systems.607 Additional reasons that make nuclear 
weapons usage improbable are: the idea that such use would trigger “a regional or global 
nuclear war,”608 not to mention the pressure to respect the international norm established 
in the OST.609  
2. Anti-Satellite Weapons (ASAT) 
According to Sam Seitz, the recent “growth of ground-based ASAT weapons 
systems poses the greatest threat to the continued peaceful development and use of 
space.”610 As discussed in the previous section regarding nuclear weapons, kinetic-kill 
ASATs provide the user with an advantageous opportunity because it decreases the 
likelihood that tensions will escalate to the use of nuclear weapons.611  But although the 
conflict might not escalate to nuclear warfare, it does not guarantee that a country would 
not respond and retaliate by attacking the adversary’s critical space assets. In February of 
2018, the Israeli Homeland Security (IHLS) Internet website wrote an article, “New Anti-
Satellites Weapons Operational In 2020,” discussing the concern with Russia’s and China’s 
advancing developments in ASAT missiles.612 According to the intelligence directorate of 
the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, by 2020, China and Russia will have “combat-capable 
missiles that could shootdown U.S. LEO objects.”613 Also, as mentioned in a RAND think-
tank report, “the United States has their own arsenal of ASAT weapons.”614 Additionally, 
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kinetic-kill ASATs have the potential to generate large amounts of orbital debris, which 
Chapter II discussed as extremely problematic for satellite operations.615  Currently, the 
international community has been unsuccessful in adopting treaties regulating ASAT 
weapons.616 
3. Electronic Jammers/Spoofing (Cyber Attacks) 
Jamming is one of the more well-known techniques to impair and degrade satellite 
capabilities.617 The most common definition for “jamming is the act of intentionally 
directing electromagnetic energy toward a communication (or navigation) system to 
disrupt or prevent signal transmission.”618 Information security training expert, James 
Taylor, stated “satellite jamming incidents have occurred in various countries like Russia, 
Cuba, Iran, China, and even the United States.”619 There are two techniques to jam a 
satellite: orbital and terrestrial.620 Below are some definitions of such jamming, as 
provided by the INFOSEC Institute:  
Orbital jamming: The attacker sends a beam of contradictory signals 
directly toward a satellite via a rogue uplink station. The jamming signals 
are mixed with legitimate signals, thus interfering with them. The jamming 
signals are able to override the legitimate transmission, blocking its 
transmission to the recipient. Terrestrial jamming: The attacker transmits 
rogue frequencies in the direction of terrestrial targets (ground satellite 
dishes). Rather than targeting the satellite itself, as is the case in orbital 
jamming, it involves transmitting rogue frequencies in the direction of local 
consumer level satellite dishes. The jamming frequencies are limited to a 
                                                 
615 Seitz, “Dynamics of Space Weaponization and the ASAT Threat.” 
616 Israeli Homeland Security Internet website, “New Anti-Satellites Weapons Operational In 2020.” 
617 Hacking Satellites…Look Up to the Sky,” INFOSEC Institute Posted in General Security, 
September 18, 2013, http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/hacking-satellite-look-up-to-the-sky/.  
618 Alexander Rügamer and Dirk Kowalewski, “Jamming and Spoofing GNSS – An Underestimated 
Risk?!,” FIG Working Week 2015, https://www.fig.net/resources/proceedings/fig_proceedings/fig2015/
papers/ts05g/TS05G_ruegamer_kowalewski_7486.pdf.  
619 “How to do satellite jamming,” International Institute of Cyber Security, April 27, 2015, 
https://iicybersecurity.wordpress.com/2015/04/27/how-to-do-satellite-jamming/.  
620 Institute Posted in General Security, “Hacking Satellites…Look Up to the Sky.”  
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specific area and are able to interfere only with the frequency emanating 
from the satellite in a specific location.621  
Satellites are vulnerable to jamming attacks during uplink and downlink transmissions 
between the user, satellite, or ground stations.622 The most dangerous attack targets the 
satellite receiving the uplink, while attacks against the ground or user terminals cause more 
minor damage to the satellite architecture.623 Attackers can vary in skill level, and their 
effectiveness also depends on what exactly is being jammed.624 Attributing jamming to a 
specific nation, individual, or entity is extremely challenging because these attacks can be 
conducted “using off-the-shelf-technology”625 and sometimes do not require 
technologically savvy equipment or personnel.626 Additionally, this creates an even bigger 
problem if the country whose satellite has been jammed cannot attribute the jamming to 
any specific country or organization.627 
An additional attack that can be used against satellite infrastructure is spoofing. 
Spoofing is defined by the INFOSEC Institute as “a deliberate transmission of fake signals, 
associated to the intended satellite target, with the intentions of fooling that satellite 
receiver into providing false information to the users.”628 This is considered extremely 
dangerous in a military context because the attackers could feed false information into a 
system that provides situational awareness for military operations.629 For example, GPS is 





625 Ibid.  
626 Ibid.  
627 Ibid.  
628 Rügamer and Kowalewski, “Jamming and Spoofing GNSS – An Underestimated Risk?!.” 
629 Berenice Baker, “Satellites and spoofing – how hackers falsify situational awareness,” Army 
Technology, November 17, 2013, www.army-technology.com/features/feature-satellites-spoofing-hackers-
falsify-situational-awareness/.  
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considered to be vulnerable to a spoofing attack.630 According to Dinesh Manadhar  at the 
University of Tokyo, “spoofing is easy, and it only requires an instrument called a GPS 
simulator.”631 Although it is considered easy to spoof a GPS signal, it is extremely hard to 
detect when a spoofing attack has occurred.632 
4. Directed-Energy Weapons  
The Department of Defense, in Joint Publication 3–13.1, Electronic Warfare, 
defines a directed-energy weapon “as an umbrella term covering technologies that produce 
a beam of concentrated electro-magnetic energy or atomic or subatomic particles.”633 
Directed-energy weapons “can take the form of lasers, high-powered microwaves, and 
particle beams”634 which can be adapted for space warfare.635 According to Phillip Swarts, 
directed-energy weapons “could shut down enemy vehicles or communication networks, 
destroy incoming missiles or be used for a range of other purposes.”636 Currently, the 
challenge that these weapons present is the ability to deploy them due to their large size 
and weight.637 However, future research aims to make adjustments to the lasers, decreasing 
                                                 
630 Mark L. Psiaki and Todd E. Humphreys, “Protecting GPS From Spoofers Is Critical to the Future 
of Navigation,” IEEE Spectrum, July 29, 2016, https://spectrum.ieee.org/telecom/security/protecting-gps-
from-spoofers-is-critical-to-the-future-of-navigation.  
631 Dinesh Manadhar, as quoted in Shusuke Murai, “GPS Spoofing is No Joke: Dangers of GPS Data 
Hacking Realized,” Japan Times, November 28, 2016, http://www.govtech.com/security/GPS-Spoofing-is-
No-Joke-Dangers-of-GPS-Data-Hacking-Realized.html.  
632 “Is Russia developing a GPS spoofing system? Ships in the Black Sea may have been misdirected 
by a new cyber weapon, experts claim,” DailyMail.com, August 11, 2017, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/
sciencetech/article-4781714/Is-Russia-developing-GPS-spoofing-system.html.  
633 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Electronic Warfare, JP-3-13.1 (Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 25, 2007), 
https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3-13-1.pdf.  
634 Leonard David, “E-Weapons: Directed Energy Warfare In the 21st Century,” Space.com, January 
11, 2006, https://www.space.com/1934-weapons-directed-energy-warfare-21st-century.html.  
635 Ibid. 
636 Phillip Swarts, “Air Force has directed energy weapons; now comes the hard part,” AirForce 




their size so that they can be deployed.638 The most alarming concern with directed-energy 
weapons is that their use is often difficult to detect, as they can affect targets without having 
to destroy them. 
5. Overview of the United States Counterspace Capabilities 
According to the Secure World Foundation report on “Global Counterspace 
Capabilities; An Open Source Assessment,” “the United States has had an established 
doctrine and policy on counterspace capabilities for several decades, although not always 
publicly expressed.”639 Specifically, two doctrines exist in the United States to provide 
guidelines for operations and activities in outer space, “an Air Force doctrine developed by 
U.S. Air Force Space Command and a joint doctrine developed by U.S. Strategic 
Command.”640 Currently, these two doctrines separate space control operations into two 
specific categories: offensive space control (OSC) and defensive space control (DSC).641 
Some of the United States counterspace weapons are summarized in Table 1, using the 
categories from the Space Assessment Report 2018 conducted by the Center for Strategic 
and International Studies (CSIS) Aerospace Security Project: Kinetic-Physical, Non-
Kinetic Physical, Electronic, and Cyber.642 
 
                                                 
638 Alane Kochems and Andrew Gudgel, “The Viability of Directed-Energy Weapons,” The Heritage 
Foundation, April 28, 2006, https://www.heritage.org/missile-defense/report/the-viability-directed-energy-
weapons.  
639 Brian Weeden and Victoria Samson, “Global Counterspace Capabilities: An Open Source 
Assessment,” Secure World Foundation, April 2018, https://swfound.org/media/206118/
swf_global_counterspace_april2018.pdf.; 
640 Ibid., 3–17. 
641 Ibid. 
642 Todd Harrison, Kaitlyn Johnson, and Thomas G. Roberts, “Space Threat Assessment 2018,” A 
report of the CSIS Aerospace Security Project, April 2018, pps. i-iv, 1–34, https://aerospace.csis.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/04/Harrison_SpaceThreatAssessment_FULL_WEB.pdf, 2–4.  
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Table 1.   United States Counterspace Weapons643 
United States: Counterspace Weapons 
Kinetic-Physical Non-Kinetic Physical Electronic Cyber 
 1) U.S. Co-Orbital 
ASAT – Although the 
United States has never 
had an officially 
recognized co-orbital 
ASAT program, it did 
test and develop many 
of the underlying 
technologies as part of 
its missile defense 
programs during the 
Cold War 
2) Direct-Ascent ASAT 
– while the U.S. does 
not have an operational 
DA-ASAT capability, 
it does have operational 
midcourse missile 
defense interceptors 
that have been 
demonstrated in an 
ASAT role against 





(GMD) and Standard 
Missile 3 (SM-3) ship 











System (CCS) which 
can be deployed 






2) Jamming Global 
Navigation Satellite 
System capabilities 
3) NAVWAR – effort to 
develop strategy for 
how the U.S. military 
could conduct both 
defensive and offensive 
operations to protect 
U.S. use of PNT 
capabilities while also 
interdicting or 
preventing adversary 
use of PNT. 
 
1) United States is 
preparing to conduct 
cyber espionage, 
disruption, and attack 
operations against the 
space assets of rival 
states 
2) Demonstrated the 
ability and willingness 




In 2014, space security became a primary focus in U.S. policy.644 Senior military 
leadership, such as General John E. Hyten, Commander of United States Strategic 
Command, began openly discussing “the inevitability of conflict on Earth extending to 
                                                 
643 Weeden and Samson, “Global Counterspace Capabilities: An Open Source Assessment.”; David 
P. Fidler, “Cybersecurity and the New Era of Space Activities,” Council on Foreign Relations, April 3, 
2018, https://www.cfr.org/report/cybersecurity-and-new-era-space-activities.  
644 Weeden and Samson, “Global Counterspace Capabilities: An Open Source Assessment,” 3–17. 
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space and the need for the U.S. military to prepare to defend itself.”645 This shift has 
resulted in organizational changes within the national security space organization.646 In 
2018, a new organization known as the National Space Defense Center (NSDC) became 
operational.647 NSDC’s primary mission is “to improve the collaboration between military 
and intelligence communities to respond to attacks in space.”648 Additionally, the United 
States conducts wargames and exercises dedicated “to practicing and refining its 
counterspace doctrine.”649 As shown in Table 1 and the analysis provided, the United 
States continues to invest in military strategies dedicated to developing counterspace 
weapons. If conflict occurs in the future the United States could target adversary assets in 
space, which means that if space weaponization is not addressed in the immediate future, 
there is cause for concern. 
6. Overview of Adversary Counterspace Capabilities  
The United States is not the only nation developing counterspace weapons 
technology, other nations such as China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran have continued 
pursuing these technological advantages. The adversary threat discussions provided below 
over China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran are compiled from various sources reporting use 
or development of offensive and defensive space weapons by these countries. Additionally, 
a basic overview of several types of counterspace weapons and technologies these nations 
are currently assessed to have or are being developed will be given, which was assembled 
from the recently released unclassified CSIS “Space Threat Assessment 2018.”650 This 
                                                 
645 Ibid., 3–17-3-18; John E. Hyten, “Overcoming Our Space Vulnerabilities,” Speech at the Space 
and Missile Defense Symposium, August 12, 2014, http://www.afspc.af.mil/About-Us/Leadership-
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646 Weeden and Samson, “Global Counterspace Capabilities: An Open Source Assessment,” 3–18. 
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Air Force Space Command Public Affairs, January 26, 2018, http://www.afspc.af.mil/News/Article-
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648 Ibid. 
649 Weeden and Samson, “Global Counterspace Capabilities: An Open Source Assessment,” 3–19. 
650 Harrison, Johnson, and Roberts, “Space Threat Assessment 2018.” 
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report covers the countries that the United States believes are the greatest threats to its 
assets in space.651  
(1) China 
China is considered a major space power after successfully conducting numerous 
missions in outer space.652 It has also increased funding to research advancements in 
counterspace weapons and technology.653 The Space Assessment Report 2018 emphasized 
China’s desire to achieve superiority in space, which meant “it must ensure its ability to 
fully utilize its own space assets while simultaneously degrading, disrupting, or destroying 
it’s [sic] adversary’s space capabilities.”654  The Israeli Homeland Security Internet 
website mentioned China’s unwavering interest in pursuing various robust counterspace 
capabilities.655 Some of China’s counterspace weapons are summarized in Table 2, using 
the categories from the “Space Assessment Report 2018”: Kinetic-Physical, Non-Kinetic 
Physical, Electronic, and Cyber.656  
  
                                                 
651 Ibid., 1.  
652 Ibid., 6.  
653 Ibid., 8.  
654 Ibid., 8.  
655 “China’s Counterspace Weapons,” Israeli Homeland Security Internet Webpage, November 2, 
2015, https://i-hls.com/archives/66372.  
656 Harrison, Johnson, and Roberts, “Space Threat Assessment 2018,” 2–4.  
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Table 2.   China Counterspace Weapons657 
China: Counterspace Weapons 
Kinetic-Physical Non-Kinetic Physical Electronic Cyber 
 1) SC-19 direct-ascent 
ASAT (capable of 
threatening assets in 
LEO orbit) 
2) New DN-3 ASAT 
(capable of reaching 
higher orbiting assets) 
3) Testing and 
developing satellites to 
perform co-orbital 
capabilities—such as 
SJ-12 which has 
advanced maneuvering 
to conduct proximity 
operations 
4) Aolong-1 spacecraft 
which has a robotic 
arm. 
1) Developing and 
advancing in directed 
energy technologies 
(blinding and damaging 
optical sensors) 
2) High-powered Laser 
system developments 
and testing 
3) Probable ICBMs 
gives China a latent 
capability to launch a 
nuclear weapon into 
LEO 
1) Development and 
deployment of satellite 
jamming systems is a 
high priority in China 





3) Spoofing and 
jamming GPS kits—
easily accessible and 
highly capable 
1) Highly advanced 
cyber capabilities 
2) China demonstrated 
hacking capabilities 
against U.S. Satellites 
and were successful 
 
A report by the congressional U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 
states “China’s People’s Liberation Army believes demonstrating capabilities that can 
damage or destroy satellites is important to deterring adversaries, and that the anti-satellite 
threat is a more credible deterrent than nuclear arms.”658 If conflict occurs, Chinese 
military analysts believe that China will conduct offensive operations against satellites in 
order to “deprive an opponent of initiative on the battlefield and make it difficult for them 
to bring their precision-guided weapons into full play.”659 Additionally, Chinese strategy 
discusses plans to conduct “military cyberattacks that can take control of satellites by 
hacking into the microwave signals used by satellites.”660 For example, if the United States 
and China were to go to war, China would likely target both computer networks and 
satellite ground control stations to dismantle the United States military operations reliant 
                                                 
657 Ibid., 8–11; See Space Threat Assessment 2018 provided references on pp. 28–30 regarding 
Russia counterspace weapons.  
658 Report by the congressional U.S.-China Economic and Security review commission, as quoted in 




on satellites.661 As shown in Table 2 and the analysis provided, China has the capability 
to threaten assets in space, which means that if space weaponization is not addressed in the 
immediate future, there is cause for concern. 
(2) Russia 
Following its post-Cold War deterioration and the rise of Vladimir Putin since 
2000, Russia has strived to reconstitute its superpower status in space.662  In April of 2018, 
the Secure World Foundation released a report, “Global Counterspace Capabilities: An 
Open Source Assessment,” which suggests that there is evidence to support this refocus on 
regaining its counterspace capabilities.663 Some of Russia’s counterspace weapons are 
summarized in Table 3:664 
Table 3.   Russia Counterspace Weapons665 
Russia: Counterspace Weapons 
Kinetic-Physical Non-Kinetic Physical Electronic Cyber 
1) ASAT weapon 
program dating back to 




threat to GEO) 
3) Rendezvous and 
Proximity Operations 
(RPO) 
4) PL-19 Nudol - 
Direct-Ascent ASAT 
(significant threat to 
LEO) 
5) S-300 and S-400—
Surface to Air missile  




2) Development of a 
laser ASAT weapon 
(blinding and dazzling 
techniques) 






2) Six different 
jamming and radio 
monitoring platforms, 
including the R-330Zh 
jammer and the R-
381T2 UHF radio 
monitoring system. 
3) GPS Jamming 
system called Pole-21 
1) Most advanced in 
the world—use cyber-
attacks daily 
2) Russian hackers 
have hacked and 
accessed satellite data 
using the malware 
Turla 
                                                 
661 Israeli Homeland Security Internet Webpage, “China’s Counterspace Weapons.” 
662 Sandra Erwin, “Analysts: Space weapons proliferating, there is more congestion and competition,” 
Spacenews.com, April 11, 2018, http://spacenews.com/analysts-space-weapons-proliferating-there-is-more-
congestion-and-competition/.  
663 Secure World Foundation report “Global Counterspace Capabilities: An Open Source 
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665 Harrison, Johnson, and Roberts, “Space Threat Assessment 2018,” 13–15; See Space Threat 
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The Secure World Foundation report indicates the high priority placed on 
advancements and deployment of electronic warfare weapons.666 For example, 
unclassified intelligence reporting suggests that Russia’s usage of jamming and electronic 
warfare techniques is part of a larger goal to dominating the information environment.667 
Russia believes the “role of space in conflict is to provide the information necessary to 
employ one’s forces and weapons and to deny that ability to one’s adversary.”668 In the 
event conflict occurs, Russia has the capability to target all levels of war (i.e., tactical, 
strategic, and operational).669 For example, at the tactical level, Russia can employ GPS 
jammers capable of denying the United States and its allies access to GPS satellites.670 
Russia will continue to promote the incorporation of counterspace technologies throughout 
its military “to both protect its own space-enabled capabilities and degrade or deny those 
capabilities to adversaries.”671 As shown in Table 3 and in the analysis provided, Russia 
has the capability to deny and threaten an adversary’s use of space-based assets, which 
means that if space weaponization is not addressed in the immediate future, there is cause 
for concern.  
(3) Iran 
In the recent decade, Iran has increased its efforts in space as well as continued to 
advance and develop their ballistic missile program.672 Additionally, Iran has a “proven 
space launch vehicle, the Safir Rocket, which has placed four small satellites in orbit.”673 
Information regarding Iran’s intent in space is not openly known, “but evidence suggests 
that Iran views the ability “to deny the United States and its allies the use of space in a 
                                                 
666 Secure World Foundation report “Global Counterspace Capabilities: An Open Source 
Assessment,” as quoted in Erwin, “Analysts: Space weapons proliferating, there is more congestion and 
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regional conflict is critical to its security.”674 Although Iran is not a key player in outer 
space, it has developed counterspace weapons that have the ability to put space systems at 
risk.675 Some of Iran’s counterspace weapons are summarized in Table 4:676 
Table 4.   Iran Counterspace Weapons677 
Iran: Counterspace Weapons 
Kinetic-Physical Non-Kinetic Physical Electronic Cyber 
1) Open source 
information does not 
indicate that Iran is 
attempting to develop 
either direct-ascent or 
co-orbital ASAT 
weapons 
2) Ballistic missile 
technology—which 
could transfer to future 
kinetic ASAT 
capability  
1) Iran may have 
acquired and used a 
laser dazzling or 
blinding counterspace 
system on a United 
States satellite—this 
technology may have 
been obtained from 
Russia or China—but 
limited public 
knowledge exists 
2) Iran has not yet 





against space systems, 
including uplink 
jamming, downlink 
jamming, and spoofing. 
2) Spoof GPS 
Signals—most 
concerning 
1) Advanced offensive 
cyber capabilities that 
could be used to target 
U.S. space systems. 
2) Exploring the 
military uses of cyber 
capabilities to disrupt 




and command and 
control links. 
 
The Secure World Foundation report suggests that “there is significant public 
evidence that Iran has the ability to conduct electronic warfare attacks against commercial 
satellite broadcasters.”678 In addition to jamming against commercial satellite 
broadcasters, evidence suggests that Iran “could interfere with satellite-based command 
and control signals or GPS signals.”679 Currently, Iran’s primary space strategy is focused 
on cyber and electronic warfare rather than kinetic ASAT capabilities.680 Even without a 
kinetic counterspace capability, Iran is considered a formidable threat because of its 
                                                 
674 Reference 148, as cited in Harrison, Johnson, and Roberts, “Space Threat Assessment 2018,” 17.  
675 Harrison, Johnson, and Roberts, “Space Threat Assessment 2018,” 17.  
676 Ibid., 2–4.  
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advancing spoofing and jamming capabilities.681 As shown in Table 4 and in the analysis 
provided, Iran has the capability to deny and degrade its adversary’s space assets, which 
means that if space weaponization is not addressed in the immediate future, there is cause 
for concern.  
(4) North Korea 
The Secure World Foundation reports that “North Korea does not appear motivated 
to develop counterspace assets, though certain capabilities in their ballistic missile program 
might be eventually evolved for such a purpose.”682 Currently, the information available 
does not suggest that North Korea “is making substantial efforts to build or sustain a space 
industrial base.”683 But its missile program, with likely assistance from China, Iran, and/
or Pakistan, continues to advance.684 With little information on North Korea’s space 
doctrine, the “Space Threat Assessment 2018” assesses that if North Korea uses 
counterspace weapons, it would be because it is “focused on ensuring the survival of the 
regime and deterring foreign aggression, specifically the United States.”685 Some of North 
Korea’s counterspace weapons are summarized in Table 5:686 
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Table 5.   North Korea Counterspace Weapons687 
North Korea: Counterspace Weapons 
Kinetic-Physical Non-Kinetic Physical Electronic Cyber 
1) To date North Korea 
has not tested, or 
indicated that it is 




2) Ballistic Missile 
technology could serve 
as a basis for kinetic 
ASAT capability but 
would have to 
overcome significant 
technological hurdles  
1)Some evidence that 
North Korea may be 
developing or has 
already acquired 
nuclear EMP devices—
but it is not likely the 
obtain the level of 
technology required to 
use directed-energy 
weapons, such as lasers 
that can dazzle or blind  
2) Given its existing 
ballistic missile and 
nuclear capabilities, 
North Korea could 
theoretically launch a 
nuclear weapon 
1) North Korea has 
acquired and is actively 
using electronic attack 
capabilities against U.S. 
space assets 
2) GPS Jamming 
capability—operate via 
mobile platforms 
making it hard to locate 
and neutralize in 
conflict 
 
1) Cyber forces are well 
organized and among 
the best in the world 
2) Cyber-attacks have 
been launched against 
South Korea, United 
States, and other 
countries. 
3) Hack into and 
intercept information as 
well as inject corrupt 
information into the 
links of the satellites 
 
North Korea has proven its electronic warfare capabilities “by interfering with GPS 
navigation in the vicinity of South-North border and nearby coastal areas.”688 According 
to unnamed U.S. officials mentioned in the Secure Foundation report, “this type of 
jamming would not affect U.S. military members who use the military GPS signals.”689 
As shown in Table 5 and in the analysis provided, North Korea currently lacks any serious 
known  capability to target adversary space assets, but its developing missile program could 
serve as a basis for future counterspace technologies, which is cause for concern if space 
weaponization is not addressed in the near future.690 
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D. OUTER SPACE TREATY ANALYSIS 
The OST was the second of the space arms control treaties; as mentioned, it was 
modeled after the Antarctic Treaty.691 This case study presents the hypothesis: If countries 
continue to go forward weaponizing space without further legal agreements, the OST as it 
stands will not be able to adequately prevent conflict. The previous section showed the 
threat of space weapons and discussed countries continuing to develop counterspace 
technologies; this section will address whether the articles within the OST can cover the 
increasing concerns regarding the development of space weapons in the 21st century. 
The first few articles of the OST are regarded as the initial provisions to dictate the 
use of space and could be interpreted to address and prevent future weaponization from 
occurring in space.692 Article I states “the exploration and use of outer space, including the 
moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of 
all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development, and shall 
be the province of all mankind.”693 Additionally, Article IV states “the Moon and other 
celestial bodies shall be used by all State Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful 
purposes.”694 Interpretation of these two articles could suggest that weaponizing space 
would not be in the interest or benefit all State parties and would be considered an activity 
that is not peaceful.695 Moreover, the continuing development of satellite technology and 
weapons continues to challenge the international agreement of space to be used for peaceful 
purposes.696 Despite a general consensus on peaceful purposes, the lack of an agreed upon 
definition causes debates within the space community on whether those guidelines are 
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“directed against non-military rather than non-aggressive activities.”697 Although, during 
the creation of the treaty, “the principal space powers agreed to treat all military activities 
in outer space as permitted except those explicitly prohibited by the treaty or customary 
law.”698 The term “‘military’”699 has also sparked debates when linked with activities in 
space, simply because commercial satellites currently can be and are being used for 
military operations.700 Furthermore, most countries have satellites that can be considered 
“‘dual-use,’”701 which means in terms of space weapons, it is hard “to plausibly claim that 
space weapons acquired or developed are strictly defensive.”702 If dual-use technologies 
being developed continue, such use will significantly hinder any future discussions 
regarding the weaponization of space.703 
Certain other articles of the OST could be interpreted and used to challenge or 
prevent State Parties to the Treaty from weaponizing space. Article VI states:  
State Parties to the Treaty shall bear international responsibility for national 
activities in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, 
whether such activities are carried out by governmental agencies or by non-
governmental agencies, and for assuring that national activities are carried 
out in conformity with the provisions set forth in the present Treaty.704 
With the potential weaponization of space, Article VI could provide a legal argument for 
those State Parties that want to challenge other State Parties’ space weaponization 
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698 Hans-Joachim Heintz, “Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and International Law,” space4peace.org, 
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activities.705 State Parties may perceive space weaponization as a non-peaceful use of 
space.706 Additionally, Article IX states:  
A State Party to the Treaty which has reason to believe that an activity or 
experiment planned by another State Party in outer space, including the 
Moon and other celestial bodies, would cause potentially harmful 
interference with activities in the peaceful exploration and use of outer 
space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies may request 
consultation concerning the activity or experiment.707 
Any State Party to the OST has the right, under Article IX, to request a consultation with 
another Party member.708 A consultation could be used if one State Party felt that another 
State Parties’ research advancements, testing, or use of space weapons conflicted with the 
peaceful-uses rhetoric of the OST, therefore providing adequate guidance to prevent 
conflict.709  
According to Cesar Jaramillo, the weaponization of space is unavoidable because 
the OST is “outdated, inadequate, and insufficient.”710 The OST “does not explicitly 
prohibit the placement or use of other types of weapons.”711 For example, the OST does 
not cover Earth-based weapons, such as ASATs, that can target satellites.712 These are 
provisions, according to Jaramillo, that are in need of clearer regulation or outright bans 
and prohibitions.713 Article IV of the OST states:  
State Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth 
any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass 
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destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such 
weapons in outer space in any other manner.714  
Article IV “only bans weapons of mass destruction (WMD) from orbit,”715 but it does not 
consider the various ground, air, and sea-based weapons that could be deployed against 
satellites, or even worse against their ground-control elements.716 The OST is often 
criticized for “its ill-defined use of the term ‘weapon’ within its provisions,”717 much like 
its use of ambiguous phrase ‘peaceful purposes’ that was discussed earlier.718 Nations, 
such as the United States, Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, “have already started 
deploying space weapons.”719 In addition, proponents of weaponizing space believe that 
dual-use satellites already represent viable weapons and therefore any prohibition will be 
ineffective.720 Since almost anything in outer space can be used as a weapon, the lack of a 
standing legal agreement defining space weapons increases the risk for conflict.721 Steve 
Mirmina, professor of space law at Georgetown, provides an example using NASA’s 
Robotic Refueling Mission.722 This mission is designed to provide refueling in space, 
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which Mirmina debates could also give other countries the idea that if the capability exists 
to refuel a satellite, then the ability to approach and conduct attacks on adversary satellites 
exists.723 The only regulations that have been made regarding space weapons lie in a treaty 
that was established more than fifty years ago.724 The OST could not have predicted the 
increase in space weapon technology; without specific guidelines nations will continue to 
test, fund, and possibly field weapons that can both be deployed to space and be used from 
Earth. 
The analysis conducted above on the OST leads to the conclusion that although 
certain articles could be interpreted to cover some of the current weaponization of space 
issues, they are not all encompassing and leave too much to interpretation to adequately 
prevent conflict in the 21st century. Additionally, technological advancements in space and 
the emerging threats were not considered in the OST and, therefore cannot adequately 
cover new space weapons technology. Supplementary guidance or treaties are needed in 
the future or space could become another warfighting domain. This need will be further 
illustrated in the next section when presented with hypothetical scenarios that could 
potentially create conflict due to a lack of international agreements that can deal with the 
complexities of this threat. In the concluding chapter of this thesis, potential 
recommendations will be provided to address and overcome the gaps within the OST. 
E. POTENTIAL FUTURE CONFLICTS 
In recent years, both the commercial and military sectors have become increasingly 
dependent on space-based services and assets.725 This growing reliance comes with an 
increased vulnerability whether from an accidental interruption or a deliberate targeting of 
space-based assets..726 But with the continued development of space weapons by the U.S., 
Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, the future of space looks as if it will be 
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weaponized.727 This section will consider potential conflicts that could occur regarding the 
weaponization of space, separated by those that are most likely or most dangerous. 
Additionally, hypothetical scenarios will be discussed to emphasize the reality of future 
conflict regarding weaponizing space.  
1. Most Likely 
Space weaponization, according to Alexander Chanock, “raises several concerns 
for both countries and people on Earth.”728 Conflicts in space do not just affect one person 
or one country, they have the potential to affect the entire world.729 Chanock believes the 
most likely conflict that will occur is an arms race, much like the Cold War in terms of 
nuclear weapons.730 An arms race has the potential to destabilize the international 
community, increasing the possibility of an armed conflict.731 Let us examine a 
hypothetical scenario, U.S. intelligence collects imagery showing the recent Chinese 
stationing of multiple ASAT launchers and systems for possible future testing and 
deployments. This announcement creates instability amongst the international community 
leading to other countries, such as the United States, feeling forced to respond, possibly 
with space-based weapons. To make matters worse, Russia follows suit and enters the arms 
race. An arms race is just the beginning to a bigger issue. With no specific ASAT bans 
adopted, these three countries could continue to fund and test these weapons and, if they 
felt it necessary, deploy and use these weapons against one another. Additionally, space 
weapons can be very expensive, which could cause internal political concerns because of 
the amount of money that would be needed to stay ahead in an arms race to space.732 The 
scenarios and concerns presented above suggest that an arms race would most likely create 
political instabilities that will eventually lead to military disputes.  
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Another additional likely conflict deals with the testing and use of weapons against 
objects in space resulting in the creation of space debris.733 As noted by Joel Primack, one 
of the premier experts on space debris,  
The weaponization of space would make the debris problem much worse, 
and even one war in space could encase the entire planet in a shell of 
whizzing debris that would thereafter make space near the Earth highly 
hazardous for peaceful as well as military purposes.734 
Space debris is a complex threat. Hence, this thesis featured a dedicated case study (chapter 
II) on this concern. Let us look at a real situation revolving around space weapons: the 
Chinese tested their ASAT in 2007, “producing over 2,087 trackable debris and 35,000 
untrackable debris.”735 Later in January 2013, one of these debris hit a Russian spacecraft 
causing severe damage.736 This collision illustrates a significant concern because “if one 
controlled military test can cause harmful debris six years later, a space war could have 
disastrous consequences for space assets that could continue for years after the conflict 
ended.”737 With no regulations or guidance on space weapons (i.e., ASATs) or space 
debris, this could cause both political disagreements and even lead to military disputes. 
Specifically, according to Alexander Chanock, this issue “is especially dangerous for the 
United States because its civilian and military infrastructures are heavily intertwined with 
its space assets.”738 For example, if a communications satellite is lost, an immediate 
reduction in the U.S.’s ability to communicate and share information will occur, placing 
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any current military operations at risk.739 Additionally, from a commercial or social 
perspective, individuals who rely on satellites for Internet connectivity, television signals, 
cell phone reception, and radio broadcasts will lose or have degraded service.740  
2. Most Dangerous 
The use of dual-use technology presents a more dangerous situation, increasing the 
potential for conflict. Let us look at some real-world examples that have the potential to 
spark instability. The U.S. intelligence community has reported that “China has a satellite 
with an extendable robotic arm that it says can be used to collect space junk but likely can 
also be used to cripple working satellites.”741 Additionally, according to Theresa Hitchens, 
senior research associate at the University of Maryland’s Center for International and 
Security Studies, certain “U.S. satellites that can dock with existing satellites to refuel them 
could be turned into weapons by ordering them to bump enemy satellites out of orbit or 
equipping them with jammers or lasers.”742 Let us examine a hypothetical scenario, the 
Chinese have launched a new satellite with a laser on it intended to be used to clean up 
space debris. Tensions between the United States and China have been rapidly escalating 
due to continuous Chinese jamming and spoofing of GPS signals resulting in numerous 
U.S. Navy ship collisions, aggressive maneuvering in the South China Sea, and the 
shootdown of multiple U.S. aircraft. The U.S. retaliates with multiple air strikes on 
mainland China. China decides to take the fight further, targeting U.S. satellites that are 
providing imagery to target mainland China. It decides it will use its newly launched debris 
removal satellite laser capability against U.S. imagery satellites, leaving the U.S. without 
the capability of collecting imagery for future strikes. Although this scenario is unlikely in 
the near future, it shows the potential threat dual-use satellites could play in space warfare. 
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As China’s and Russia’s military space programs and counterspace technologies 
continue to rapidly advance, challenging U.S. dominance in outer space, “the power 
struggle risks sparking a dangerous conflict that could cripple or even destroy the entire 
planet’s space-based infrastructure.”743 The most dangerous issue regarding space 
weaponization would be a war in space or on Earth.744 Even worse would be the inability 
to use outer space due to the aftermath or lasting effects from a war in space. Let us examine 
a hypothetical scenario, the Chinese launch of multiple ASATs at U.S. GPS satellites, 
causing a significant reduction in U.S. military capabilities. Additionally, targeting 
multiple GPS satellites would affect the civilian and commercial sectors all over the globe. 
Although this conflict started in space, it would be extremely difficult to prevent this 
scenario from escalating out of control, becoming a full-blown war against China, due to 
the lack of norms for space warfare.745  The scenarios and concerns provided above suggest 
that if space-faring nations begin to weaponize space or use space weapons against 
adversaries without international legal agreements, it could create political instability and 
wars in space and on Earth, putting millions of people in danger.  
F. CONCLUSION  
The steady increase in technology and the continuing “proliferation of space 
weapons is a key issue”746 that the international community is grappling with in the 21st 
century.747 Since the weaponization in space may occur in the near future, the international 
community needs to either find a way to halt it completely or insure “that the creation of 
these new weapons does not destabilize the security system”748 that is already in place 
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guiding activities in space.749 This case study discussed the progression of weaponization 
of space through history, showing the continued threat of these issues. The weaponization 
of space was a key concern during the creation of the OST regarding nuclear weapons, but 
it did not account for future technologies and advancements in space weapons. This chapter 
also addressed the threat that weaponizing space plays in the 21st century and discussed 
the importance of evaluating the OST’s ability to guide and direct space-faring nations on 
this issue. The analysis of the OST’s capability to aid in the challenges posed by space-
faring nations’ perceived need to develop space weapons determined that even though 
certain articles could potentially cover the issue, they simply do not address the 21st 
century advancements in space weapons nor do they offer any specific guidelines. 
Therefore, in conclusion, this chapter finds that the OST would not be able to prevent 
conflicts resulting from the continued development of space weapons by multiple countries 
in the 21st century. 
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IV. ASTERIOD AND MOON MINING CASE STUDY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Due to recent renewed interests in exploring space and the growth of commercial 
and private space companies, the idea of space mining (i.e., on asteroids, the Moon, and 
other planets) is no longer an idea but an achievable reality.750 This section will present a 
case study on the potential risks of conflict from asteroid and Moon mining and address 
whether the Outer Space Treaty has the ability to prevent future conflict. Unlike space 
debris and weaponization of space, space mining is still in the relatively beginning stages 
and the actual threat is unknown. Therefore, this case study will address the potential threat 
that asteroid and Moon mining could become in the future. The case study will be divided 
into four parts: 1) an historical analysis of asteroid and Moon mining (space mining); 2) 
the potential risks from asteroid and Moon mining in the 21st century; 3) an Outer Space 
Treaty analysis; and 4) a discussion on the potential for conflict.  
B. HISTORY OF ASTEROID AND MOON MINING 
The concept of space mining is not something new, the idea dates back centuries.751 
In the late 1800s, Russian scientist, Konstantin Tsiolkovsky, “prophesized the construction 
of mines of the surface of asteroids.”752 Later in 1926, “Tsiolkovsky released his 16-point 
plan for colonization of the galaxy.”753 The twelfth point referenced the inherent need to 
exploit asteroids for sustainable resources in order to attain autonomy from Earth.754 Of 
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note, some of the earliest mentions of space mining were just illustrations in science fiction 
stories.755 For example, Garrett Serviss’ 1898 story “Edison’s Conquest of Mars” 
described an armada comprised of human space explorers who stumbled upon a mining 
outpost on an asteroid, while enroute to attack Mars.756 The spacefaring humans realized 
that they had stumbled upon a literal goldmine of opportunities.757 Also, in 1944 Isaac 
Asimov’s published “Catch That Rabbit,” detailing a plot “that placed two bored corporate 
overseers on an asteroid, where they watched a team of robotic miners plying their 
trade.”758 Although these were ideas of science fiction writers, outer space was seen as a 
new area of opportunity and competition for the world.759 The race to space was about to 
begin between the United States and the Soviet Union. Therefore, discussions regarding 
the conduct of space activities that involved the exploitation of celestial bodies (i.e., Moon, 
asteroids, and other planets), were also about to begin.  
Prior to 1960, discussions had already taken place regarding celestial bodies.760 
Two major concerns were discussed: 1) “The possibility of nation-states acquiring 
sovereignty over all or part of a natural celestial body”761 and 2) “What would be required 
under existing law to make such a claim legally valid.”762 Comparisons were being made 
to past examples of countries claiming sovereignty over areas on Earth’s surface.763 The 
Soviet Union announced on September 14, 1959, “a rocket carrying their flag had crashed 
                                                 
755 Shaer, “The Asteroid Miner’s Guide to the Galaxy: U.S. companies are preparing to tap the solar 
system’s riches.” 
756 Matt Novak, “Asteroid Mining’s Peculiar Past,” BBC, November 18, 2014, https://www.bbc.com/
future/story/20130129-asteroid-minings-peculiar-past.  
757 Ibid.  
758 Shaer, “The Asteroid Miner’s Guide to the Galaxy: U.S. companies are preparing to tap the solar 
system’s riches.”  
759 Ibid.  
760 Dembling and Arons, “The United Nations Celestial Bodies Convention,” 535–536.  
761 Ibid. 
762 Dembling and Arons, “The United Nations Celestial Bodies Convention,” 535–536; Libson and 
Katzenbach, Report to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration on the Law of Outer Space, 
A.B.A. Found. 22(a) (1960).  
763 Ibid. 
 109 
onto the Moon’s surface.”764 The United States was quick to respond, warning the Soviets 
this feat did not give them any territorial claims or rights over the Moon.765 Surprisingly, 
the Soviets did not assert sovereignty over the Moon.766 Additionally, in 1959, a resolution 
was approved by the American Bar Association excluding celestial bodies from claims of 
sovereignty and maintaining their use for “the common interest of mankind.”767 COPUOS 
reported the potential problems that could transpire if nations decided to claim celestial 
bodies.768 In 1960, President Eisenhower presented three proposals to the General 
Assembly, with his first one stating that “we agree that celestial bodies are not subject to 
national appropriation by any claims of sovereignty.”769 But by this time, COPUOS had 
already decided: 
while scientific programs envisaged relatively early exploration of celestial 
bodies, human settlement and extensive exploitation of resources were not 
likely in the near future. For this reason, the Committee believed that 
problems relating to the settlement and exploitation of celestial bodies did 
not require priority treatment.770 
Later in 1960, John F. Kennedy was elected president.771 Quickly after taking office, 
President Kennedy increased the budget for the U.S. space program because he had made 
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a promise to the American people “that the United States would send a man to the Moon 
by the end of the decade.”772 
December 20, 1961, marked the passage of “the nonbinding resolution 1721 on 
‘International Cooperation in the Peaceful Use of Outer Space’” at the United Nations.773 
Two significant principles were established in this resolution to help regulate space 
activities:774  
Namely that international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, 
applies to outer space and celestial bodies, and that outer space and celestial 
bodies are free for exploration and use by all States in conformity with 
international law and are not subject to national appropriation.775 
Unfortunately, as a nonbinding resolution, it was unenforceable.776 In 1962, the 
first session of the Legal Subcommittee occurred.777 At this session, several documents 
were submitted for review, one of them being “a draft Declaration of the Basic Principles 
Governing the Activities of States Pertaining to the Exploration and Use of Outer Space 
proposed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).”778 This draft was not 
immediately supported by some members of COPUOS.779 While deliberations continued 
regarding this draft proposal, on the other side of the world, U.S. Vice President Lyndon 
Johnson addressed the American people at the Seattle World’s Fair, speaking about the 
benefits of asteroid mining.780 Vice President Johnson stated “someday we will be able to 
bring an asteroid containing billions of dollars’ worth of critically needed metals close to 
Earth to provide a vast source of mineral wealth to our factories.”781 Additionally, during 
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this time, newspapers in the United States were covering topics such as the benefits of 
asteroid mining, referencing a “new gold rush”782 in outer space.783  
In 1963, the Soviet Union’s draft had finally gained favor among the members of 
COPUOS and a declaration was negotiated.784 Later that year in December, after 
negotiations ceased the General Assembly approved resolution 1962 which included nine 
principles, with three specifically providing protections to outer space and celestial 
bodies:785  
1) The exploration and use of outer space shall be carried on for the benefit 
and in the interests of all mankind, 2) Outer Space and celestial bodies are 
free for exploration and use by all States on a basis of equality and in 
accordance with international law, and 3) Outer Space and celestial bodies 
are not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means 
of use or occupation, or by any other means.786 
Much like the resolution 1721, this declaration was nonbinding.787 Thus, with these 
resolutions, the General Assembly concurred that international law should form the 
framework for both activities in outer space and on celestial bodies and that no rights 
should be lost to individual countries.788 This event was significant because these 
resolutions set the foundations for future international space treaties.789 
On May 7, 1966, prior to the Fifth Session, President Johnson stressed the need for 
action in developing an international agreement that would safeguard the Moon and other 
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celestial bodies.790 President Johnson presented five proposals that he felt should be 
considered within an international treaty, the first three discussing the Moon and celestial 
bodies.791 Here are the first three proposals: 
1. The moon and other celestial bodies be free for exploration and use by 
all countries. No country should be permitted to advance a claim of 
sovereignty. 2. There should be freedom of scientific investigation, and all 
countries should cooperate in scientific activities relating to celestial bodies. 
3. Studies should be made to avoid harmful contamination.792 
Shortly after these statements were made, Arthur J. Goldberg, the United States 
ambassador to the United Nations, “wrote a letter to the chairman of COPUOS requesting 
an early convening of the Legal Subcommittee to consider the treaty proposed by President 
Johnson.”793 A date, July 12, and location, Geneva, were then decided upon for formal 
considerations to be heard regarding an international treaty.794 The United States and the 
Soviet Union both submitted draft treaty proposals to COPUOS.795 One of the more 
significant debates within the Legal Subcommittee regarded “whether the treaty should 
establish rules governing activity on celestial bodies or should it include all of outer space 
as well.”796 The two drafts submitted to the committee highlighted this debate. The United 
States included only celestial bodies and the Soviet Union included celestial bodies and 
outer space.797 With both the United States and the Soviet Union in a fierce competition 
to be the first to successfully conduct a manned landing on the Moon, it was important that 
the committee agree on a treaty as soon as possible.798 United Nations General Assembly 
finally approved a treaty on December 19, 1966, and opened it for signatures on January 
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27, 1967.799 The final version of the treaty included several articles that detailed safeguards 
and regulations for use of the Moon and other celestial bodies.800  
On July 20, 1969, U.S. Apollo 11 and its crew successfully landed on the Moon.801 
The astronauts collected rock and soil samples from the Moon’s surface and successfully 
brought them back to NASA to further analyze.802 Additionally, from 1970–1976, the 
Soviet Union, in competition with the United States, successfully launched and conducted 
three robotic missions bringing back samples from the Moon.803 The Soviet Union used 
the Luna series spacecraft which “drilled a few tens of cm below the Moon’s surface using 
a drill at the end of a sampling arm.”804 Luna 16, the first successful mission, “returned a 
small sample from Mare Fecunditatis in September of 1970.”805 This event occurred 
between the United States Apollo 12 and Apollo 14 Moon missions.806 In February 1972, 
the Soviet Union successfully conducted its second sample return mission with Luna 20. 
Luna 20 brought back “55 grams of soil from the Apollonius highlands region.”807 Other 
notable U.S. lunar missions were Apollo 15, 16, and 17, which were conducted prior to the 
ending of the program in December 1972.808 In 1974, the Soviet Union Luna 23 was 
unsuccessful in collecting samples due to technical difficulties.809 But, in August 1976, 
Luna 24 was the third successful Soviet sampling mission to the Moon.810 Luna 24 was 
                                                 
799 Ibid., 455.  
800 Ibid.  
801 Ryan A Zeigler and Eric A. Nielsen, “Lunar Sample Public Displays Information,” NASA.gov, 
September 14, 2017, https://curator.jsc.nasa.gov/lunar/displays/index.cfm#history.  
802 Ibid.  
803 Zeigler and Nielson, “Lunar Sample Public Displays Information.”; Robert Garner, “Lunar 
Reconnaissance Orbiter,” NASA.gov, March 16, 2010, https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/LRO/
multimedia/lroimages/lroc-20100316-luna.html.  
804 Garner, “Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter.”  
805 Ibid. 
806 Ibid.  
807 Ibid.  
808 Ibid.  
809 Ibid.  
810 Ibid.  
 114 
able to “drill over 2 meters into the lunar soil thus collecting a better section and their 
largest sample to date, 170 grams.”811 
From the years 1972 to 1979, the General Assembly and its Legal Subcommittee 
applied the principles already established in the OST to elaborate on an additional treaty 
regarding specific activities on the Moon.812 In 1979, after deliberations the General 
Assembly adopted the “Moon Agreement (Moon Treaty) in resolution 34/68.”813 This 
agreement, a follow-on to the OST, provided additional guidelines regarding space 
activities involving the Moon and all other celestial bodies.814 Additionally, in Article II 
of the agreement it states “all activities on the moon, including its exploration and use shall 
be carried out in accordance with international law, in particular the Charter of the United 
Nations,” therefore placing authority and jurisdiction within the international 
community.815 It was written with the intent to safeguard the Moon from becoming another 
arena for conflict.816 It maintained that the Moon, like outer space, should remain an area 
to benefit everyone.817 It continued to highlight “that the Moon and all other celestial 
bodies must be used exclusively for peaceful purposes.”818 Most importantly in regards to 
space mining,  
The Agreement provided that the Moon and its natural resources are the 
common heritage of mankind and that an international regime should be 
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established to govern the exploitation of such resources when such 
exploitation is about to become feasible.819 
Although the Agreement acquired enough approvals to enter into force in June 1984, 
currently, no major nation ratified it, and numerous others failed to sign it.820  
In more recent years, on November 25, 2015, “President Barack Obama signed into 
law the Spurring Private Aerospace Competitiveness and Entrepreneurship Act of 2015 
(SPACE Act of 2015).”821 This act allows U.S. citizens and commercial companies to 
legally participate in mining activities in space.822 Additionally, this act grants resource 
rights to U.S. space mining companies, allowing them to sell the resources extracted and 
harvested from asteroids.823 It does not give U.S. citizens or commercial space mining 
companies any ownership over celestial bodies they have selected to harvest resources.824  
C. POTENTIAL RISKS OF ASTEROID AND MOON MINING 
As more space mining operations occur in the future, this could provoke a new, 
more threatening gold rush.825 This section will address the potential problems and risks 
that asteroid and Moon mining could bring to the 21st century. The first concern, and likely 
the most significant, is the lack of international agreements or detailed treaties regarding 
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space mining.826 Frans von der Dunk, a space law professor at the University of 
Nebraska—Lincoln, argues that “proponents of asteroid mining view mining activities 
similarly to the ‘global commons’ status of the high seas: no state may colonize the Atlantic 
Ocean, yet anyone can harvest its fish.”827 Joanne Gabrynowicz by contrast, editor-in-
chief emerita of the Journal of Space Law, details the arguments of those against asteroid 
mining using Antarctica as an example of a “global commons.”828 She argues that 
Antarctica has internationally approved treaties and guidelines on extraction activities, 
whereas outer space does not.829 Additionally, von der Dunk gives an argument in support 
of Gabrynowicz’s claim of needing additional guidelines and clarification in asteroid 
mining.830 Without clarification, von der Dunk defends the argument regarding common 
ownership rights to resources.831 If the international community does not agree on rules 
that detail extraction and the sharing of benefits and resources, this could spark political 
instabilities.832 Gabrynowicz draws an analogy between space mining and past colonial 
invasions and exploitations, which is especially frightening for developing countries.833 
Currently, the international community has not come to an agreement on a universal set of 
regulations for space mining.834 Thus, the conflicting views on the legality of mining in 
space could become a major concern in the 21st century.835  
Although asteroid and Moon mining may promise substantial economic benefits, it 
would be wrong not to mention that there is a potential threat of economic disruption to 
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resource-exporting nations.836 According to Jesse Dunietz a computer scientist at Securing 
America’s Future Energy (SAFE), miners in space “will target water-rich asteroids for their 
hydrogen potential, then mineral-rich asteroids for their nickel and iron-ore.”837 Another 
resource that will be harvested is platinum, which means there is potential risk to the market 
on Earth.838 Platinum has no purpose in outer space, therefore, mining companies would 
extract these resources and bring them to Earth.839 As technology increases and the ability 
to target larger asteroids becomes available, it is thought the harvested platinum from space 
could negatively affect the Earth’s platinum industries.840 Let us look at an example given 
by Charles Kieck, head of energy and precious metals at Afriforesight (a commodities 
research firm in Cape Town, South Africa): 
An asteroid with a diameter of about 1000 meters (about 3280 feet) could 
yield about 100,000 tons of platinum. The Earth produces a few hundred 
tons per year, on average. And even then, the main suppliers are struggling 
to keep up. South Africa produces more than two-thirds of the world’s 
platinum, but the country’s mining sector has been racked by labor unrest 
and shaft closures. For thousands of men forced to work underground and 
live above ground in impoverished conditions, being replaced by robots in 
space could have both its advantages and disadvantages.841 
Another way to address this situation is to look at the ethical aspect of space mining. 
Brother Guy Consolmagno, an American Jesuit and research astronomer for the Vatican 
Observatory, raises the issue suggesting robots could manufacture as easily as the mine 
leading to a large unemployment rate in these nations that rely heavily on exporting 
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minerals.842 Space mining is still in the beginning stages and results most likely would not 
be seen until 2030, but it is important to begin thinking about this potential problem.843 
The next potential issue space mining presents is that the technology required to 
conduct such activities could be viewed as threatening. Mining in space does not 
necessarily require that humans travel to the asteroid or the Moon to harvest these raw 
materials.844 Since the 1970s, NASA and other space advocates have researched different 
means to extract resources from space (i.e., asteroids, the Moon, and other plants and their 
Moons).845 Karl Tate provided a graphic illustrating the distinct types of asteroids and 
techniques for space mining.846  
The infographic, which is cited in references, shows three potential ways asteroids 
could be mined and provides descriptions on the specific techniques.847 The first, which 
was developed by NASA and AMES, is known as the on-site technique.848  This technique 
would use a robot prospector that drills on-site and then brings the extracted materials back 
to Earth.849 What if an adversary sees this capability as a threat? If a robot can drill into an 
asteroid or a rock; what’s stopping this technology to be used on adversary spacecraft? The 
second, which is being developed by Deep Space Industries (DSI), is known as the tow 
truck technique.850 This technique would use rocket power to “haul the asteroid into Earth 
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orbit,”851 much like a tow-truck would tow a car.852 Similarly, NASA proposed the 
mission Asteroid Redirect Mission (ARM), which would have used a similar technique.853 
ARM was intended to “visit a large near-Earth asteroid, collect a multi-ton boulder from 
its surface by grabbing it using a robotic arm, and then redirect it into a stable orbit around 
the Moon for further analysis.”854 Although the Trump administration terminated this 
project, the same questions apply to this technology. Also, having a robotic arm in space 
is cause for alarm, simply because, if the arm can grab an asteroid, what is stopping the 
arm from grabbing an adversary’s satellite? If an adversary interprets this capability and 
technology as a threat, there is potential that conflict could occur in the future. The final 
technique, which was proposed by NASA and the Keck Observatory, is known as the bag-
it technique.855  This final technique would use a capsule designed to “enclose an asteroid 
up to 23 feet in diameter for transport to the Moon’s orbit”856 so it can be exploited later.857 
Hypothetically, this technology could be used for more than just encompassing an asteroid. 
What if an adversary decides to encompass another country’s satellite? This would remove 
it from being used, and if the technology exists, could destroy the satellite upon 
encapsulation. The following paragraphs briefly overview some of the U.S. companies and 
space agencies involved in space mining as well as those of other countries, beside the 
United States, that are becoming more interested in this field of activities. Additionally, 
these overviews will provide some current technologies and capabilities in space mining. 
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1. Who is conducting Space Mining?  
a. NASA 
NASA realized that there was a lack of knowledge regarding analyzing and 
extracting the raw materials from asteroids.858 As mentioned above, NASA’s ARM robotic 
spacecraft would have demonstrated the ability to exploit and analyze a specified asteroid, 
it had a secondary mission “to perform defensive asteroid deflection measures to protect 
Earth.”859 Additionally, NASA has created the spacecraft Origins, Spectral Interpretation, 
Resource Identification, Security and Regolith Explorer (OSIRIS-REx) with a mission to 
return an asteroid sample to Earth.860 OSIRIS-REx launched in September 2016 with the 
intention of arriving at the asteroid Bennu in October of 2018.861 Dante Lauretta, principal 
investigator for NASA’s OSIRIS-REx, contends that the mission serves as a secondary 
benefit for any entity that has interest in asteroid exploitation and its technology, even 
though its primary purpose is for advancements in scientific research.862  
b. Planetary Resources 
Planetary Resources was the first commercial/private company to advertise an 
asteroid-mining business.863 In April of 2012, Planetary Resources “announced their plans 
to mine Near-Earth Asteroids (NEAs) for resources ranging from water to precious 
metals.”864 Chris Lewicki, president and chief engineer, said “Planetary Resources’ 
mission is not only to expand the world’s resource base, but we want to increase people’s 
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access to, and understanding of, our planet and solar system by developing capable and 
cost-efficient systems.”865 Currently, Planetary Resources has three spacecraft: ARKYD-
301, ARKYD-6, and ARKYD-3R.866 These spacecraft were launched into Earth orbit with 
the primary purpose of  identifying sources of water that could be used to sustain human 
life as well as repurposed into rocket fuel but have provided a secondary purpose in 
demonstrating mining capable technology for future missions to asteroids.867  
c. Deep Space Industries 
Deep Space Industries (DSI) was the second commercial/private company to 
advertise an asteroid-mining business.868 DSI made its debut in the space mining sector in 
2013 with CEO David Gump advertising their plan “to launch a fleet of prospecting 
spacecraft to near-Earth asteroids”869 by 2015.870 Unfortunately, their 2015 goal was not 
met and currently they have not yet sent any spacecraft to an asteroid.871 But, DSI 
continues to pursue asteroid mining missions that include both exploiting and harvesting 
both metals and water from asteroids.872 DSI believes that successfully harvesting 
resources from space is the first step toward future colonies in space.873 DSI plans to use 
four phases to develop and operate their spacecraft in order to mine an asteroid.874  
The first phase, prospecting, involves using sophisticated scientific 
equipment on tiny scouts or small spacecraft to locate and study asteroids. 
Once the prospecting spacecraft identify locations or specific asteroids, the 
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second phase, harvesting is conducted. Harvesting uses specialized robotic 
spacecraft to extract and transport resources back to Earth. After the asteroid 
materials are returned to the near-Earth environment, they must be 
processed. The third phase is processing or separating the resources 
harvested into usable materials, so they can be manufactured. Lastly, the 
final phase manufacturing, discusses the possibilities of repurposing the 
materials by using a 3D printer, known as the Microgravity Foundry, to 
create high-strength metal components in zero gravity.875  
One of DSI’s planned missions is the Prospector-1 which is intended to investigate an 
asteroid and then determine if that object contains valuable resources for extraction.876 
Prior to this mission, DSI alongside its international partner, Luxembourg, will launch 
Prospector-X to test space mining technologies, thereby paving the way for the Prospector-
1 mission.877 By the end of the decade, DSI and the government of Luxembourg anticipate 
success in their exploration missions, allowing the company to begin harvesting for 
resources.878 
d. Moon Express 
In 2010, a private company by the name of Moon Express was co-founded by Bob 
Richards and Naveen Jain.879 Its mission is to colonize the moon for commercial and living 
purposes.880 Its original goal was to land on the Moon by the end of 2017, but that was 
pushed to March of 2018, which also was not met.881 But with no current commercial 
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guidelines regarding space activities beyond Earth orbit, the company had to undergo a 
multi-step licensing process.882 On April 8, 2016, Moon Express submitted a license 
request to land on the Moon to the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), which 
was also looked at by the other entities of the government to include the U.S. State 
Department, the U.S. Department of Defense, NASA, NOAA, and the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC).883 Additionally, Moon Express provided a level of 
detail to the federal government regarding its payload, intentions on the Moon, and how it 
planned to comply with the principles in the OST.884 
Moon Express tried to address three critical provisions of the Outer Space 
Treaty. First, nations must continually supervise all of the space missions 
that happen within their borders. Moon Express told the FAA it would 
frequently update the agency with information on the 2017 trip, so that the 
government could oversee it. The second rule is not messing with other 
nations’ spacecraft or space operations. On the Moon, that mostly means 
the Apollo sites, and Moon Express assured the government that it would 
not disturb these areas. Finally, Moon Express had to show the State 
Department it would abide by the OST’s provision that is meant to prevent 
people from contaminating other worlds, called planetary protection. 
Fortunately, the Moon doesn’t host life, so Moon Express did not have to 
worry too much about contamination.885 
After voluntarily providing this information, the FAA, the State Department, and 
the White House discussed this request and after a year of discussion the United States 
government finally authorized Moon Express to conduct Moon landings.886 This was a 
significant event because “Moon Express became the first and only private company to 
obtain this approval.”887 Moon Express hoped by 2017, it would have successfully sent its 
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MX-1 Rover to Moon but that date has been pushed forward.888 MX-1 Rover intends on 
collecting samples from the Moon as well as taking high-definition images and sending 
them back to Earth.889 If this mission is successful, Moon Express will then initiate its 
plans to mine the Moon for essential and valuable resources.890 Prior to mining operations, 
Moon Express intends on constructing “a robotic outpost on the South Pole of the 
Moon.”891 Eventually, Moon Express will invest in the continuous mining of water for use 
on the Moon and minerals that can be sold on Earth.892  
e. European Space Agency (ESA) 
The European Space Agency (ESA) has also been involved in missions involving 
space mining. In 2004, the ESA launched the unmanned Rosetta Probe which has carried 
out several momentous events, with its primary mission to “link up with comet 67P/
Churyumov-Gerasimenko.”893 In 2010, Rosetta successfully relays pictures of Lutetia 
asteroid back to Earth marking this as the “largest asteroid ever visited by a satellite.”894  
Finally, in November of 2014, it successfully completed its mission by landing its probe 
on the pre-selected comet.895 Jean-Jacques Dordain, ESA’s Director General, noted “that 
their ambitious Rosetta mission had secured a place in the history books: not only was it 
the first to rendezvous with and orbit a comet, but it was also the first to deliver a lander to 
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a comet’s surface.”896 Additionally, the ESA has partnered with NASA on the “Asteroid 
Impact and Deflection Assessment Mission (AIDA),”897 specifically with the development 
of the “Asteroid Impact Mission (AIM).”898 AIM, set to launch in 2020, has the primary 
mission to: 
travel to a binary asteroid system—the Paired Didymos asteroids, which 
will come a comparatively close 16 million km to Earth in 2022. The 800-
meter diameter main body is orbited by a 170-meter moon, informally 
called Didymoon. This smaller body is AIM’s focus: the spacecraft would 
perform high-resolution visual, thermal and radar mapping of the moon to 
build detailed maps of its surface and interior structure. AIM plans to carry 
at least three smaller spacecrafts—the Mascot-2 asteroid lander, as well as 
two CubeSats.899 
If successful, AIM would be considered Europe’s contribution to a larger global effort to 
reduce the risk of asteroids heading toward Earth.900  
2. Other Countries 
The United States, ESA, and the private sector are not the only ones heavily 
investing in space mining. The Government of Luxembourg made an announcement in 
2016, detailing its commitment to become a global leader in space mining by heavily 
investing in the company Planetary Resources.901 Luxembourg has taken strategic steps to 
facilitate space mining under their country’s auspices.902 First, it created and “appointed a 
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government Special Envoy for Space Resources.”903 Second, it financially supported and 
invested in several companies dedicated to space mining.904 Finally, it continued to explore 
the possibility of creating a specific government fund dedicated to the mining sector.905 
These strategic steps, are the first moves that could allow Luxembourg to become the future 
Silicon Valley for space mining.906 On July 13, 2017, Luxembourg passed a space 
resources law, similar to the U.S. Space Act in 2015.907 Etienne Schneider, deputy prime 
minister of Luxembourg, says that “the passage of this law reinforces its position as a 
European hub for the emerging space resources industry and gives companies the rights to 
space resources they extract from asteroids or other celestial bodies.”908 Luxembourg is 
committed to this new frontier, but it is not the only one that is interested in establishing 
itself as a potential hub for space mining.909  
Additionally, in the Persian Gulf region, the UAE’s space policy, notes space 
mining regulations as a high priority.910 Also, Japan and China have expressed interest in 
future space mining legislation.911 As more countries invest in space mining, the potential 
for another competitive race in space seems likely.912 
D. OUTER SPACE TREATY ANALYSIS 
The analysis conducted in this section will discuss the OST’s ability or inability to 
provide guidelines to cover asteroid and Moon mining. This case study presents the 
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hypothesis: If the current technological advances in both the commercial and military 
sectors regarding asteroid and Moon mining continue to rapidly increase without further 
legal agreements, the OST as it stands will not be able to prevent conflict. The previous 
section showed the potential for international problems due to increased interest in space 
mining and the new capabilities/technologies associated with these new activities; this 
section will address whether the articles within the OST can cover the increasing issues 
regarding asteroid and Moon mining in the 21st century.  
The OST “established space as a ‘province of all mankind’ and prohibited State 
Parties to the treaty from claiming or colonizing celestial bodies, to include using them for 
military operations.”913 With the prospects of space mining, the OST has become the 
subject of debate.914 Moon and asteroid mining was not even a realistic venture during the 
creation of the treaty, but in recent years advanced technological capabilities have made it 
a future possibility.915 Although the U.S. and Luxembourg have established national laws 
regarding asteroid mining, these moves have only added to the debate on the legality of 
space mining and whether these new laws are in violation of the OST.916 
Let us first look at Articles I and II, which discuss key arguments that could 
determine the legality of space mining. Article I states:  
The exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other 
celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interest of all 
countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific 
development, and shall be the province of all mankind….Outer Space, 
including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free for exploration 
and use by all States without discrimination of any kind, on a basis of 
equality and in accordance with international law, and there shall be free 
access to all areas of celestial bodies.917 
                                                 
913 Dunietz, “Floating Treasure.” 
914 Ibid.  
915 Ibid.  
916 Foust, “Mining issues in space law.”  
917 Outer Space Treaty, U.S. State Department.  
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The first point to highlight in regard to space mining is the term “celestial body”918 and 
“the lack of a definition provided on whether it applies to all-natural objects (including 
asteroids) or only to planets.”919 Also, Fabio Tronchetti from the School of Law at Harbin 
Institute of Technology in China argues the clause stating, “the exploration and use of outer 
space”920 has been subject to interpretation regarding the word “use”921 and how it refers 
to “both economic and non-economic use.”922 Additionally, if space mining is to “be 
carried out for the benefit and interest of all countries,”923 then some space lawyers argue 
that Article I would prevent companies from profiting from extracted resources.924 Article 
II states “outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to 
national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any 
other means.”925 This article has been interpreted in different ways. One debate is over 
“national appropriation.”926 Those in support of private-sector mining argue that this 
article “only refers to the assertion of national sovereignty over celestial bodies and doesn’t 
forbid actions, such as mining, to be conducted on them.”927 Another argument in support 
dictates that “national appropriation forbids the appropriation of territory, but not of natural 
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resources.”928 But what happens when space companies take the entire asteroid?929 As 
mentioned in the threat section, technology exists that could harvest or even encompass the 
entire asteroid, which Joanne Gabrynowicz believes could be argued as a form of 
appropriation and therefore a violation of the OST.930 But, on the other hand, the OST 
specified only “national appropriation,”931 therefore, some would argue, specifically, Jill 
Stuart at the London School of Economics and Political Science, that refers to only 
countries and does not include private/commercial companies.932 Therefore, according to 
her interpretation, “private companies or individuals could make claims toward celestial 
territories or bodies, since they are not countries.”933 Although Stuart interprets the article 
in support of private industries claiming these entities, according to Sagi Kfir, DSI General 
Counsel, he is adamant that the U.S. commercial space mining industry does not want to 
lay claim to any celestial bodies themselves.934 These companies just want the rights to 
keep the material exploited from their mining missions.935 Also, Tronchetti provides 
additional support regarding Article II in that he believes the no-claims provision extends 
to private industries, and therefore these companies are prohibited from claiming these 
entities.936 
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The next article that could provide guidance regarding space mining is Article VI, 
which states:  
State Parties to the Treaty Shall bear international responsibility for national 
activities in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, 
whether such activities are carried on by governmental agencies or by non-
governmental entities, and for assuring that national activities are carried 
out in conformity with the provisions set forth in the present Treaty. The 
activities of non-governmental entities in outer space, including the Moon 
and other celestial bodies, shall require authorization and continuing 
supervision by appropriate State Party to the Treaty.937 
Art Dula, a space professor at the University of Houston, argues this article gives 
commercial space companies permission to mine asteroids because Article VI specifically 
allows “the use of outer space by nongovernmental entities.”938 Another perspective 
discusses the inability to monitor these nongovernmental mining activities.939 Article VI 
says these activities would “require authorization and continuing supervision.”940 For 
example, in regards to the U.S. commercial space mining companies, arguments against 
contend that the United States currently has no assigned licensing authority for activities 
such as mining or commercial Moon landings.941 The United States, has the FAA, which 
is in charge of licensing launches and reentries, but nothing specifically established for 
mining or Moon landings.942 If challenged by other State Parties to the OST, the lack of 
supervising authority for space mining activities could be interpreted as a U.S. failure to 
follow Article VI of the OST.943 Although the United States could appoint one, until it 
does it could be subject to challenges by other signatories on the treaty. 
                                                 
937 Outer Space Treaty, U.S. State Department.  
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Lastly, this section will address the U.S. SPACE Act of 2015. The passage of the 
U.S. SPACE Act of 2015 allows American commercial companies to legally exploit 
asteroids,944 which led to discussions within the United States and the international 
community as to whether the act violates the OST.945 Specifically, in Journal Resources 
Policy, Sarah Jane Fox, a legal scholar at Coventry University in the U.K., argues “by the 
current standards of international law, a country can’t just go and create laws that function 
outside its own borders.”946 Fox discusses her belief that the United Nations and the 
international community regard this U.S. law as non-binding and an overstep of its 
authority.947 But, not everyone agrees with Fox’s viewpoint. Tronchetti, argues that the 
act is intended to fill a gap due to the absence of international space laws covering the 
private sector’s desire to exploit natural resources in space.948 Additionally, Tronchetti, 
suggests that it is not impractical to envision that the passage of this act will stir controversy 
among other countries that are actively pursuing mining activities or exploration of the 
Moon (i.e., China).949 He believes these countries would demand further explanation 
regarding the act and would most likely enact similar legislation of their own.950 If these 
activities become defined by numerous national laws, the possibility of disagreements 
increases, unless some international body is created to manage conflicting claims.951 
Currently, the OST  lacks the capability to address nations enacting their own national laws 
to cover activities in space that are not clearly defined by the treaty.  
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The analysis conducted above on the OST leads to the conclusion that although 
certain articles could provide clarification to cover the current and future asteroid and 
Moon mining issues, the treaty itself is not all encompassing and leaves too much to 
interpretation to adequately prevent conflict in the 21st century. In the following section, 
hypothetical scenarios will be presented to reemphasize the OST’s inability to address the 
potential conflicts that might emerge from space mining in the future. In the concluding 
chapter of this thesis, potential recommendations will be provided to address and overcome 
the gaps within the OST.  
E. POTENTIAL FUTURE CONFLICTS 
Space mining is being considered the “new Wild West or the new gold rush,”952 
which has the potential to create conflicts in the political, military, and commercial arenas. 
As more countries and the private sector become more aware to the potential benefits, this 
will become another competitive market.953 With competition comes the potential for 
concern. Although some countries are beginning to develop laws and policies of their own, 
without an international agreement, conflicts will most likely occur.954 This section will 
consider the potential conflicts that could occur regarding asteroid and Moon mining, 
separated into those that are most likely or most dangerous. Additionally, hypothetical 
scenarios will be discussed to emphasize the reality of future conflict regarding space 
mining.  
1. Most Likely 
Frans von der Dunk emphasizes the ambiguity over legality of private mining in 
space.955 This statement alone is alarming. Without future regulations or guidelines, the 
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conflict that will most likely occur is a heated political dispute about the legality of mining 
resulting in instability within the international community. With the passage of laws, such 
as the U.S. SPACE Act of 2015 and the Luxembourg Space Resources Law in 2017, these 
laws have become the subject to numerous legal debates. The U.S. SPACE Act is already 
the subject of legal discussions within the United States, as well as in the international 
community.956 These deliberations revolve primarily on whether this act is a violation of 
the principles set in the OST.957 U.S. commercial companies, such as Planetary Resources 
and Deep Space Industries, are satisfied with this new bill, which established the 
foundations for future asteroid mining activities in the private sector.958 Even though U.S. 
commercial companies are thrilled about these new regulations, not everyone feels the 
same way, especially in the international community.959 In the next paragraph, examples 
will be provided from different representatives within the international legal community 
regarding their opinions on the Space Act. 
Alexander Soucek, head of legal services department at the 22-nation European 
Space Agency, proposed the question “Is the Commercial Space Act a violation of the 
OST’s prohibition of national appropriation?”960  Soucek answered the question stating “it 
is very controversial; I can say that. There are lots of opinions on this.”961 Although Joanne 
Wheeler, another lawyer, refused to answer directly about the legality of the act, she 
admitted “it is really pushing the boundaries.”962 Tanja Masson-Zwaan, president of the 
International Institute of Space Law and deputy director of the International Institute of Air 
and Space Law at Leidan University in the Netherlands, said many nations will interpret 
                                                 
956 Oduntan, “Who owns space? U.S. asteroid-mining act is dangerous and potentially illegal.”  
957 Ibid. 
958 Fecht, “Is Space Mining Legal?”  
959 Ibid.  
960 Alexander Soucek, as quoted in in Peter B. de Selding, “New U.S. Space Mining Law’s Treaty 
Compliance May Depend on Implementation,” Spacenews.com, December 9, 2015, http://spacenews.com/
u-s-commercial-space-acts-treaty-complaince-may-depend-on-implementation/.  
961 Ibid.  
962 Joanne Wheeler, as quoted in de Selding, “New U.S. Space Mining Law’s Treaty Compliance 
May Depend on Implementation.”  
 134 
the SPACE Act as aggressive.963 Even Von der Dunk has stated that “Russia and China 
might consider using the passage of the U.S. Space Act as another example of the economic 
aggression of the U.S. and going ahead of the international law.”964 What if countries, such 
as China or Russia, decide to create a national law similar to the U.S. Space Act? How will 
the United States feel about their new laws? Let us look at a hypothetical scenario, Russia 
has enacted a space mining act that is an exact replicate of the U.S. SPACE Act. Russia, 
having conducted research and analysis, has found an asteroid with substantial amounts of 
platinum resources. Planetary Resources, a U.S. company, has also identified the same 
asteroid for a platinum harvesting mission. With no international agreement and each with 
its own national law that awards the right to the resources collected, who owns the rights 
to the resources? Is it whoever gets there first? Currently, the U.S. is leading in space 
mining technologies, which means that the “U.S. and U.S. based companies could possibly 
be the first to lay claim to the richest and most easily accessible prospecting sites.”965 If 
Planetary Resources does get there first, what happens when they do not want to share the 
resources or the asteroid?966 This is likely going to cause political disputes and instability 
between the United States and Russia, which could result in a stand-off between the two 
countries.  
Let us add another layer to the scenario above. There is a shortage of Earth’s 
platinum resources and the asteroid has the potential to replenish these platinum reserves 
for the next five years. Will the shortage in platinum resources result in further political 
disagreements or will this result even more drastic measures such as a military dispute 
between Russia and United States? Although this added layer to the scenario is not likely 
to happen in the near future, it is essential that the international community begin to think 
about this because Earth has a limited amount of resources and once they have been 
depleted, countries will have to find other sources. In the future, if other resources are 
                                                 
963 Tanja Masson-Zwaan, as quoted in de Selding, “New U.S. Space Mining Law’s Treaty 
Compliance May Depend on Implementation.”  
964 Von der Dunk, as quoted in Fecht, “Is Space Mining Legal?”  
965 Ramin Skibba, “Mining in Space Could Lead to Conflicts on Earth,” Nautilus (blog), April 19, 
2016, http://nautil.us/blog/mining-in-space-could-lead-to-conflicts-on-earth.  
966 Ibid.  
 135 
limited or almost non-existent, this could result in more dangerous concerns. The 
arguments and scenarios provided in this section suggest that without an international 
regulation on space mining and the continuance of countries enacting their own national 
laws, political disagreements will occur in the future.  
2. Most Dangerous 
All forms of mining come with their own inherent risks and dangers which means 
that space mining should not be seen any differently.967 One of the more dangerous 
concerns with asteroid mining activities is it carries the risk of space debris from being 
mined, which inherently causes a potential for future collisions with space assets.968 Space 
debris is a complex threat. Hence, there is a dedicated case study to discuss these issues in 
this thesis.  
In recent decades, the possibility of asteroid and Moon mining has increased 
because of advancements in scientific knowledge and technology.969 As mentioned in the 
potential risk section, the technology associated with asteroid and Moon mining is 
extremely sophisticated. Although it may not seem likely that the technology created for 
space mining would be used against adversary satellites, it is important to consider the 
technological capabilities to mine in space and their potential uses for military purposes. 
As illustrated in chapter III and defined in this thesis, space weapons come in many forms 
(including dual-use systems) and with no current legal framework halting the 
weaponization of space, it is essential to discuss the future possibility to stir a more 
dangerous concern. For example, if Russia and China feel that the passing of the U.S. 
SPACE Act was a display of “economic aggression,”970 what is stopping them from also 
thinking the technology required to mine could not be used as a weapon against their 
satellites? The weaponization of space and what constitutes a space weapon are very 
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complex issues. Hence, there is a chapter dedicated to that topic in this thesis. Although it 
is unlikely that the mining spacecraft themselves would be used to attack Russia and China, 
there is a potential that the capabilities gained from these assets could be added to military 
satellites, such as lasers or drills, which would be a more dangerous outcome. Therefore, 
the potential that armed conflict could occur between space-faring nations is more likely if 
the technology is incorporated into military satellites. In conclusion, the OST cannot 
adequately provide guidelines to prevent these future international instabilities that could 
eventually lead to military disputes. 
F. CONCLUSION 
Technology is and has been developed to mine the Moon and asteroids, making 
space mining a future reality. In addition, countries, such as the United States and 
Luxembourg, have established their own laws and regulations for mining in space.971 This 
case study discussed the progression of asteroid and Moon mining through history showing 
the steady growth of interest over time. Mining in space was not a reality during the 
creation of the OST. But the international community felt it was important to protect outer 
space, the Moon, and celestial bodies. Yet it did not specifically ban mining in the future. 
This thesis also addressed the potential threat mining could pose in the 21st century and in 
the future, as well as discussed, the importance of evaluating the OST’s ability to guide 
and direct space-faring nations on this issue. The analysis of the OST’s capability to aid in 
the challenges posed by mining determined that even though certain articles could cover 
the issue, they are not specific enough to cover all the possible mining scenarios that could 
in theory occur in space and they offer no specific remedies. Therefore, in conclusion, the 
OST alone is unlikely to be able to prevent conflicts resulting from space mining from 
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE CASE STUDY FINDINGS 
FOR THE OUTER SPACE TREATY  
A. INTRODUCTION 
The importance of continuing to develop and strengthen space law will have a 
major influence on our ability to maintain and achieve “long-term sustainability (LTS)”972 
in the use of outer space.973 Without clearly defined and globally accepted agreements, 
laws, norms, policies, or codes, LTS in space may not be achievable.974 The case studies 
have identified the OST’s inability to adequately cover a range of potential concerns with 
these current and emerging 21st century issues. This chapter will summarize the findings 
in each of the case studies and identify the gaps within the OST. Additionally, policy 
recommendations will be provided that could pave the way to prevent conflicts from 
occurring due to the concerns with space debris, the weaponization of space, and asteroid 
and Moon mining. This chapter will be divided into two sections, followed by a conclusion: 
1) case study findings on the gaps within the OST; and 2) potential policy 
recommendations.  
B. CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON THE GAPS WITHIN THE OST 
The case studies have identified and provided scenarios and analyses that highlight 
the OST’s inability to provide guidance for these important emerging problems. This 
section will provide a summary of the conclusions from each of the case studies and 
identify some of the specific gaps found in the OST during the analysis.  
1. Space Debris Case Study 
The analysis provided in this case study led to the conclusion that although certain 
articles could be interpreted as covering the current debris issue, they were not all 
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encompassing and left too much to interpretation to adequately prevent conflict in the 21st 
century. Significant gaps within the OST contribute to its inability to cover the concerns 
presented by the growing problem of space debris.  
The most worrisome gap in the OST is the lack of any mention of space debris 
mitigation or removal.975 The space debris case study identified Articles I, VI, VII, and IX 
of the OST as possible provisions to address issues that could arise with the continued 
creation of space debris, as well as mitigation and removal efforts. But the OST is regarded 
to be “inherently permissive in its nature,” leaving too much room for interpretation that 
could cause conflict amongst the State Parties to the treaty.976 Another gap is the ill-
defined and often debated terminology within the treaty.977 Some of the terms include 
“interests of all other state parties,” “space object,” “harmful interference,” and “peaceful 
purposes.”978 With no clearly defined and internationally accepted definitions, this 
imprecise language leaves room for various interpretations. Articles VI and VII are too 
limited in addressing concerns associated with liability and fault, requiring an additional 
amount of guidance from the Liability Convention.979  Although the Liability Convention 
provided more effective guidelines, it was not perfect and contained gaps and 
limitations.980 The lack of clarity regarding the term “space object”981 leads to the 
confusion of whether space debris falls within the provided definition.982 Additionally, the 
Liability Convention cannot cover cases that involve debris that cannot be attributed to a 
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specific space object or nation-state.983 Therefore, its inability to provide support or 
solutions regarding damage caused by unattributable debris is a significant gap within 
space law.984 The gaps identified further support the case studies’ conclusion, stressing the 
inability of the OST to prevent future conflict. 
2. Weaponization of Space 
The analysis provided in the weaponization of space case study led to the 
conclusion that the OST failed to predict the increase in space weapon technology or offer 
adequate guidelines to prevent the weaponization of space. Although certain articles could 
be interpreted as covering some of the current space weaponization issues, they are not all 
encompassing and leave too much to interpretation to adequately prevent conflict in the 
21st century. Significant gaps within the OST contribute to its inability to cover the 
concerns presented by the weaponization of space.  
The most troublesome gap in the OST is its lack of clarification of the term “space 
weapon.” The weaponization of space case study identified Articles I, IV, VI, and IX of 
the OST as possible provisions to address issues that could arise if nations continue to 
develop, test, and fund offensive and defensive space weapons. Article IV “prohibits 
placing nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction into orbit or 
permanently affixing them to a celestial body.”985  The limitation with Article IV is “that 
it only bans weapons of mass destruction (WMD) from orbit;”986 it fails to consider the 
various ground, air, and sea-based weapons that could be deployed against satellites or, 
even worse, against their ground-control elements.987 Another concern is the OST “does 
not explicitly prohibit the placement or use of other types of weapons.”988 For example, 
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the OST does not cover Earth-based weapons, such as ASATs that can target satellites.989  
Additionally, Jinyuan Su identifies another gap within the OST regarding its inability to 
prevent an arms race in outer space.990  Another gap and issue of concern is the OST’s 
failure to provide guidelines regarding dual-use technologies in outer space.991 Some argue 
that dual-use satellites are considered weapons in space, others suggest “that no weapons 
have been placed in outer space.”992 The gaps identified further support the case studies’ 
conclusion, stressing the inability of the OST to prevent future conflict. 
3. Asteroid and Moon Mining Case Study 
The analysis provided in the asteroid and Moon mining case study led to the 
conclusion that although certain articles could provide clarification to cover current and 
future asteroid and Moon mining issues, the treaty itself is not all encompassing and leaves 
too much to interpretation to adequately prevent conflict in the 21st century. Significant 
gaps within the OST contribute to its inability to cover the concerns presented with future 
space mining missions. 
The most obvious gap in the OST is the lack of any clearly defined guidelines for 
commercial activities, such as space mining.993 Jill Stuart discusses the importance of the 
OST, but clearly believes it is failing in the modern era due to its primary focus on countries 
only and its little consideration for commercial interests in space.994 The asteroid and 
Moon mining case study identified Articles I, II, VI of the OST as including possible 
provisions to address the future concerns that could arise with commercial space mining 
missions. Specifically, Article VI is considered one of the only articles that establishes a 
“foundation on which any laws or regulations regarding commercial space activity are 
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erected.”995  This provision of the “treaty makes states responsible for the activities of 
nongovernmental entities, requiring authorization and continuing supervision of space 
activities by commercial enterprise.”996 This could be considered problematic due to the 
concept of direct attribution.997  During the creation of the OST, commercial interests were 
not a priority (as few existed then), therefore “the treaty made every nation directly 
responsible for any activities its citizens engaged in above Earth.”998 Thus, the treaty is 
missing clearly defined guidelines “for regulating and managing commercial actors in 
space.”999  Joanne Gabrynowicz mentions that “nongovernmental agencies is [sic] only 
stated once and because of that oversight, there is no U.S. agency with jurisdiction of on-
orbit activity. That’s a big gap in the law.”1000 The gaps identified further support the case 
studies’ conclusion, stressing the inability of the OST to prevent future conflict. 
C. POTENTIAL POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The outcomes of the OST analyses present a challenge to the future of space law 
and governance. The findings here conclude that the OST is not all encompassing and it 
likely cannot cover several emerging problems, therefore increasing the likelihood for 
conflicts to occur in the 21st century. With never-ending wars continuing to plague nations 
on Earth, it is essential that these conflicts do not reach into outer space. Therefore, it is 
important to discuss policy recommendations that could aid in addressing concerns 
associated with space debris, the weaponization of space, and the future of space mining. 
This section will provide short-term policy recommendations for each case study, with the 
hope that in the long term, the future of space activities will find a global solution because 
“any considerable effort to close the existing gaps in international space law must include 
measures to build confidence and transparency among states.”1001  
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1. Space Debris: Policy Recommendations 
Situational awareness is a key aspect of preventing conjunctions from occurring in 
outer space. As mentioned in the space debris case study in the threat section, the 
challenging aspect of space debris is those debris that are too small to be tracked.1002 
NASA believes that “there are millions of pieces of debris that are so small they can’t be 
tracked,”1003 but could damage a spacecraft due their velocity of roughly 17,500 mph.1004 
Currently, no international organization exists to track space debris and the inherent 
responsibility lies with each nation.1005 The United States Air Force’s Joint Space 
Operation Center (JSpOC) “maintains the most complete catalog of objects in orbit”1006 
and when necessary (i.e., risk of collision) it shares that information with the affected 
parties.1007 One possible course of action to lower the risk of future collisions would be to 
create an international “space traffic control”1008 agency dedicated to tracking debris in 
outer space. First, the United States could begin transferring the responsibility of tracking 
non-military space debris in LEO from the military to commercial space companies. This 
transfer of responsibility would not remove the military from the business of tracking 
debris, but rather it would allow the military to focus on other areas of concern in space. 
For example, a potential commercial company that would have the technological capability 
to alleviate some of the load from JSpOC is LeoLabs. LeoLabs was created with the 
dedicated mission “to provide high resolution data on objects in LEO by offering 
foundational mapping data and services to mitigate the risks of collisions.”1009  In the past 
the technology capable of providing space situational awareness (SSA) was not available 
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in the commercial sector nor was there a competitive market or interest in this mission. But 
as this technology becomes more readily available, commercial companies are seeing the 
potential for profit in SSA capabilities. Additionally, the current Trump administration 
proposed a plan to transfer the role from the Air Force to the Commerce Department.1010 
The administration wants this agency to not only track space debris but “devise new, best 
practices to coordinate the coming profusion of thousands more commercial platforms 
operating in space.”1011 Outreach to commercial SSA companies, like LeoLabs, could help 
build a robust network for more effective space traffic management. The proposed 
organizational structure is to have JSpOC responsible for tracking military space objects, 
the Department of Commerce become a civil/commercial JSpOC, and the commercial SSA 
companies would be available to the public (i.e., other commercial satellite companies or 
Department of Commerce). This could potentially alleviate the concern with data-sharing, 
especially in support to the Liability Convention. Currently, JSpOC is the only entity that 
could provide tracking data to help adjudicate cases of debris or satellite damage that might 
be brought by State Parties under the Liability Convention. This is problematic because the 
JSpOC, as a U.S. military entity, is not likely to be viewed as a neutral party. By sharing 
the tracking responsibility, the proposed system would allow injured parties raising cases 
under the Liability Convention to access public data via commercial SSA companies to 
assist in enforcing awards for damages. The 2010 United States National Space Policy 
specifically mentioned, under international cooperation, that the U.S. should “lead in the 
enhancement of security, stability, and responsible behavior in space.”1012 This would not 
be an overnight transition, but a gradual transition over the next few years. Additionally, 
this policy recommendation has the potential to “build confidence and trust”1013 within the 
international community. If the United States can help provide a system of space debris 
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tracking that allows data sharing to be more accessible to the world, this would show the 
international community the U.S. dedication to continuing to pursue global solutions to 
ensuring the safety of all assets in space as well as promoting responsible behaviors in 
space.  
A second area of concern relates to the adequacy of existing guidelines for de-
orbiting of satellites. The Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC), 
“the international organization dedicated to addressing concerns regarding man-made and 
natural debris in space,”1014 issued guidelines in an “effort to provide recommendations to 
mitigate debris.”1015 One of the guiding principles in this document stated “this IADC and 
some other studies and a number of existing national guidelines have found 25 years to be 
a reasonable and appropriate lifetime limit.”1016 However, on May 24, 2018, Lisa Kuo, 
commercial programs and business development head for the Aerospace Corporation, 
challenged this all-encompassing rule when she asked participants at the Space Tech Expo 
, “What is the optimal lifespace for a satellite?”1017 Answers to the question suggested 
“customers want everything from CubeSats built for six-month missions to geostationary 
communications satellites designed to last decades.”1018 But, Brian Roberts, a robotic 
technologist at NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center, “suggested ten years was the 
optimum lifespace for a satellite.”1019 Therefore, the proposed 25 years in the “IADC 
Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines” needs to be reviewed and further studied to verify if 
25 years is a sufficient recommendation. This policy is targeted at addressing the current 
needs of a diversifying space market.1020 According to Michael Gabor, SSL (formerly 
Space Systems/Loral, LLC) advanced programs director, “trying to look for a one-size-
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fits-all solution is probably the wrong thing to do,”1021 so this policy has the potential to 
create more specific guidelines regarding de-orbiting based on the missions or size of the 
satellite.1022  
2. Weaponization of Space: Policy Recommendations 
Two rather promising, yet imperfect mechanisms have been presented to the 
international community to prevent the weaponization of space – the Russia-China PPWT 
and the International Code of Conduct (formerly known as the EU Code of Conduct). The 
United States has failed to support either of these proposals. In 2008, U.S. Ambassador 
Christine Rocca provided a point-by-point rebuttal of the PPWT and staunchly said “we 
continue to believe that there is no arms race in space, and therefore no problems for arms 
control to solve.”1023 But, U.S. Ambassador Rocca failed to propose any innovative ideas 
to replace the PPWT.1024 Although these proposals have provisions within them that are 
extremely flawed, the United States has yet to provide any substantial alternative to either 
of these proposals. The United States, as a world leader in space, has the unique opportunity 
to shape a future framework of stability and longevity in the use of outer space. In this 
regard, it is better served by providing positive solutions rather than just criticism: i.e., to 
propose new concepts to strengthen existing proposals or to offer new regulations aimed 
at the prevention of weaponization. For example, the United States could propose a 
moratorium to China and Russia to ban ASAT tests against one’s own systems as well as 
those of other nations. During this moratorium, the United States could initiate discussions 
with Russia, China, and other space-faring nations to discuss possible revisions of the 
PPWT or adopting restraint-based rules of the road for outer space which were proposed 
in the International Code of Conduct. By initiating discussions and providing positive 
solutions, the United States has the potential to promote trust and constructive discussion 
moving forward amongst space-faring nations aimed at fulfilling the U.S. goal of 
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“promoting responsible behavior”1025 in space, as well as showing its commitment to 
preventing outer space from becoming weaponized.  
Weaponizing space is a complex issue that is going to need the international 
community to work together in order to prevent outer space from becoming another 
warfighting domain. The OST “only bans nuclear weapons and weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) from orbit,”1026 but it does not consider the various ground-, air-, and 
sea-based weapons that could be deployed against satellites or, even worse, against their 
ground-control elements.1027 The OST is often criticized for “its ill-defined use of the term 
‘weapon’ within its provisions.”1028 Since almost anything in outer space can be used as a 
weapon, the lack of a standing legal agreement defining space weapons increases the risk 
for conflict.1029 Therefore, there is a need to settle the debate on what exactly is a space 
weapon. Rather than have a strict definition, this thesis proposes a policy dedicated to the 
concept of prohibiting nefarious behaviors, rather than specific weapons. This 
recommendation could alleviate the concerns with dual-use satellites and technology. 
Within the next 1–2 years, the United States should propose a multilateral agreement 
amongst space-faring nations to ban dual-use technology from being used to conduct 
nefarious activities in space, with the long-term goal of one day having an internationally 
accepted treaty preventing these behaviors in space, supported by an international 
verification mechanism. Some of the potential dual-use areas to be covered could include 
satellites with robotic arms or laser capabilities. Satellites that have been designed with a 
robotic arm are most likely conducting servicing activities and may be used on future space 
debris removal missions but, potentially, in a time of conflict, they could maneuver close 
to an adversary satellite, grab it, and either cause damage or push it so that it tumbles out 
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of position.1030 This multilateral agreement would prohibit the use of the robotic arm 
against other nations’ satellites, but not ban the arm itself. The long-term goal would be to 
have an actual treaty via UN COPUOS on detailing dual-use behaviors that could be 
considered nefarious and would be subject to sanctions or other punishments if violated. 
Additionally, NASA recently “conducted a study on the feasibility of using power-
constrained pulsed lasers to remove virtually all dangerous orbital debris in the range of 
one to ten centimeters between 400 and 1100 kilometers in altitude.”1031 Again, a laser 
could be used to cause damage to a satellite but, banning the use of lasers against spacecraft, 
including the testing on one’s own satellites, could alleviate the concern. Additionally, 
within these guidelines it would be essential that if a dual-use technology was used to 
damage another nation’s satellite, that spacecraft would no longer be protected, and a 
foreign country would have an inherent right to treat that spacecraft as a legitimate target. 
3. Asteroid and Moon Mining: Policy Recommendations 
Asteroid and Moon mining present the world with a new challenge in regard to 
space law. The international community should be proactive and take this unique 
opportunity presented to them to start the process either of defining specific agreements or 
establishing norms for exploitation and mining missions. Space mining is still in the 
beginning stages and results most likely will not be seen until 2030, which means there are 
more than 10 years to develop a solution to future concerns associated with mining.1032 
With this in mind, the United States might be well served to get ahead of the process and 
instigate talks with Russia and China to re-evaluate and discuss the Moon Treaty. 
Currently, the U.S., Russia, and China “have neither signed, acceded, nor ratified the Moon 
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Treaty.”1033 Thus, if a new treaty were to be agreed upon, it would be seen as a significant 
achievement for international space law. In the short term, these countries could adopt 
certain principles of the treaty to help establish best practices or norms for mining, with the 
long-term goal of conducting a full reevaluation of the treaty in order to target the 
provisions that cause the most debate. The first provision the United States, Russia, and 
China could discuss for possible adoption in the short-term might be Article 5 of the Moon 
Treaty, which states: 
State Parties shall inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations as 
well as the public and international scientific community, to the greatest 
extent feasible and practicable, of their activities concerned with the 
exploration and use of the Moon. Information on the time, purposes, 
locations, orbital parameters, and duration shall be given in respect of each 
mission to the Moon as soon as possible after launch.1034 
This article could easily be implemented into a licensing process for companies looking to 
mine in outer space. For example, Moon Express would provide in detail to the United 
States government, or assigned agency within, the specific requirements requested in 
Article 5, which would then be provided to the Secretary-General of the UN. This 
compliance could be considered a sign of good faith to other countries that might be 
worried that space mining activities may interfere with their space programs. Additionally, 
the treaty discusses the establishment of “an international regime by the State Parties of the 
treaty,”1035 which should be considered and addressed in the short-term discussions. It is 
essential, much like the Liability Convention was created to provide an amplification and 
arena to handle claims and liability for damage caused by space activities, that an 
international regime be created to monitor and provide guidance on future space mining 
activities. But, in the long-term, the responsibilities provided in the Moon Treaty for this 
international regime would need to be reevaluated and re-proposed, so that everyone is in 
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agreeance. For these discussions, it may be more beneficial for the United States, China, 
and Russia to invite other nations likely to become involved in near-term space mining to 
the table to draft some sort of responsibilities for this international regime.  
 Space lawyers, such as Joanne Gabrynowiz, state “that new legislation and 
regulation is the only plausible avenue for modernizing legal framework in outer space 
right now.”1036 She is referring to national legislation to fill the gaps that international 
space law has yet to address adequately.1037 In the past few years, the United States and 
Luxembourg have passed national laws to support and provide guidelines for the 
commercial industry. As part of this process, the United States will need to create a 
supervising authority specifically for space mining or Moon landings.1038 Because the 
United States has yet to create or task an existing agency, it could be challenged by other 
State Parties to the OST for the lack of supervising authority for space mining activities, 
which could be interpreted as a U.S. failure to follow Article VI of the OST.1039 
Additionally, in order to prevent the problem of multiple countries enacting their own 
forms of national legislation--which could lead to potential disputes in the future--the 
United States should reach out to State Parties in the OST and begin initiating discussions, 
recommending that interested countries enact mirroring space mining legislation. By 
enacting very similar national legislation, these processes may have firmer legal standing 
and promote the development of best practices, which could eventually lead to a treaty. 
Since the United States and Luxembourg have already adopted legislation, it is essential 
that both countries are willing to support (or discuss) new rules or guidelines that other 
countries bring to the table as they create similar regulation.  
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D. CONCLUSION 
More than fifty years ago, the OST “established the foundations for the exploration 
and use of outer space.”1040 Emerging concerns and new space activities in the 21st century 
have presented new challenges for the OST. Although the treaty has worked thus far, this 
thesis shows that the OST will not be able to cover many possible concerns that may come 
with space debris, weaponization of space, and space mining. This thesis asked the 
question: Can the Outer Space Treaty Prevent Conflicts in Orbit in the 21st Century? The 
short answer is no. Recently, Secretary of Defense James N. Mattis addressed the way 
forward and solving the issues with outer space, declaring  
you break the problem down into bite-sized pieces, because you understand 
we’ve got to solve space. You know, that – that provides zero fidelity for 
what we have to do, but you have to do it, break down everything from what 
is our strategy? What are our arms control of it – almost call it initiatives 
for space? What are we doing to set the strategic framework there?1041  
Secretary of Defense Mattis’s concept of creating “initiatives for space,”1042 is essential to 
the way forward for regulating current and emerging space activities. Furthermore, 
breaking space up into manageable areas and assigning issue-specific guidelines for each 
individual area of concern could assist in developing regulations for current and emerging 
space problems.1043 Currently, without further legal agreements to elaborate on space 
debris, the weaponization of space, and asteroid and Moon mining, the OST as it stands 
will not be able to adequately prevent conflict in the 21st century. Therefore, the time for 
creative approaches and positive U.S. engagement is now.  
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